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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Highway bulk package design elements have a substantial effect on the probability 
and quantity of release if a vehicle transporting hazardous materials (a.k.a. hazmat, dangerous 
goods) is involved in an accident.  However, the ability to statistically quantify bulk package 
performance is constrained due to insufficient reliable information about the number of 
accidents, nature and severity of damages, frequency and severity of releases, and design 
specifications of involved packages.   This thesis identifies necessary elements of an accident 
reporting system to collect sufficient information to evaluate U.S. DOT-specified hazardous 
materials bulk package accident performance.  Such a data collection program would enable 
private and public sector organizations to better inform their risk management efforts 
including choice of package design, hazardous material routing decisions, or general 
understanding of the risk associated with various business activities.  
In the context of collision-caused accidental releases, current practices for 
conducting quantitative risk analyses are reviewed.  These mainly consist of route-selection 
analyses that compare the expected risk on alternative routes.   Many current practices use 
the most basic expression of risk: a product of the probability of a release event and the 
resulting consequences; however, there is a growing trend to expand the basic risk equation 
to account for differences in bulk package performance.   The probability that a release will 
occur given that the bulk package has been involved in an accident, or conditional 
probability of release (CPR), is a potential metric to assess bulk package safety performance.  
Two methods are developed to incorporate CPR regression equations into the risk model: 
(1) a generalized risk model assuming independence of the CPR estimate for each roadway 
type, accident scenario and bulk package component, and (2) a route-specific risk model that 
accounts for route-specific information for each accident scenario – roadway type – bulk 
package component combination. 
Information needed to assess CPR is identified by surveying potential database users, 
and reviewing cargo tank classifications and specifications, industry practices, existing data 
collection methodologies, risk analysis strategies, container performance studies, and cargo 
tank accident investigations.   This study identifies data fields in the following categories: 
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bulk package design information, basic commodity information, bulk container damage 
information, and basic accident information.   
Several options for recording cargo tank performance in accidents are considered.  
An industry-sponsored extension of an existing program with voluntary participation was 
found to be the most desirable, but a government-sponsored mandatory program was 
identified as the most feasible.  The U.S. DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety 
Administration (PHMSA) Hazardous Materials Information Reporting System (HMIRS) was 
determined to be the most appropriate existing program to extend because it collects about 
70% of the desired information.  This could be achieved by modifying the existing Form 
DOT F 5800.1 to collect additional data or by importing the necessary information from 
Form DOT F 5800.1 and requesting additional information separately.   Technical 
implementation and security methods required for such a data collection program are 
explored in further detail. 
Data from National Transportation Safety Board accident reports, PHMSA HMIRS 
reports, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration Motor Carrier Management 
Information System reports and news articles are used to populate a prototype database.  
Using these data, the time required to collect sufficient incident data to support reasonable 
statistical analyses was determined.  Based on a calculated rate of 132 accidents and 34 
releases per month and assuming an accident-reporting rate of 20%, the database is expected 
to have a sufficient number of records to test basic hypotheses within two years of program 
implementation.  The information in the prototype database was analyzed.  Damage was 
observed to most likely occur to the top front passenger-side tank shell (from rollover 
accidents) and to the piping and/or undercarriage below the tank (from collisions).  
Crushing damage to the tank shell, including dents, was shown to be the most prevalent type 
of damage; however, it is the least likely to result in a release of hazardous materials.   
Barriers to implementing a successful accident database are identified and 
approaches to overcoming them suggested.   These challenges are categorized as barriers 
associated with implementation, participation, obtaining data and database maintenance 
costs.  Many of these concerns have already been addressed by the rail industry in their 
implementation of the Tank Car Accident Database (TCAD).   Ultimately the success of an 
accident damage data collection system will require overcoming all of the potential 
institutional barriers.        
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION1  
 
1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this research was to consider the development and implementation 
of an accident-reporting database system to collect information on the nature and extent of 
damage to U.S. DOT-specified hazardous materials bulk packages damaged in accidents as 
well as the characteristics of the accidents.  The database would enable better quantification 
of hazardous materials transportation risk, assessment of bulk package performance, 
identification of possible design improvements, estimation of their effectiveness, and 
evaluation of the effectiveness of current and proposed regulation. 
1.2 Motivation and Background 
Chemicals and petroleum products play an essential role in many aspects of modern 
industrialized society.  Large quantities of these products are transported from points of 
production to points of consumption via all modes, including highways, railways, waterways, 
pipelines, and, in small amounts, via air (American Chemistry Council 2010).  Many of these 
products have the potential to harm people, property or the environment if they are released 
in transport.    In recognition of the potential hazard, the U.S. Department of Transportation 
(DOT) has developed extensive regulations governing the safe transport of these materials.  
A total of 2.2 billion annual tons of hazardous materials were transported in the United 
States in 2007 (Duych et al. 2011).   Much of the long distance transport of hazardous 
material is by rail, which account for 28.5% of ton-miles shipped, while highway transport 
accounts for only 19% of interstate ton-miles.  However, highway transport is more 
                                                          
1 Parts of this chapter were developed to fulfill the requirements of the 
Transportation Research Board (TRB)’s Hazardous Materials Cooperative Research Program 
(HMCRP) project HM-07 entitled “Accident Performance Data of Bulk Packages Used for 
Hazardous Materials Transportation.”   This section appears as part of Chapter 1 in HM-07’s 
final deliverable which was published in 2013.   
Philip J. Daum, P.E., Christopher P. L. Barkan, Ph.D., M. Rapik Saat, Ph.D., and 
Laura E. Ghosh, 2013.  Feasibility Study for Highway Hazardous Materials Bulk Package 
Accident Performance Data Collection. Hazardous Materials Cooperative Research Program 
(HMCRP) Report 10, Transportation Research Board. Washington, DC. 
 2 
 
commonly used for regional and local transportation and delivery.  Although interstate 
trucks only account for 13% of intrastate ton-miles, they account for 45% of the total tons 
shipped, which is more than any other mode.   Many of these local and regional shipments 
occur in more developed regions of the country where highways are more congested and 
adjacent areas are more densely populated.  Compared to other modes, the consequences of 
a release from a truck’s bulk package may be greater because of the proximity of drivers and 
passengers in other vehicles sharing the roadway, pedestrians walking adjacent to roads, and 
individual homes and businesses located along the roadside.    
Among the DOT regulations are detailed specifications for the type and design of 
bulk packages used to transport hazardous materials.  These specifications apply to a range 
of different portable tanks, cargo tank trailers, and cargo tank motor vehicles.  Tank 
specifications and designs are intended to be commensurate with the hazards posed by the 
various products, with more damage-resistant designs required for more hazardous products.  
These regulations and specifications result in a generally safe record of highway transport.  
Nevertheless, when accident-caused releases occur, questions may arise regarding the 
adequacy of current package designs and how their safety might be improved.  Furthermore, 
private and public sector organizations may be interested in quantifying the risk associated 
with highway shipment of hazardous materials so that they can better inform their risk 
management efforts including choice of package design, hazardous materials routing 
decisions, or general understanding of the risk associated with various business activities.   
Package design elements have a substantial effect on the probability and quantity of 
release if a vehicle transporting hazardous materials is involved in an accident.  This is 
implicit in the regulatory differences in package specifications required for different types of 
hazardous materials.  Yet, in spite of the need to understand the relationship between 
hazardous materials bulk-package, safety-design features and their performance in accidents, 
the quantitative understanding of these relationships is quite limited.  This is primarily due to 
insufficient reliable data regarding the number of hazardous materials bulk packages 
involved in accidents, the design specifications of the packages involved in these accidents, 
the nature and severity of the damages the packages incurred, and the frequency and severity 
of releases.  Although a variety of highway safety and accident data are collected by private 
companies, local, state and federal government agencies, and other organizations, these data 
do not provide a satisfactory basis for the type of analysis described above.  The overarching 
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goal of this study was to address these data gaps by determining the types of data already 
being recorded, the types of data needed, and identifying possible new data and data 
collection systems that would be needed to satisfactorily address the various pertinent 
questions.  
This study presents an approach to the development and implementation of an 
accident-reporting database system to collect information on the nature and extent of 
damage to U.S. DOT-specified hazardous materials bulk packages damaged in accidents as 
well as the characteristics of the accidents.  The objectives of this study were to (1) 
determine which data are needed to develop a satisfactory database, (2) develop 
methodologies for systematic collection of the necessary safety design performance data, (3) 
identify methodologies to analyze cargo tank accident performance using these data, and (4) 
identify and evaluate the institutional barriers to development of such a database and 
approaches to overcoming them. 
1.3 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters including an introduction, conclusion and 
six chapters within the body in which the following questions are addressed:  
 Chapter 2 - How does bulk package accident performance relate to the risk of 
transporting hazardous materials? 
 Chapter 3 - What information is needed to assess bulk package accident 
performance?  
 Chapter 4 - Which data collection methodologies are possible, preferred, and/or 
most feasible?  
 Chapter 5 – What technical aspects should be considered during 
implementation?  What quality of data can be expected from the implementation 
of such a data collection system? How much time would be required to collect 
sufficient incident data to support reliable statistical analyses?  
 Chapter 6 – What institutional barriers need to be addressed to implement such a 
data collection system? 
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1.3.1 An Overview of the Risk of Transporting Hazardous Materials (Chapter 2) 
The purpose of this chapter was to discuss how bulk package accident performance 
relates to the risk of transporting hazardous materials, explain the importance of developing 
estimates of the conditional probability of release (CPR), and illustrate how collected data 
might be used to estimate the CPR.       
1.3.2 Information Needed to Assess Bulk Package Accident Performance  
(Chapter 3) 
The purpose of this chapter was is to identify design parameters that may affect bulk 
package accident performance and evaluate variables needed to develop more accurate risk 
estimates.  These include design information that is not currently collected, information that 
describes the accident environment (such as in which accident scenarios the bulk package 
has been involved), and information needed for database administrative purposes.   An 
effort was made to qualitatively understand the influence of a particular variable on whether 
a bulk package survives the accident intact and the amount of effort required in collecting 
such information.  The evaluation favored variables that, while marginally are not as accurate 
at explaining performance, may be more feasible to collect.   
1.3.3 Data Collection Methodologies (Chapter 4) 
The purpose of this chapter was to identify possible data collection methodologies, 
and select the methodology most likely to be successfully implemented.  This depends 
largely on the willingness of participants to provide data, the ability of the sponsoring 
organization(s) to cover its costs and the ability of the resulting analyses to relate to other 
factors affecting risk.  For example, developing CPR estimates for a rollover accident 
scenario may not be appropriate to use in a risk analysis that does not distinguish between 
different accident scenarios.     
An additional purpose of this chapter was to present implementation strategies that 
will ensure data integrity and security.   This is important if analysts wish to develop accurate 
explanatory or predictive models.  Incomplete records must either be removed from the data 
used to develop the model or missing variables must be approximated.  Incorrect records 
introduce unnecessary noise into the dataset and may be difficult for analysts to filter.    In 
addition, ensuring data security is important should the sponsoring organization wish to 
either protect data from malicious individuals or the keep the information confidential.   
 5 
 
1.3.4 Bulk Package Accident Data Collection Program Pilot Study (Chapter 5) 
The purpose of this chapter was to describe a pilot study to explore the collection of 
accident damage data, evaluate the expected quality of data, demonstrate the types of 
analyses facilitated by the database and estimate how long it would take to collect incident 
data sufficient to support reasonable statistical analyses.    The information provided in this 
chapter can aid the sponsoring organization(s) in the planning and implementation of a 
successful data collection program as it tests the challenges of data collection and provides 
recommendations for improving reporting efficiency and data collection quality.   In 
addition to the objective described above, the pilot study provided a preliminary 
understanding of the performance of certain components under various accident scenarios.   
1.3.5 Institutional Barriers (Chapter 6) 
The purpose of this chapter was to identify industry concerns and institutional 
barriers to be addressed in order to implement a successful data collection program.  The 
chapter also suggested some approaches to overcoming them.  These barriers often result 
from established regulatory processes and procedures as well as concerns with costs, risks 
and benefits incurred by program participants.  
Some regulatory processes and procedures may slow the implementation process or 
prevent data collection.  Their early identification will allow implementation of such a 
program to proceed in a streamlined manner as multiple hurdles can be addressed at the 
same time.  For example, an extension of DOT Form F 5800.1 would likely require a multi-
year implementation process.  During the same timeframe, a national program may be 
initiated to encourage police responders to take photos of bulk packages involved in 
accidents.   
Concerns with costs, risks and benefits incurred by program participants must also 
be overcome in order to have a successful data collection program.  Although there are 
differences between highway and rail hazardous materials transportation industries, a 
reasonable basis for evaluating these concerns can be extrapolated from the Railway Supply 
Institute (RSI) – Association of American Railroads (AAR) Tank Car Accident Database 
(TCAD).   The rail industry sponsors of the database believe it has been successful and 
effective.  Differences and parallels between the two industries with respect to such a 
database are discussed.   
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CHAPTER 2 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE RISK OF TRANSPORTING  
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS  
2.1 Basic Risk Equations used in Quantitative Risk Assessments and Route 
Analyses 
Hazardous materials transportation may pose risk to individuals and ecosystems in 
the event of a release.  The degree of this threat is typically evaluated using quantitative risk 
analyses, which combines the probability of a hazardous materials release (P) and the 
resulting consequence (C) (equation 2.1).   
         (2.1) 
In the realm of hazardous materials transportation, there are multiple scenarios that 
can result in the release of hazardous materials including: 
 accident-caused releases such as those resulting from bulk packages being unable 
to withstand impacts of a crash or derailment 
 non-accident-caused releases such as during loading and unloading   
 accidental releases resulting from exposure to fire 
 intentional releases such as terrorist and other malicious activities  
In this chapter we focus on developing risk estimates pertaining to accident-caused 
releases due to highway collisions.  Models quantifying this risk have focused primarily on 
operations research approaches that quantify the risk of specific routes and determine the 
optimal route choice given various conditions and objective functions (Ak and Bozkaya 
2008, Bubbico et al. 2004, Centrone et al. 2011, Chakrabarti and Parikh 2011, Chakrabarti 
and Parikh 2011[2], Dadkar et al. 2008, Erkut and Verter 1998, Erkut and Ingolfsson 2005, 
Erkut and Alp 2007, Guo and Verma 2010,  Guo 2010, Harwood et al. 1993,  Huang et al. 
2005, Jin and Batta 1997, Kara et al. 2003, Noick et al. 1997, Wijeratne et al. 1993, Zheng 
2010).      
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Equation 2.1 can be used to estimate the release risk at a particular location.  When 
considering the risk of transporting hazardous material over a segment of roadway the 
probability of a release event is usually calculated in terms of occurrences per million miles 
and the number of miles traveled.  Quantitative estimates of segment specific accident rate 
may be developed based on data for particular routes, or more general highway attributes 
that are applied to various portions of a route as appropriate.  Exposure estimates can be 
determined based on the national commodity flow surveys, or, in a route-specific analysis, by 
the expected number of miles traveled by the bulk container(s).   
As noted in Harwood et al. (1993), many route selection methodologies assume “that 
hazmat releases are equally likely in all accidents”.   Therefore, the probability of an accident 
has been widely used in lieu of calculating the conditional probability of a release event given 
an accident.  Although many accidents involving highway hazardous materials bulk packages 
do not actually result in a release, this practice continues even with more recent routing 
analyses (Bubbico et al. 2004, Dadkar et al. 2008, Erkut and Alp 2007, Guo and Verma 2010,  
Guo 2010, Jin and Batta 1997, Kara et al. 2003, Zheng 2010).  This practice does not take 
into account the myriad of factors that can affect the probability of release including package 
design, roadway type and accident speed.  It almost certainly overestimates risk in general 
and does not permit accurate estimates of location-specific risk.  The accident rate is usually 
estimated using historical accident information such as that gathered by individual states or 
contained in Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) Motor Carrier 
Management Information System (MCMIS).  The most widely used probabilities of 
accidents are those developed by Harwood et al. (1993) (Table 2.1).   
The consequences of a release are a function of the amount of material released, its 
physicochemical and toxicological properties, combined with the population density, 
property and environmental conditions and characteristics at the release location.  A simpler 
approach typically used in various risk analyses focuses on the number of people residing 
within the hazardous materials’ evacuation perimeter (Bubbico et al. 2004; Dadkar et al. 
2006; Erkut and Alp 2007; Guo and Verma 2010; and Guo 2010).  This is particularly 
evident in most operations research route selection analyses which tend to use “static 
estimates of accident probabilities and consequences” (Erkut and Alp 2007).  Due to these 
generalizations, these models tend to select routes so as to minimize population exposure.   
Alternatively, some studies have attempted to quantify 
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Table 2.1 Harwood et al. (1993) Truck Accident Rates  
Highway Class 
Truck Accident Rate  
(Accidents per Million Vehicle-Miles) 
Area 
Type Roadway Type California Illinois Michigan 
Weighted 
Average 
Rural Two-lane 0.66 1.21 0.83 0.85 
Rural Multilane Undivided 2.10 0.82 3.67 1.73 
Rural Multilane Divided 0.47 1.85 2.19 0.83 
Rural Freeway 0.21 0.18 0.45 0.25 
Urban Two-lane 1.63 4.29 4.22 3.34 
Urban Multilane Undivided 5.03 6.58 4.00 5.37 
Urban Multilane Divided 1.35 5.72 4.09 4.82 
Urban One-way street 2.55 10.18 3.12 3.75 
Urban Freeway 0.62 2.25 1.08 0.84 
 
consequences based on average costs (Desai et al. 2010; Deng et al. 2010).  These may 
include emergency response and remediation expenses, repair expenses, and costs associated 
with casualties resulting from the hazardous materials release.   
2.1.1 Extending the Definition of Highway Transport Risk 
Such methods of generating risk estimates may be sufficient for route selection 
models but they do not account for large potential sources of variance depending on the 
commodity and the container in which it is shipped (Brown et al. 2000).  Attempts to more 
accurately estimate hazardous materials transportation risk have led to use of the probability 
of a release given that an accident has occurred, or conditional probability of release (CPR)( 
Ak and Bozkaya 2008, Centrone et al. 2011, Chakrabarti and Parikh 2011, Chakrabarti and 
Parikh 2011[2], Erkut and Verter 1998, Erkut and Ingolfsson 2005, Harwood et al. 1993,  
Huang et al. 2005, Noick et al. 1997, Wijeratne et al. 1993).  These CPR estimates have been 
incorporated into quantitative risk assessment methodologies using Bayes’ Theorem such 
that the probability of a release is represented by the product of the probability of an 
accident (   ) and the probability of a release given that an accident has occurred ( (   ) ) 
(equation 2.2). 
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                ∑[        (   )     ]
 
   
 (2.2) 
 
Where:  
              = the risk due to a release of hazardous materials along a particular 
route. 
i = the ith link in a route.   
m = the total number of links in a route.   
   = an exposure estimate.  It may represent the length, in number of miles, of link i.  
Alternatively, if assessing the annual risk, it may represent the product of the 
length of link i and the number of times the route traversed in a year. 
    = the probability of an accident. 
 (   )  = on the i
th link, the probability of a release given that an accident has 
occurred, or CPR.  Therefore,    (   )  corresponds to the events on the i
th 
link in which the vehicle is involved in an accident but does not result in a 
release.   
   = the consequences of the release on the i
th link. 
 
CPR is a function of the damage incurred during an accident and the bulk package’s 
ability to withstand that damage.  It is independent of the probability of an accident 
occurring and the consequences of a release.   Rudimentary CPR estimates, such as those 
provided by Harwood et al. (1993) (Table 2.2), compare the total number of releases 
(numerator) to the total number of accidents involving hazardous materials (denominator).  
Both variables can be computed using FMCSA’s MCMIS or state-specific datasets.    
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Table 2.2 Harwood et al. (1993) Probabilities of Release Given that an Accident 
Occurred as a Function of Highway Class  
Highway Class 
Probability of a Hazardous Materials Release  
Given an Accident 
Area 
Type Roadway Type California Illinois Michigan 
Weighted 
Average 
Rural Two-lane 0.100 0.074 0.073 0.086 
Rural Multilane Undivided 0.100 0.071 0.064 0.081 
Rural Multilane Divided 0.087 0.064 0.062 0.082 
Rural Freeway 0.083 0.111 0.095 0.090 
Urban Two-lane 0.077 0.059 0.069 0.069 
Urban Multilane Undivided 0.064 0.052 0.055 0.055 
Urban Multilane Divided 0.068 0.048 0.058 0.062 
Urban One-way street 0.066 0.050 0.056 0.056 
Urban Freeway 0.062 0.055 0.067 0.062 
 
2.2 Reduce CPR  By Improving Bulk Package Performance 
Risk-based research on highway transport of hazardous materials has been focusing 
on alternative route selection.  As a result, research on factors affecting CPR have been 
limited to roadway classification, accident type and bulk package specification.   Further risk-
reduction could be accomplished by employing historical hazardous materials accident data 
to identify opportunities for improved bulk package design.  This not only increases the 
ability of the bulk package to withstand damage incurred in an accident, but also may reduce 
the amount of material released.   However, an extensive review of current data collection 
practices revealed that available bulk package information is generally insufficient to evaluate 
CPR (refer to Chapter 3).  Furthermore, where data are collected, existing databases suffer 
from underreporting, which, as noted by Batelle Memorial Institute (2009) and Trépanier et 
al. (2009), may introduce considerable uncertainty into estimates of CPR.  Care should be 
taken when using small subsets of datasets for estimation. 
2.2.1 Bulk Package Performance Evaluations 
Two variables in Equation 2.2 relate directly to bulk package performance: the CPR 
and the quantity released.  Bulk package design affects CPR in that it determines the 
package’s ability to withstand damage incurred in an accident.   The amount released is a 
function of the size of the opening (related to the package’s ability to withstand damage), the 
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physical properties of the hazardous material, and the time elapsed before the opening can 
be plugged or the hazardous material can be off-loaded.  Current highway data collection 
practices are generally insufficient to evaluate CPR so chapters 3 through 7 explore what 
information would be needed in the development of a highway bulk package accident 
database.  A principal objective of developing such an accident damage database is to 
provide a robust source of empirical accident information on bulk package performance in a 
wide range of accident scenarios.  As data are accumulated over time, the statistical power of 
these regression equations will increase and increasingly sophisticated analyses can be 
conducted.  These include developing the CPRs for various components, in different 
accident scenarios.   
In a similar manner the performance of railroad tank cars has been evaluated using 
information in the Railway Supply Institute (RSI) - Association of American Railroads 
(AAR) Tank Car Accident Database (TCAD).  Since its formation in 1970, more than 45,000 
records of damaged tank cars and more than 29,000 accidents have been recorded in the 
database.  This extensive database enables robust statistical analyses of the performance of 
the principal tank car components, and development of quantitative answers to a variety of 
questions (CCPS 1995; Barkan and Pasternak 1999).  The most basic questions include 
“What percentage of tank cars were involved in accidents and released some or all of their 
contents?”, “What is the safety performance of tank car transport of hazardous materials?”,  
“How do different tank car specifications perform in accidents?”, and “How has tank car 
safety performance improved over time?”.  Meanwhile, more complex questions include 
“What is the likelihood and the expected quantity of release from a particular component?”, 
“How does the performance of a particular component differ with the incorporation of 
various design features?”, “What is the effectiveness of different design changes to improve 
safety?”, “How has tank car safety improved as a result of some change in design or 
operation?”, and “What is the cost-effectiveness of various design changes?”.   
The RSI-AAR TCAD illustrates how such a data collection process enables:  
 Quantitative understanding of the relative performance of different bulk package 
designs in various accident circumstances.  
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 The capability of assessing the risk of transporting various hazardous materials 
using a particular specification or a bulk package equipped with a particular 
feature. 
 A means to estimate the potential benefit from incorporation of a particular 
safety measure or by changing a particular design element. 
 Combined with financial information, identification of the most efficient risk 
reduction measures. 
2.3 Logistic Regression Models 
Previous experience involving analysis of railroad tank car safety performance using 
the RSI-AAR TCAD illustrates the use of statistical techniques to develop prediction models 
for CPR based on bulk package performance (Treichel et al. 2006).   As part of the RSI-AAR 
Railroad Tank Car Safety Research and Test Project, several regression methods were 
employed to develop the estimates of CPR:  
 Logistic regression in which a binary response variable such as release or no 
release is selected.  Logistic regression makes an exponential transformation that 
allows probability estimate errors to conform to the required assumption of 
normality.   
 Ordinal logistic regression in which response variables are binned.  For example, 
binned data regarding the percentage lost would be an appropriate response 
variable for ordinal logistic regression. 
 Multiple binary logistic regression in which there are several response variables 
representing, for example, release or no release of hazardous materials in several 
categories.      
Wen and Simpson, in Multivariate Regression Analysis of Tank Car Lading Loss 
(Wen and Simpson, 2000), presented the following equations and some other details of the 
general logistic regression model: 
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Where: 
Yi = a binary dependent variable associated with the ith record where 0 represents a 
non-release event and 1 represents a release event,  
Xi = a vector denoting the values of l independent variables for the ith record:  
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L  = the logarithmic odds ratio,  
 = Xi’β, and     
β = the following vector denoting values of l coefficients of the logarithmic odds 
ratio, L: 
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 (2.5) 
 
Unlike linear regression, an analytical solution does not exist for logistic regression.  
Instead, a maximum likelihood procedure, in which an iterative process is employed to 
converge at the best possible solution, is used to estimate the coefficients (Menard, 2001). 
The incorporation of a linear equation within the logistic regression model is 
beneficial because it “allows consideration of a large number of independent variables and 
has [a] well established theoretical basis for further statistical inference” (Wen and Simpson, 
2000), while the incorporation of a quadratic or higher-order equation allows for interactions 
between variables (occurs when there is a covariance between two or more variables in the 
equation). Since the estimation of the conditional probability of release for bulk packages 
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transported by highway is similar to the estimation of the conditional probability of release 
for tank cars, similar approaches for developing the response function may be used. 
Accident scenarios that may initially be considered include, among others, accidents 
in which another vehicle is involved and incidents in which the vehicle and bulk package 
overturned.  Roadway types that may be considered include those specified by Harwood et 
al. (1993):  
 Rural two-way 
 Rural multilane undivided 
 Rural multilane divided 
 Rural freeway 
 Urban two-way 
 Urban multilane undivided 
 Urban multilane divided 
 Urban one-way, and  
 Urban freeway. 
 
Similarly, the bulk package components that may be considered include:  
 Valves. 
 Loading/unloading lines, piping or fittings. 
 Manway or dome covers. 
 Tank head. 
 Tank shell. 
The above combination results in the need to calculate 135 separate regression 
equations representing the conditional probability of release from the jth component given 
the kth accident scenario on the lth roadway type.   The various combinations are illustrated in 
Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 Route Risk Model Development Event Tree 
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Assuming roadway type, accident scenario and bulk package component are 
independent, a generalized conditional probability of release can be determined using 
equation 2.6:    
 
       ∏∏∏[         ]
   
   
  
   
 
   
 (2.6) 
 
Where: 
     = the probability of a release given that an accident has occurred, or CPR.   
        = the CPR from the l
th source due to the kth accident scenario on the jth 
roadway type.  
  = the number of roadway types considered. 
   = the number of accident scenarios considered for each roadway type. 
    = the number of components considered for each accident scenario – roadway 
type combination. 
 
Alternatively, should consequence information be available for each accident 
scenario – roadway type – bulk package component combination (Cjkl), the risk of 
transporting hazardous materials along a particular route could be determined using equation 
2.7:  
 
                ∑     
 
   
∑       ∑              
   
   
  
   
 (2.7) 
Where: 
               = the additional risk of transporting hazardous materials should a  
release occur.   
   = the route length of the j
th roadway type.  
    = the probability of an accident occurring on the j
th type of roadway. 
  = the number of roadway types considered. 
 17 
 
        = the probability of release as a result of an accident of the k
th type, given 
that an accident has occurred on the jth type of roadway. 
   = the number of accident scenarios considered for the j
th roadway type. 
          = the probability of a release from the l
th bulk package component, given 
that an accident of the kth type has occurred on the jth type of roadway. 
      = the consequences of a release due to the k
th accident type on the jth type of 
roadway from the lth bulk package component. 
    = the number of components considered for each accident-scenario, roadway-
type combination. 
In Treichel et al. (2006), separate regression models for each of the four major 
components (head, shell, top fittings, and bottom fittings) were developed by removing 
factors that had no significant effect on a particular component’s loss probability from that 
component’s model.  Similarly, a regression analysis of highway accident data may show that, 
for example, the capacity of the bulk package does not have a significant effect on the 
probability of a release from loading/unloading lines.  Not all the characteristics considered 
will have a significant effect on a particular component’s loss probability given a particular 
type of accident on a particular type of roadway.  Therefore, regression model building 
techniques comparing every subset of the full model should be conducted.   
Similar to the methodology used in Treichel et al. (2006), to determine the 
coefficients for each significant factor, accident report selection criteria for the population to 
be analyzed should be constructed with the intention of eliminating the possibility of 
undesirable heterogeneities.  Without these inclusion criteria, biased conclusions may be 
drawn, particularly if loading characteristics differ (bulk package is empty) or damage is 
sustained to the bulk package after the initial impact (such as prolonged exposure to fire).  
Thus, the inclusion criteria for accident records are particularly important when accident data 
include accidents involving cargo tanks whether or not they carried hazardous materials; 
were loaded at the time they were damaged; sustained sufficient damage to result in a lading 
loss; or were exposed to a fire for a prolonged period of time.   
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CHAPTER 3 
INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSESS  
BULK PACKAGE ACCIDENT PERFORMANCE 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter consists of a review of the nature and quality of the bulk package 
performance data currently being collected1.  This is achieved through a literature review, a 
review of relevant definitions used in analyzing bulk package accident performance, an 
investigation of existing data collection strategies, and an extensive interview process.   
The literature review focuses on studies and reports in the following categories:  
 Cargo tank and portable tank classification and specifications – The packages for 
which accident data will be collected are identified, and design attributes, such as 
minimum head and shell thicknesses and type and location of valves and 
manholes, are noted.  
 Cargo tank motor vehicle industry practices – Besides container design 
specifications, industry practices may influence the performance of cargo tanks in 
an accident scenario.  Factors affecting the service life of a cargo tank identified 
by Bowman et al. (2009) are summarized.   
 Container performance studies – Past studies are reviewed to determine how 
existing crash data have been used. For highway cargo tanks, a number of 
analyses have been performed to evaluate the performance of front heads as well 
as container performance in rollover scenarios.  Key factors required to perform 
similar statistical analyses of container performance are identified. 
                                                          
1 This chapter was developed to fulfill the requirements of the Transportation 
Research Board (TRB)’s Hazardous Materials Cooperative Research Program (HMCRP) 
project HM-07 entitled “Accident Performance Data of Bulk Packages Used for Hazardous 
Materials Transportation.”   This chapter appears as Chapter 2 in HM-07’s final deliverable 
which was accepted for publication.   
Philip J. Daum, P.E., Christopher P. L. Barkan, Ph.D., M. Rapik Saat, Ph.D., and 
Laura E. Ghosh, Feasibility Study for Highway Hazardous Materials Bulk Package Accident 
Performance Data. Hazardous Materials Cooperative Research Program (HMCRP) Report, 
Transportation Research Board, 2013. 
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 Cargo tank accident investigations – Accident investigations are reviewed to 
identify key factors for inclusion in a database enabling statistical analyses of 
container performance.   
Data collected by existing programs were reviewed for applicability in evaluating 
cargo tank and portable tank performance in accidents.  These existing programs include the 
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)’s Hazardous Materials 
Incident Reporting System (HMIRS), the Federal Motor Carriers Safety Administration 
(FMCSA)’s Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS), the University of 
Michigan Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI)’s Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 
(TIFA), and NHTSA’s National Automotive Sampling System (NASS) General Estimates 
System (GES).  Additionally, the Railway Supply Institute (RSI) - Association of American 
Railroads (AAR) Tank Car Accident Database (TCAD) is an existing data collection process 
used for a comparable purpose in railroad bulk liquid transport.   
Finally, an extensive interview process was undertaken.  Several companies from 
each stakeholder group were visited and interviewed to determine what information is 
currently recorded regarding bulk package design and/or accident damage.  Through these 
stakeholder interviews, it was ascertained that, due to the large differences in bulk package 
use and accident performance associated with different specification containers, a process to 
engage a larger number of stakeholders was required.  Therefore, a set of stakeholder online 
surveys were developed and distributed, where possible, through their respective industry 
associations.  The purpose of the surveys was to gain insight on what information different 
stakeholders believe would be most useful in an accident damage database. Additionally, the 
survey was intended to provide information on what constraints might exist among 
stakeholders as well as various preferences they might have regarding the database.  
Questions were tailored to each survey group to collect information most appropriate to 
their interests and expertise.   
Survey responses were used in conjunction with interviews, literature reviews, and 
existing database reviews, to identify and rank the most important types of data to be 
collected.  These include bulk package design characteristics, the nature of damage they 
experience, the circumstances of accidents involving hazardous materials packages, whether 
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or not there was a release of product, and, if so, the quantity and other details about the 
release.   
3.2 Literature Review 
As part of a review to identify and evaluate the quality of bulk package performance 
data currently being collected, extensive searches for relevant literature were conducted.  The 
review focused on studies and reports in the following categories:  
 Bulk package classification and specifications. 
 Cargo tank motor vehicle assembly and repair. 
 Container performance studies. 
 Cargo tank accident investigations. 
3.2.1 Bulk Package Classification and Specifications 
One of the primary purposes of this project is to outline a database containing 
information concerning damage to highway bulk packages. An understanding of various 
cargo tank motor vehicles and intermodal containers currently in use was obtained through 
the following sources:  
 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Section 178 – Specifications for 
Packagings.  This source provides the minimum design requirements for the 
lading retention system of certified cargo and portable tanks including authorized 
materials, minimum thicknesses, structural integrity requirements, and accident 
damage protection requirements.   
 Guidelines for Chemical Transportation Risk Analysis Appendix A: Standard 
Container Illustrations and Specifications (CCPS 1995). This source provides an 
overview of current motor carrier series cargo tanks including the types of 
materials typically carried in the tank, a description of the tank, and design 
features of the tank. 
 State of Ohio Hazmat and Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) Awareness for 
the First Responder: Instructor Guide Unit Three – The Ability to Recognize 
and Identify Hazardous Materials (Ohio Hazmat/Decon Technical Advisory 
Committee 2009).  A series of PowerPoint slides for first responder hazardous 
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material training that provides detailed descriptions of cargo tank motor vehicles 
and intermodal tanks. 
The following sections describe the packages for which accident data will be 
collected.  Design attributes, such as minimum head and shell thicknesses, and type and 
location of valves and the manhole, are noted because the proposed database is anticipated 
to allow analyses of the performance of these features.   
3.2.1.1 MC 306/DOT 406 – Atmospheric Pressure Cargo Tank 
With a maximum allowable working pressure between 2.65 psig and 4 psig (49 CFR 
178.346), MC 306/DOT 406 cargo tanks typically transport between 2,000 and 9,500 gallons 
of flammable and combustible liquids or poisonous materials (CCPS 1995).  Figure 3.1 
illustrates an MC 306/DOT 406 cargo tank. 
 
Source: 2012 Emergency Response Guidebook. 
Figure 3.1 MC 306/DOT 406 Non-Pressure Liquid Tank. 
MC 306/DOT 406 cargo tanks typically have a single shell oval cross-section and are 
equipped with a vapor collection system that is evident by the piping running along the top 
and wrapping around the end of the tank.  The lading retention system may feature a multi-
compartment design in which compartments are separated by double bulkheads and a 
vented/drained airspace (CCPS 1995).  The manhole is either recessed into the cargo tank or 
is equipped with rollover protection. 
The tank is equipped with bottom stop-valves that are generally grouped together on 
the underside of the tank to assist with unloading.  Piping connects the compartments to the 
bottom valves and is protected from breakage by accident protection devices or shear 
sections (CCPS 1995).  Additionally, an emergency valve remote closure device is located 
more than 10 feet from the stop-valves.  A rear bumper provides additional protection to 
pipes and valves in the event of a rear-end collision.   
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Minimum thicknesses for tank head/bulkhead/baffle and tank shell as specified in 
49 CFR 178.346 are shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, respectively, based on the type of material 
and the cargo tank motor vehicle rated capacity, in gallons.  
Table 3.1 Specified Minimum Head Thickness of MC 306/DOT 406 Cargo Tank (or 
Bulkhead and Baffle When Used as Tank Reinforcement) 
Volume capacity in 
gallons per inch of length 
Minimum Head Thickness (inches) 
Mild Steel 
High Strength Low 
Alloy Steel & 
Austenitic Stainless 
Steel Aluminum 
14 or less 0.100 0.100 0.160 
Over 14 to 23 0.115 0.115 0.173 
Over 23 0.129 0.129 0.187 
Table 3.2 Specified Minimum Shell Thickness of MC 306/DOT 406 Cargo Tank 
Cargo tank motor vehicle rated capacity 
(gallons) 
Minimum Shell Thickness (inches) 
Mild Steel 
High Strength Low 
Alloy Steel & 
Austenitic Stainless 
Steel Aluminum 
More than 0 to at least 4,500 0.100 0.100 0.151 
More than 4,500 to at least 8,000 0.115 0.100 0.160 
More than 8,000 to at least 14,000 0.129 0.129 0.173 
More than 14,000 0.143 0.143 0.187 
 
3.2.1.2 MC 307/DOT 407 – Low-Pressure Cargo Tank 
With a maximum allowable working pressure between 25 psig (49 CFR 178.347) and 
40 psig (CCPS 1995), MC 307/DOT 407 cargo tanks typically transport between 2,000 and 
8,000 gallons of flammable liquids and mild corrosives with vapor pressures not more than 
40 psi at 70oF.  Figure 3.2 illustrates an MC 307/DOT 407 cargo tank. 
MC 307/DOT 407 low-pressure cargo tanks are typically made of steel with a 
double-shell and may be lined.  The lading retention system may have a multi-compartment 
design in which compartments are separated by double bulkheads and a vented/drained 
airspace (CCPS 1995).  The manhole, able to withstand an internal fluid pressure of at least 
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40 psi, is either recessed into the cargo tank or is provided with rollover protection.  
Additionally, stiffening rings add additional structural strength to the tank. 
The tank is equipped with bottom stop-valves that are generally grouped together on 
the underside of the tank to assist with unloading.  Piping connects the compartments to the 
bottom valves and is protected from breakage by accident protection devices or shear 
sections (CCPS 1995).  Additionally, an emergency valve remote closure device is located 
more than 10 feet from the stop-valves.   
 
Source: 2012 Emergency Response Guidebook. 
Figure 3.2 MC 307/DOT 407 Low-Pressure Chemical Tank 
Minimum thicknesses for tank heads/bulkhead/baffles and tank shell as specified in 
49 CFR 178.347 are shown in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, respectively, based on the type of material 
and the cargo tank motor vehicle rated capacity, in gallons. 
Table 3.3 Specified Minimum Head Thickness of MC 307/DOT 407 Cargo Tank (or 
Bulkhead and Baffle When Used as Tank Reinforcement) 
Volume capacity 
in gallons per inch 
of length 
Minimum Head Thickness (inches) 
Mild Steel 
High Strength 
Low Alloy Steel 
Austenitic 
Stainless Steel Aluminum 
10 or less 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.160 
Over 10 to 14 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.160 
Over 14 to 18 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.173 
Over 18 to 22 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.187 
Over 22 to 26 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.194 
Over 26 to 30 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.216 
Over 30 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.237 
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Table 3.4 Specified Minimum Shell Thickness of MC 307/DOT 407 Cargo Tank 
Volume capacity 
in gallons per inch 
of length 
Minimum Shell Thickness (inches) 
Mild Steel 
High Strength 
Low Alloy Steel 
Austenitic 
Stainless Steel Aluminum 
10 or less 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.151 
Over 10 to 14 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.151 
Over 14 to 18 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.160 
Over 18 to 22 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.173 
Over 22 to 26 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.194 
Over 26 to 30 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.216 
Over 30 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.237 
 
3.2.1.3 MC 312/DOT 412 Corrosive Cargo Tank 
MC 312/DOT 412 cargo tanks are characterized by a narrow cylindrical shape and 
are typically lined with a homogeneous corrosive resistant material to transport high-density 
liquids and corrosives such as acetyl chloride and hydrochloric acid (CCPS 1995). The cargo 
tanks have a multi-compartment design, are usually constructed of steel, stainless steel or 
aluminum, and equipped with rollover protection and splashguards that also provide rollover 
protection.  Figure 3.3 illustrates an MC 312/DOT 412 cargo tank. 
 
Source: 2012 Emergency Response Guidebook. 
Figure 3.3 MC 312/DOT 412 Corrosive Cargo Tank. 
The manhole is located at either the center or the rear of the tank.  The loading area 
is typically covered with corrosive resistant material; and piping, hoses, and connections may 
be made of non-metallic materials to resist corrosion as well (49 CFR 178.348).  These cargo 
tanks are typically equipped with the ability to be unloaded from the top using air pressure 
and are provided with valves both at the discharge point and inside the tank to prevent 
siphoning in the event of a valve failure (CCPS 1995).  Discharge piping is shown in Figure 
3.3 at the rear of the tank.    
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Minimum thicknesses for tank head/bulkhead/baffle and tank shell as specified in 
49 CFR 178.347 are shown in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, respectively, based on the type of material, 
the cargo tank motor vehicle rated capacity, in gallons, and the lading density at 60°F. 
Table 3.5 Specified Minimum Head Thickness of MC 312/DOT 412 Cargo Tank  
(or Bulkhead and Baffle When Used as Tank Reinforcement) 
Volume Capacity 
(gallons per inch) 
Lading Density 
(pounds per gallon at 60°F) 
Minimum Head Thickness 
(inches) 
Steel Aluminum 
10 or less 10 lbs. and less 0.100 0.144 
Over 10 to 13 lbs. 0.129 0.187 
Over 13 to 16 lbs. 0.157 0.227 
Over 16 lbs. 0.187 0.270 
Over 10 to 14 10 lbs. and less 0.129 0.187 
Over 10 to 13 lbs. 0.157 0.227 
Over 13 to 16 lbs. 0.187 0.270 
 Over 16 lbs. 0.250 0.360 
Over 14 to 18 10 lbs. and less 0.157 0.227 
Over 10 to 13 lbs. 0.250 0.360 
Over 13 to 16 lbs. 0.250 0.360 
Over 18 10 lbs. and less 0.157 0.227 
Over 10 to 13 lbs. 0.250 0.360 
Over 13 to 16 lbs. 0.312 0.450 
 
3.2.1.4 MC 331 High-Pressure Gas Cargo Tank 
MC 331 cargo tanks are typically used to transport liquefied pressurized gases (49 
CFR 178.337).  With a maximum allowable working pressure between 100 and 500 psig, MC 
331 cargo tanks are made of steel or aluminum using seamless or welded construction.  
Aluminum tanks are insulated and covered with a steel jacket while steel tanks only need to 
be insulated and covered with a steel jacket when carrying a flammable gas.  Insulation must 
be non-combustible if used for tanks carrying nitrous oxide refrigerated liquid and must be 
corkboard, polyurethane foam, or ceramic fiber/fiberglass if used for tanks carrying chlorine.  
If the cargo tank is not insulated, it is painted white, aluminum, or a similar reflecting color 
on the upper two-thirds of the container.  Structural members, the suspension sub-frame,  
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Table 3.6 Specified Minimum Shell Thickness of MC 312/DOT 412 Cargo Tank 
Volume 
Capacity 
(gallons per 
inch) 
Lading Density 
(pounds per gallon 
at 60°F) 
Distances between 
heads (and bulkheads 
baffles and ring 
stiffeners when used 
as tank reinforcement) 
Minimum Shell Thickness 
(inches) 
Steel Aluminum 
10 or less 10 lbs. and less 60 in. or less 0.100 0.144 
Over 10 to 13 lbs. 60 in. or less 0.129 0.187 
Over 13 to 16 lbs. 60 in. or less 0.157 0.227 
Over 16 lbs. 60 in. or less 0.187 0.270 
 10 lbs. and less 54 in. or less 0.100 0.144 
Over 54 in. to 60 in. 0.129 0.187 
Over 10 to 13 lbs. 54 in. or less 0.129 0.187 
Over 54 in. to 60 in. 0.157 0.227 
Over 13 to 16 lbs. 54 in. or less 0.157 0.227 
Over 54 in. to 60 in. 0.187 0.270 
Over 16 lbs. 54 in. or less 0.187 0.270 
Over 54 in. to 60 in. 0.250 0.360 
Over 14 to 18 10 lbs. and less 36 in. or less 0.100 0.144 
 Over 36 in. to 54 in. 0.129 0.187 
 Over 54 in. to 60 in. 0.157 0.227 
 Over 10 to 13 lbs. 36 in. or less 0.129 0.187 
Over 36 in. to 54 in. 0.157 0.227 
Over 54 in. to 60 in. 0.250 0.360 
Over 13 to 16 lbs. 36 in. or less 0.157 0.227 
Over 36 in. to 54 in. 0.187 0.270 
Over 54 in. to 60 in. 0.250 0.360 
Over 18 10 lbs. and less 36 in. or less 0.129 0.187 
Over 36 in. to 54 in. 0.157 0.157 
Over 54 in. to 60 in. 0.187 0.270 
 Over 10 to 13 lbs. 36 in. or less 0.157 0.227 
Over 36 in. to 54 in. 0.250 0.360 
Over 54 in. to 60 in. 0.250 0.360 
Over 13 to 16 lbs. 36 in. or less 0.187 0.270 
Over 36 in. to 54 in. 0.250 0.360 
Over 54 in. to 60 in. 0.312 0.450 
 
accident protection structures, and external circumferential reinforcement devices are 
typically used for attachment of appurtenances and other accessories.  Figure 3.4 illustrates  
an MC 331 cargo tank with vents located on top of the cargo tank and a manhole located on 
the rear head. 
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Source: 2012 Emergency Response Guidebook. 
Figure 3.4 MC 331 High-Pressure Gas Cargo Tank 
Non-chlorine cargo tank openings include gauging devices, thermometer wells, 
pressure relief valves, manhole openings, product inlet openings, product discharge 
openings, and other openings that have been closed with a plug, cap, or bolted flange.  
Backflow check valves or internal self-closing stop valves are located inside the cargo tank or 
inside a welded nozzle that is an integral part of the cargo tank.  Additionally, non-chlorine 
cargo tanks have remote closure valves in at least two diagonally opposite locations (CCPS 
1995).  Chlorine cargo tanks only have one opening on the top of the tank, which is fitted 
with a nozzle, an internal excess flow valve and an external stop valve, and protected by 
either a manway cover or a dome cover plate (49 CFR 178.337).    
The minimum thickness for MC 331 tanks is based on the structural requirements of 
the tank and 25 percent of the tensile strength of the material used.  Sulfur dioxide and 
chlorine tanks are made of steel and designed to incorporate a corrosion allowance of the 
lesser of an additional 20 percent or an additional 0.100 inches.  Chlorine tanks are required 
to be at least 0.625 inches, including the corrosion allowance.  All other MC 331 steel tanks 
should exceed 0.187 inches and MC 331 aluminum tanks should exceed 0.270 inches (49 
CFR 178.337). 
3.2.1.5 MC 338 Cryogenic Liquid Cargo Tank 
MC 338 cargo tanks are designed to prevent heat transfer to the lading, and consist 
of an inner tank enclosed within an outer tank.  This provides a thermos-bottle-type design 
where the interstitial space can be evacuated of air (vacuum).  Additionally, an insulation 
material may be provided between the inner and outer tanks.  Depending on the insulation 
provided, each tank is rated for a specific holding time before the tank pressure exceeds the 
set pressure of a pressure relief valve.  The insulation must also meet certain fire rating 
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standards based upon the type of lading for which the tank was designed (49 CFR 178.338).  
Figure 3.5 illustrates an MC 338 cryogenic liquid cargo tank. 
 
Source: 2012 Emergency Response Guidebook. 
Figure 3.5 MC 338 Cryogenic Liquid Cargo Tank 
The manhole, typically located on the top or rear of the tank must be provided with 
a means of entrance and exit through the jacket, or the jacket must be marked to indicate the 
manway location on the tank. Tanks designed for flammable ladings have a discharge 
opening located at the bottom centerline of the tank and are equipped with a closure that is 
leak tight at the tank’s maximum allowable working pressure.   
Accident damage protection for all valves, fittings, pressure relief devices and other 
accessories is typically provided through a collision-resistant housing located at the rear of 
the tank.  Additionally, pressure relief devices are protected so that they are not obstructed in 
the event of a collision.  MC 338 cargo tanks typically have a remote means of automatic 
closure located at the end of the cargo tank that is furthest from the loading/unloading 
connection area.  
The tank is typically constructed of steel alloys suited for the low temperature 
environment to which the tank is subjected.  The minimum thickness of the steel tank is 
0.187 inches or 0.110 inches if the tank is vacuum insulated or double walled with a load-
bearing jacket carrying a proportionate amount of structural loads.  The minimum thickness 
for an aluminum tank is 0.270 inches.  
The minimum thickness requirements for the jacket are shown in Table 3.7. 
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Table 3.7 Specified Minimum Jacket Thickness of MC 338 Cargo Tank 
Note: ‘--' indicates that gauge measurements are not applicable. 
3.2.1.6 Compressed Gas Tube Trailer 
Tube trailers transport bulk non-liquefied compressed gases such as helium, 
hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen at pressures ranging between 3,000 and 5,000 psi.  A group 
of cylinders, meeting standards outlined in 49 CFR 178.35 are stacked and banded together 
in a modular or nested shape.  Each cylinder is constructed using a material without seams, 
cracks or laminations, or other defects.  Figure 3.6 illustrates an example configuration of 
cylinders in a tube trailer, and Table 3.8 displays some properties associated with cylinders 
used for tube trailers. 
 
Source: 2012 Emergency Response Guidebook. 
Figure 3.6 Compressed Gas Tube Trailer 
 
  
Type Metal 
Jacket Evacuated Jacket Not Evacuated 
Gauge Inches Gauge Inches 
Stainless steel 18 0.0428 22 0.0269 
Low carbon mild steel 12 0.0946 14 0.0677 
Aluminum -- 0.1250 -- 0.1000 
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Table 3.8 Specified Seamless Cylinder Properties 
Cylinder 
Type 
Max. 
Water 
Capacity 
(lbs.) 
Cylinder Dimensions 
(where max. water 
capacity is not provided) 
Min. 
Service 
Pressure 
(psig) 
Max. 
Service 
Pressure 
(psig) Material Type 
Max. 
Diameter 
(inches) 
Max. 
Length 
(feet) 
3A 1000 N/S N/S 150 N/S Open-Hearth or  
Electric Steel 
3AX 1000 N/S N/S 500 N/S Open-Hearth or  
Electric Steel 
3AA 1000 N/S N/S 150 N/S Open-Hearth, Basic 
Oxygen, or Electric 
Steel 
3AAX 1000 N/S N/S 500 N/S Open-Hearth, Basic 
Oxygen, or Electric 
Steel 
3B 1000 N/S N/S 150 500 Open-Hearth or 
Electric Steel 
3BN 125 N/S N/S 150 500 Nickel 
3E N/S 2 2 N/S 1,800 Open-Hearth or 
Electric Steel 
3HT 150 N/S N/S 900 N/S Open-Hearth or 
Electric Furnace 
Steel 
3T 1000 N/S N/S 1800 N/S Open-Hearth, Basic 
Oxygen, or Electric 
Furnace Steel 
3AL 1000 N/S N/S 150 N/S Aluminum 
Note: N/S = Not Specified 
 
3.2.1.7 Non-Pressurized UN Portable Tank 
Non-pressurized UN portable tanks are used to transport liquid and solid hazardous 
materials.  These tanks are designed to withstand temperatures between -40oC and 50oC (-
40oF and 122oF) or greater than the maximum temperature of its lading. Tanks are generally 
made out of steel; however, some shells may be constructed using aluminum.  Additionally, 
tanks may be lined with a homogeneous corrosion-resistant material that is compatible with 
the lading.  Minimum thicknesses are specified based on the type of material used as well as 
the tank diameter and are exclusive of corrosion allowance.  Table 3.9 shows the required 
minimum thickness of a non-pressurized UN portable tank as specified in 49 CFR 178.275. 
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Table 3.9 Specified Minimum Thicknesses for Non-Pressurized UN Portable Tanks 
Tank Diameter 
Minimum Thickness 
[mm (in)] 
Reference Steel Absolute 
Up to 1.8 meters 5 (0.197) 3 (0.100) 
1.8 meters and above 6 (0.200) 3 (0.100) 
 
All UN portable tanks (Figure 3.7) are constructed with supports that provide a 
secure base during transportation.  Longitudinal bars may be used to provide additional 
lateral support.  Reinforcement rings or bars fixed across the frame, an ISO frame, or an 
insulation jacket may be used to provide additional protection against overturning.  A 
bumper or rear frame may also be equipped to protect against rear impacts (49 CFR 
178.275).  
 
Source: 2012 Emergency Response Guidebook. 
Figure 3.7 Portable Tank 
A pressure relief device is located within the vapor space on top of the shell, near the 
longitudinal and transverse center.  Accident damage protection is provided to ensure the 
pressure relief device continues to function in the event of a collision.  Stop valves, or 
another suitable means of closure, are located close to the shell at all openings except for 
openings leading to venting or pressure relief devices.  If the tank is insulated, a spill 
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collection reservoir with suitable drains will surround top fittings.  Bottom fittings, if 
provided, shall have either two or three independent shut-off valves located both close to 
the shell and at the end of the discharge pipe (49 CFR 178.275). 
3.2.1.8 Pressurized UN Portable Tank 
Pressurized UN portable tanks are used to transport non-refrigerated liquefied gases.  
Tanks have a circular cross section, and are made of steel with a minimum thickness of four 
millimeters (0.2 inches).  If insulated, the insulation either covers between the upper third 
and upper half of the shell surface or completely covers the shell and is separated from the 
shell by an air space.  Like all UN portable tanks, the tank is constructed with supports that 
provide a secure base during transportation.  Longitudinal bars may be used to provide 
additional lateral support.  Reinforcement rings or bars fixed across the frame, an ISO frame, 
or an insulation jacket may be used to provide additional protection against overturning.  A 
bumper or rear frame may also be provided to protect against rear impacts (49 CFR 
178.276). 
A pressure relief device is located within the vapor space on top of the shell, near the 
longitudinal and transverse center.  Accident damage protection is provided to ensure the 
pressure relief device continues to function in the event of a collision.  All other openings 
greater than 1.5 mm (0.100 inches) have at least three mutually independent shut-off devices 
in series.  Types of shut-off devices can include stop-valves, excess flow valves, integral 
excess flow valves, external stop-valves, blank flanges, thread caps, and plugs (49 CFR 
178.276). 
3.2.1.9 Cryogenic UN Portable Tank 
Cryogenic UN portable tanks are used to transport refrigerated liquefied gases.  The 
tank is constructed of steel and designed to hold at least 450 liters (118.9 gallons).  
Consisting of an inner shell enclosed in a jacket, the tank is insulated by either an 
intermediate layer of solid, thermally-insulating material or by vacuum (49 CFR 178.277).   
Like all UN portable tanks, the tank is constructed with supports that provide a 
secure base during transportation.  Longitudinal bars may be used to provide additional 
lateral support.  Reinforcement rings or bars fixed across the frame, an ISO frame, or an 
insulation jacket may be used to provide additional protection against overturning.  A 
bumper or rear frame may also be provided to protect against rear impacts.  All filling and 
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discharge openings have at least two mutually independent stop-valves and one blank flange 
or equivalent device in series.  Two independent reclosing pressure relief devices are 
provided for every shell.  Pressure relief devices are designed to resist dynamic forces and to 
open automatically when pressures exceed the maximum allowable working pressure by 10 
percent (49 CFR 178.277).     
3.2.2 Cargo Tank Motor Vehicle Assembly and Repair 
Besides container design specifications, industry practices may influence the 
performance of cargo tanks in an accident scenario.  To understand this aspect further, 
information was obtained from the FMCSA report entitled “Guidelines for the Operation, 
Assembly, Repair, Testing, and Inspection of Hazardous Material Cargo Tanks” by Bowman 
et al. (2009).  The report identifies factors that affect the service life of a cargo tank based on 
industry comments, regulatory documents, and professional organizations’ guidance.  The 
report also provides recommendations to minimize the effects of those factors, thus 
extending the service life of a cargo tank.  Industry input was gathered through direct 
observation, interviews and focus groups.  These focus groups consisted of 63 
administrators and maintenance/inspection personnel from: (1) commercial fleets carrying 
hazardous materials, and (2) certified inspection/repair facilities.  Industry comments were 
then supplemented with recommended procedures from industry-related associations and 
engineering societies, resulting in a list of industry-recommended practices.   
The following sections discuss the report in more detail and provide further 
information on cargo tank motor vehicle assembly and repair. 
3.2.2.1 Cargo Tank Assembly 
Bowman et al. (2009) identifies the following three types of frames to which cargo 
tanks may be mounted: 
 A full-sized semi-trailer frame. 
 A front, fifth-wheel mounting frame and a rear, wheel-mounting frame or bogie 
(used when the cargo tank serves as the loadbearing structure). 
 A straight truck chassis or “bobtail” (used when the cargo tank serves as the 
loadbearing structure). 
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Bowman et al. (2009) recommends that the following attachments should be 
examined for material compatibility in order to avoid galvanic corrosion: 
 Supports designed to prevent excessive localized stresses. 
 Round, oval, or rectangular reinforcing plates used between a support or the 
chassis and the tank. 
 Saddles extending over at least one-third of the circumference. 
 Stiffening rings. 
 Longitudinal stringers at the top of the tank. 
 Gussets. 
Bowman et al. (2009) also provides a review of the installation guidelines for 
manhole assemblies, accident damage protection, pressure relief valves, tank outlets, and 
gauges for DOT 406/407 and 412 specification cargo tanks and for MC 330 and MC 331 
specification cargo tanks.  Information is also provided concerning emergency discharge 
control equipment, engine fuel lines, liquid level gauging devices, pumps and compressors, 
and the installation of linings and coatings. 
3.2.2.2 Cargo Tank Repair 
Bowman et al. (2009) provides recommended practices for the repair of cargo tanks 
based on existing regulations, codes, and standards.  The report also provides 
recommendations for the following conditions requiring repair: 
 Corrosion – It is recommended that operators be aware of corrosion and that a 
corrosion mitigation plan be developed that establishes the process for 
determining the root cause of corrosion and the proper repair procedures needed 
for each one.  If the wall thickness has not been compromised, pitting corrosion, 
line corrosion, and general corrosion can be repaired using a weld overlay.  
Otherwise, the repair will consist of a flush patch.  Galvanic corrosion is 
mitigated by eliminating the cause or by removing the incompatible material.  
Other types of corrosion include erosion/corrosion, crevice corrosion, and 
passivation.   
 Weld Defects – It is recommended that welding quality control policies and 
procedures be established that not only ensure consistent welding techniques 
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throughout company personnel but also identifies all weld defects and 
procedures for rectifying such defects before placing cargo tanks back into 
service.  Weld cracking, undercutting, excessive reinforcement, insufficient 
reinforcement, and incomplete fusion are some examples of weld defects.   
 Cargo Tank Distortion – Flush patch repair is required if dents with a weld 
exceed one-half inch or if dents without a weld exceed one inch or a depth 
greater than one-tenth of the greatest dimension of the dent.  Gouges may be 
repaired by blending and re-evaluated for service. 
 Cracking – It is recommended that policies for identifying and correcting 
material cracking be established.  Recommended policies should include properly 
trained personnel and proper procedures.  Types of cracking include fatigue 
cracks, structural overload, non-ductile fracture, stress-corrosion cracking, 
transgranular stress, and hydrogen embrittlement. 
 Bulkhead and Baffles Defects – It is recommended that bulkheads and baffles be 
attached and joined appropriately to ensure structural integrity.  Bowman et al. 
(2009) indicate that there are two forms of construction: fillet-welding the flange 
of the baffle to the shell and welding the edge of the baffle without a flange 
directly to the shell.  Using flanged construction is more desirable. 
 Omitted or Undersized Welding Pads – It is recommended to use welding pads 
appropriately to prevent cargo tank shell defects.  Bowman et al. (2009) indicated 
that omitting or using undersized pads is a major contributor to defects in 
attachment of shell to frame, rollover protection devices, or rear-end structures.   
Bowman, et al. (2009) anticipated the current regulation that requires National Board 
certification of facilities and inspectors involved in the certification of repairs to cargo tanks.  
Individuals with National Board Inspection Code certifications are ideal candidates for 
providing information as to the location and extent of damage sustained by the lading 
retention system of vehicles involved in accidents.   
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3.2.3 Container Performance Studies 
Container performance studies were reviewed to determine how existing crash data 
have been used in past studies.  For highway cargo tanks, a number of analyses have been 
performed to evaluate the performance of front heads and container performance in rollover 
scenarios.  Key factors required to perform similar statistical analyses of container 
performance are identified.   
Safety Performance of Tank Cars in Accidents: Probabilities of Lading Loss 
(Treichel et al. 2006).  In this study, the safety performance of tank cars in accidents is 
analyzed using multivariate logistic regression to examine the probability of lading loss from 
railway tank cars involved in accidents.  The underlying database, the Railway Supply 
Institute (RSI) - Association of American Railroads (AAR) Tank Car Accident Database, is 
the result of long-term industry effort to record detailed tank car accident damage 
information. Treichel et al. (2006) analysis started by determining which cars should be 
included in the analysis by detailing inclusion criteria that would ensure that the probability 
estimates developed would be relevant and resulting container performance comparisons 
meaningful.  The variables considered in the regression analysis include pressure car vs. non-
pressure, head thickness, head shield type, shell thickness, presence of a jacket, presence of 
shelf couplers, presence of bottom fittings, presence of bottom fitting protection, and 
location of accident (yard vs. mainline).  Variables were evaluated to determine if they had a 
significant effect on the probability of lading loss and a coefficient was developed for each 
significant factor.  Using these coefficients, regression equations to calculate the conditional 
probability of release were determined for specific tank car components, namely the head, 
shell, and top and bottom fittings.   
Improving Crashworthiness of Front Heads of MC 331 Cargo Tank Motor 
Vehicles (Selz and Heberling 2000).  In this study, design alternatives to improve MC 331 
cargo tank head crashworthiness are evaluated.  Selz and Heberling (2000) used drop tests to 
develop a computer model capable of predicting deformations and rupture of a cargo tank.  
The model was refined using data from an accident that occurred in White Plains, New York 
in 1994.  Two additional accidents were selected for similar analysis however the accident 
reports lacked enough data.  Elements of the accident report that were required to develop 
an analytical correlation included:  
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 Speed of the trailer. 
 Characteristics of object struck (i.e., shear capacity, weight of portion sheared). 
 Combined weight of the vehicle and cargo. 
 Response of the cargo tank as a result of the crash (i.e., amount of deformation, 
size of rupture). 
The model enabled prediction of the interaction of steel, propane, foam, and 
roadway structures in a crash scenario.  Several possible head configurations were tested 
including bare head design, the incorporation of a secondary head, and the incorporation of 
energy-absorbing material between two heads.  The model indicated that the bare head 
design would not be able to withstand an impact above 30 mph.  The secondary head 
increased the crashworthiness of the tank except in the most severe crash scenarios.  The 
addition of energy-absorbing material (foam) between the primary and secondary heads 
further improved the crashworthiness of the container. 
LPG Rail Tank Cars Under Head-On Collisions (Lupker 1990).  In this study, 
the critical velocity of a train part striking the head of a European liquefied petroleum gas 
(LPG) railway tank car is calculated.  The analysis used scaled models and finite difference 
calculations to show that non-symmetrical deformation begins to occur when the 
deformation is one order of magnitude greater than the shell thickness.  An analytical 
approach used in the analysis indicated that indentations greater than 30 times the shell 
thickness would result in penetration of the tank car.   
Cargo Tank Roll Stability Study (Pape et al. 2007).  In this study, the factors 
causing cargo tank rollover events are analyzed by reviewing 966 rollover accident records 
from the MCMIS, 89 cargo tank accident records from the LTCCS, 1,837 cargo tank 
accident records from the TIFA, and 197 rollover crashes from the GES databases.  Using 
the information obtained from these databases, the following four complementary 
approaches to reducing the incidence of cargo tank rollovers were evaluated:  
 Improved driver training. 
 Electronic stability aids. 
 Modified vehicle designs to increase vehicle stability. 
 Modified highway design. 
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The following factors were identified in various databases as having a contributing 
cause to rollover events:  
 Crosscutting factors including the primary reason or critical event and the pre-
crash event or maneuver. 
 Vehicle factors including the body type, hazardous material involvement, load, 
mechanical problems, and cargo tank specification. 
 Roadway and environment factors including road type, population area, roadway 
surface condition, roadway curvature, and location relative to an interchange. 
 Driver factors including driver age, vehicle speed, and driver errors or 
distractions. 
The analysis resulted in some unexpected findings.  Namely, the majority of truck 
rollover crashes involved a single vehicle in dry-pavement conditions and were due to driver 
error.  Speeding, presence of an interchange, and truck configuration had little significance 
on causality.  Pape et al. (2007) recommended the use of driving simulators to train drivers 
on how to avoid pre-rollover events, electronic stability aids to ensure proper speeds on 
curves, lower center of gravity vehicle designs, and proper signage where unusual curves, 
grades or traffic patterns exist.   
The Dynamics of Tank-Vehicle Rollover and the Implications for Rollover-
Protection Devices (Winkler et al. 1998).  In this study,  two tank truck and five 
combination vehicle (tractor and semi-trailer) rollover computer simulations are developed.  
The simulations were intended to calculate the range of initial conditions of input for three 
scenarios:  
 The vehicle falls on its side and engages the rollover protection devices. 
 The vehicle becomes airborne and the rollover protection devices directly impact 
the ground at a speed of 6 to 18 feet per second and up to 30 feet per second in 
severe cases. 
 The vehicle lands on its side and slides into a vertical barrier oriented parallel to 
the roadway. 
 In particular, the following maneuvers were tested: 
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 Intersection turn where the vehicle attempts to follow a 100-foot radius curve at 
speeds ranging between 20 and 55 miles per hour. 
 Highway/exit ramp turn where the vehicle attempts to follow a 500-foot radius 
curve at speeds between 50 and 70 miles per hour. 
 Curb-strike maneuver where the vehicle strikes a six-inch curb while attempting 
to travel in a 500-foot radius curve between 35 and 55 miles per hour. Various 
angles of impact between 5 and 30 degrees were tested. 
 Guardrail-strike maneuver similar to curb-strike but occurring when a vehicle 
struck a guardrail between 16 to 36 inches above the ground. 
 Spiral turn where the steering-wheel angle is increased at a rate of 2 degrees per 
second while traveling at 40 miles per hour. 
 High-speed avoidance maneuver where the vehicle, traveling at 50 miles per 
hour, turns slightly to the right and severely overcorrects left. 
 Step-turns where the steering wheel is “cranked” to a predetermined angle while 
traveling at speeds between 30 and 70 miles per hour. 
The simulations identified several dynamic parameters present in rollover scenarios 
including: 
 Roll, pitch, and yaw attitude upon ground strike. 
 Vertical, lateral, and roll impact velocity.  
The computer simulation indicated that a load 400 times the weight of the vehicle 
results from an input velocity of 24 feet/second (16.4 mph) striking the ground at an angle 
between 10 and 15 degrees and having a crush allowance of one foot.  As the impact force 
results in high-profile, bulky rollover protection measures, the authors indicate that tank 
designs allowing more tank deformation may be desirable.  In order to achieve increased 
deformation, Winkler et al. (1998) provided two alternatives: increasing the allowable 
deformation of the tank (i.e., when strength of protective devices exceeds strength of the 
tank) or increasing the allowable deformation of the accident protection devices.  In all 
designs, the focus should be on energy dissipation that is ideally achieved through a constant 
crush force.  Existing and modified rollover protection devices, such as various staple 
designs or flat rail designs with a variety of dams, were analyzed.  Results indicated that 
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designs such as staple designs typically result in higher crush forces and are less able to 
support these forces because of their geometry.   
Full-Scale Rollover Testing of Commercial Cargo-Tank Vehicles (Winkler 
2009).  In this study, single unit cargo tank trucks and combination cargo tank vehicles 
(tractor-semi tanker) were analyzed to determine crashworthiness of the cargo tank and 
verify the results of a previous simulation study (Winkler et al. 1998).  The purpose of the 
experiment was to determine the attitude and velocities at the moment of impact rather than 
the amount of damage sustained by the lading retention system.  Since the single unit vehicle 
was being tested multiple times in progressively more severe maneuvers, the cab was 
equipped with close fitting roll bars.  On the other hand, no additional rollover protection 
was used on the combination vehicle as it was only being tested once in a very severe 
maneuver. Total mass and static rollover threshold were determined for both vehicles.  
Initial vehicle speeds of the single unit vehicle prior to the critical movement ranged from 
49.9 km/h (31 mph) to 80.6 km/h (50.1 mph) for all tests resulting in a rollover.  The 
combination vehicle was tested at 73.4 km/h (45.6 mph) and, as is typical of rollover 
maneuvers, the trailer rolled prior to the tractor cab.  Winkler (2009) attributes the rolling of 
the trailer prior to the tractor cab to the low center of gravity and torsion-compliant design 
of the tractor.  Winkler (2009) also indicated that the trailer had rolled 104° by the time it 
struck the ground because of the narrow MC 312 profile and heavy-side tires.  The amount 
of deformation sustained by the trailer or truck as well as the potential for lading loss was 
not reported. 
3.2.4 Cargo Tank Accident Investigations 
Accident investigations were also reviewed to identify key factors for inclusion in a 
database enabling statistical analyses of container performance.  The following sources 
represent serious relatively unique accidents that could have been avoided.  Similar accidents 
should be easily identified by the proposed database. 
Safety Advisory: Chlorine Transfer Hose Failure (U.S. Chemical Safety and 
Hazard Investigation Board 2002).  This investigation reviewed an incident occurring on 
August 14, 2002 in which a chlorine railcar transfer hose ruptured catastrophically and 
released 48,000 pounds of chlorine into nearby areas.  The U.S. Chemical Safety Board 
determined that the hose was made of an incorrect material and issued a Safety Advisory 
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recommending that chlorine handlers using non-metallic-lined chlorine transfer hoses ensure 
that these hoses are constructed with the appropriate structural braiding layer. 
Hazardous Materials Accident Brief: Collision of Cargo Tank Truck and 
Automobile and Subsequent Fire, Upper Pittsgrove Township, New Jersey, July 1, 
2009 (NTSB 2009).  This investigation involved the collision of an MC 306 cargo tank 
semitrailer and an automobile in which the automobile became wedged beneath the cargo 
tank truck and was dragged about 500 feet.  As a result of the crash, loading line four was 
ruptured. Because the cargo tank’s loading lines contained gasoline, about 13 gallons were 
released and ignited.  Similar accidents had occurred in Yonkers, New York on October 9, 
1997 and in Wilmington, Delaware on February 15, 1998.  The NTSB recommended that 
carrying of hazardous materials in cargo tank external piping should be prohibited. 
Hazardous Materials Accident Brief: Release of Hazardous Materials From 
Cargo Tank in Middletown, Ohio, on August 22, 2003 (NTSB 2004).  This 
investigation involved an MC 331 cargo tank in which the front head cracked open while the 
cargo tank was being loaded, releasing anhydrous ammonia, a poisonous and corrosive gas.  
The cargo tank head had a 16-inch long, through-wall crack next to the radial weld as well as 
two other cracks that did not lead to lading loss.  The cracks formed as a result of stress-
corrosion cracking occurring when carbon steel, in the presence of a caustic material, is 
exposed to tensile stresses.  It is recommended that anhydrous ammonia containing less than 
0.2 percent water by weight should not be loaded into cargo tanks manufactured of 
quenched and tempered steel (marked QT). 
Hazardous Materials Accident Brief: Catastrophic Structural Failure of MC-
307 Cargo Tank South Charleston, WV, January 5, 2002 (NTSB 2003).  This 
investigation involved the catastrophic structural failure between the front and center tanks 
of an MC 307 cargo tank consisting of three independent but connected tanks.  The incident 
resulted in the closure of an intersection for 7 hours and although no hazardous materials 
were released, the total cost of damage, clean-up, and lost revenues was estimated to be 
$18,000.  The catastrophic structural failure was determined to be the result of extensive 
corrosion.  It was recommended that all similar tanks to be inspected for corrosion and that 
inspection continue to occur periodically. 
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3.3 Industry Knowledge and Opinion 
A successful accident damage database requires the collection of relevant 
information at minimal cost and with full cooperation or participation from the key industry 
stakeholders including package manufacturers, carriers, shippers, and repair facilities.  Several 
companies from each stakeholder group were visited and interviewed to determine what 
information is currently recorded regarding bulk package design and/or accident damage.   
Through these stakeholder interviews, it was ascertained that, due to the large 
differences in bulk package use and accident performance associated with different 
specification containers, a process to engage a larger number of stakeholders was required.  
Therefore, a set of stakeholder surveys were developed and distributed, where possible 
through their respective industry associations.  For stakeholders who were not members or 
affiliates of industry associations, survey invitations were sent to selected individuals. 
The following sections describe the survey process and information collected 
regarding the current use of accident damage protection and accident prevention measures, 
tank parts and appurtenances of interest, and proposed accident data fields.    
3.3.1 Site Visits 
The project team visited a single-stage manufacturing facility (Facility A), a final-stage 
manufacturing and repair facility (Facility B), and a repair facility (Facility C) to achieve the 
following objectives:  
 Learn about design, manufacturing, and repair processes that are unique to cargo 
tank trailers and cargo tank motor vehicles.   
 Identify additional data fields that should be considered for inclusion in a 
possible accident damage database. 
Budget constraints prevented visits to facilities for ISO/UN portable tanks, as they 
tend to be located outside of the United States. The following subsections summarize what 
was learned at each site. 
3.3.1.1 Facility A – Single-Stage Manufacturer 
Facility A is a single-stage trailer manufacturing facility in which the tank is 
manufactured and mounted on a truck chassis or trailer frame.  Facility A produces an 
average of 7,000 tanks per year (over the past 30 years) of which approximately ¾ are DOT 
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406 containers.  For each tank produced, this facility records the following information in a 
regularly maintained database:  
 Tank identification number. 
 Original owner. 
 Date of manufacture. 
 Design type. 
 Model. 
 Total trailer capacity. 
 Gross axle weight. 
 Number of axles. 
 Number of compartments. 
 Compartment size. 
 Number of bulkheads. 
 Load corresponding to compartment size. 
Additionally, certificates of compliance are kept on file and drawings for each model 
have been retained for the past 50 years.  Therefore, design information is still available for 
most tanks manufactured by this supplier that continue to be operated.   
The representatives at Facility A are proponents for improving the roll stability of 
their trailers by including a trailer-mounted roll stability control (RSC) system and mounting 
the tanks on a “wide-track” where dual wheels are spaced at 77.5 inches, as opposed to 
“narrow track” where dual wheels are spaced at 71.5 inches.  They indicated that these two 
measures are among the most influential measures for reducing rollovers; however, they are 
often difficult to implement because:  
 Some states do not allow wide-track trailers.  
 Insurance companies do not provide reduced premium incentives for roll 
stability devices; therefore, it is difficult to convince tank owners to pay for the 
extra cost for installation of these systems. 
Facility A representatives indicated that PHMSA Form 5800.1 would be useful; 
however, it is their belief that the reported data are neither accurate nor complete.   
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Furthermore, the form lacks the capability to identify whether the tank itself 
ruptured or if lading loss occurred solely because of some non-accident causes such as 
closures that have not been properly secured.  It was suggested that an accident damage 
database would benefit from the inclusion of information recorded on the name plate and 
specification plate affixed to each tank that provide basic specification information as well as 
the following information:  
 Length of the trailer and all containers.  
 Length and dimensions of the ruptured tank. 
 Location of the ruptured tank (within the trailer). 
 Shape of the tank (round or oval). 
 Gross vehicle weight. 
Additionally, this facility suggested that design breakthroughs or regulatory 
accommodations are needed to offset the weight of damage prevention measures.  Unless 
weight-offsetting measures are identified and implemented, the managers at Facility A 
concluded that additional strategies would not be voluntarily adopted because of the 
difficulty in simultaneously increasing state weight limits.   
3.3.1.2 Facility B – Final-Stage Manufacturer and Repair Facility 
Facility B is a final-stage manufacturing and repair facility that focuses on the 
assembly, repair, and inspection of truck-mounted atmospheric and low-pressure aluminum 
bulk packages.  Testing includes annual and 5-year inspections as well as biannual ultrasonic 
thickness testing at approximately 160 points around the bulkhead and in areas that have 
high stresses (structural areas).  Facility B includes top safety performance in their goals, 
provides expertise at the scene of hazardous materials tank truck crashes, and trains DOT 
officers in techniques for investigating crash sites.   
Facility B representatives identified two main causes of lading loss:  
 Rollover accidents in which the structural support for the tank influences 
whether or not lading loss occurs.  Tanks lacking an underbelly structure often 
twist in rollover accidents.  When this occurs, the bulkheads are typically torn at 
the seams, resulting in a leak that fills the void space between bulkheads (if there 
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are multiple compartments in a tank).  The product then fills the void space and 
exits the tank through specification vents.   
 Accidents involving another vehicle in which incorrectly repaired piping is 
compromised.  Facility B representatives indicated that they have noticed piping 
repairs performed by other repair facilities in which a crack that initiated in the 
shear plane has been welded closed.  The shear plane is designed to allow 
appurtenances such as external piping to break free so that the tank is not 
compromised in an accident scenario. This means that welding near the shear 
plane may result in rupture of the bulk package if it is involved in an accident. 
Additionally, when fatigue cracks develop in the shell, such as what might occur 
around support appendages, the influence of repair, maintenance, and qualification practices 
on the performance of cargo tanks that are later involved in crashes deserves more analysis. 
In addition to examining tank maintenance practices and structural integrity histories 
in an accident damage database, Facility B representatives indicated it would be useful to 
include the year the trailer was manufactured as well as whether the vehicle was equipped 
with roll stability control.   
3.3.1.3 Facility C – Repair Facility 
Facility C is part of a national chain of repair facilities that primarily conduct 
inspections and scheduled maintenance on atmospheric pressure (MC 306 and DOT 406), 
low pressure chemical (MC 307 and DOT 407), corrosive material (MC 312 and DOT 412), 
and liquefied high pressure gas (MC 331) bulk packages.  Of the tanks inspected at this 
facility, it was reported that approximately 30 percent are cracked (typically around dolly legs 
or the rear bulkhead) or leaking (typically in pipes that are clamped together as opposed to 
one-piece bent piping).  Facility C’s representative indicated that even MC 331 bulk packages 
are susceptible to structural discrepancies (such as corrosion in the shell) that may make the 
shell less able to withstand a crash. 
Facility C repairs tanks that have been involved in an accident approximately once a 
month.  Accident damage is typically in the form of either dents in the tank shell or piping 
that has sheared away from the bulk package.   
Facility C representatives indicated that the only information they would be 
interested in obtaining from a database is information regarding who had performed a 
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previous repair.  Furthermore, although inspection forms are filled out on a computer, the 
facility maintains only hard copies of repair information and would prefer faxing information 
pertaining to a possible accident damage database in the future (particularly if participation 
was voluntary). 
3.3.2 Surveys 
Due to the potential differences in the use of bulk package accident performance 
data, five surveys, targeting package manufacturers, carriers, shippers, repair facilities, and 
researchers, were developed.  One of the objectives of the surveys was to gain insight on 
what information different stakeholders believe would be most useful in an accident damage 
database.  Questions were tailored to each survey group to maximize collecting information 
best known by those industry sectors.  Copies of the surveys, as well as an explanation of the 
survey questions, can be found in Appendix A. 
As part of the survey process the following industry organizations were asked to 
encourage their members to participate by filling out a survey:   
 Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association (TTMA). 
 International Tank Container Organization (ITCO). 
 National Tank Truck Carriers Inc. (NTTC). 
 American Chemistry Council (ACC). 
 American Petroleum Institute (API). 
 Compressed Gas Association (CGA). 
 American Trucking Associations (ATA). 
 American Transportation Research Institute (ATRI). 
3.3.2.1 Response Rates 
The response rates for the survey (Table 3.10) were on par with response rates of 
previous industry surveys.  Since the number of responses is considered a small sample size 
(less than 30), generalization of responses to a particular stakeholder group may include 
biases that are unable to be detected.  However, by pooling survey responses together, 
industry preferences may be accurately portrayed. 
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Table 3.10 Survey Response Rates 
Stakeholders 
Estimated Number of 
People Surveyed 
Number of Responses 
Received 
Approximate 
Response Rate 
Manufacturers 20 3 15% 
Repair Facilities 70 8 11% 
Carriers 360 29 8% 
Shippers 32 7 22% 
Researchers 38 8 21% 
 
3.3.2.2 Demographics of Survey Responders  
Survey responders were asked several demographic questions in order to be able to 
relate their opinions to the opinions of other stakeholder groups.  Two of the manufacturers 
were single-stage manufacturers while one was an incomplete vehicle manufacturer.  They 
mostly manufactured trailer-mounted tanks although some MC 306/DOT 406 and MC 331 
tanks were truck-mounted.  Similarly, the majority of repair facilities repair trailer-mounted 
bulk packages with the exception of two facilities that repair mostly truck-mounted bulk 
packages. 
The number of survey respondents manufacturing, repairing, or using different bulk 
packages, as shown in Tables 3.11 through 3.17, show that with the exception of the 
manufacture of cryogenic liquid cargo tanks (MC 338) and compressed gas tube trailers, 
most types of DOT-specification bulk packages are represented to some degree by survey 
responses.  In contrast, Table 3.19 shows that the portable tank industry is underrepresented 
by survey responses.  Furthermore, survey responses convey opinions of portions of the 
industry working with other types of tanks including non-specification tanks used for 
combustible materials (Table 3.18), food grade packages and vacuum packages (Table 3.20).  
Comparing Tables 3.11 through 3.20, the top three bulk packages used by the carrier survey 
respondents  are low-pressure cargo tanks (built to MC 307 or DOT 407 specifications), 
atmospheric-pressure cargo tanks (built to MC 306 or DOT 406 specifications) and 
corrosive cargo tanks (built to MC 312 or DOT 412 specifications).  The top three bulk 
packages used by the shipper survey respondents are low-pressure cargo tanks (built to MC 
307 or DOT 407 specifications), corrosive cargo tanks (built to MC 312 or DOT 412 
specifications), high-pressure gas cargo tanks (built to MC 331 specifications), and 
pressurized UN portable tanks.   
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Table 3.11 Number of Respondents Working with Atmospheric-Pressure Cargo 
Tanks (MC 306 or DOT 406) 
Stakeholder 
Number of 
Stakeholder 
Companies 
% of 
Stakeholder 
Respondents Quantity of Tanks per Year 
Bulk Tank Manufacturers 2 67% 100 – 1,000 
Repair Facilities 5 63%     1 –    199 (< 50% damaged in accidents) 
 1 13% 200 –    499 (< 25% damaged in accidents) 
 1 13%        > 1,000 (< 25% damaged in accidents) 
Carriers 17 59% -- 
Shippers 2 29% -- 
Note: ‘--' indicates that information concerning the quantity of tanks per year was not gathered 
Table 3.12 Number of Respondents Working with Low Pressure Cargo Tanks  
(MC 307 or DOT 407) 
Stakeholder 
Number of 
Stakeholder 
Companies 
% of 
Stakeholder 
Respondents Quantity of Tanks per Year 
Bulk Tank Manufacturers 2 67% 100 – 1,000  
Repair Facilities 4 50%     1 –    199 (< 25% damaged in accidents) 
 1 13% 500 – 1,000 (< 25% damaged in accidents) 
 1 13%        > 1,000 (< 25% damaged in accidents) 
Carriers 23 79% -- 
Shippers 5 71% -- 
Note: ‘--' indicates that information concerning the quantity of tanks per year was not gathered 
Table 3.13 Number of Respondents Working with Corrosive Cargo Tanks  
(MC 312 or DOT 412) 
Stakeholder 
Number of 
Stakeholder 
Companies 
% of 
Stakeholder 
Respondents Quantity of Tanks per Year 
Bulk Tank Manufacturers 2 67%   10 –     99 
Repair Facilities 4 50%     1 –    199 (< 25% damaged in accidents) 
 1 13% 200 –    499 (< 25% damaged in accidents) 
Carriers 15 52%   -- 
Shippers 5 71%   -- 
Note: ‘--' indicates that information concerning the quantity of tanks per year was not gathered 
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Table 3.14 Number of Respondents Working with High Pressure Gas Cargo Tanks 
(MC 331) 
Stakeholder 
Number of 
Stakeholder 
Companies 
% of 
Stakeholder 
Respondents Quantity of Tanks per Year 
Bulk Tank Manufacturers 1 33%   10 –      99 
Repair Facilities 4 50%     1 –    199 (< 25% damaged in accidents) 
Carriers 9 31%    -- 
Shippers 5 71%    -- 
Note: ‘--' indicates that information concerning the quantity of tanks per year was not gathered 
Table 3.15 Number of Respondents Working with Cryogenic Liquid Cargo Tanks 
(MC 338) 
Stakeholder 
Number of 
Stakeholder 
Companies 
% of 
Stakeholder 
Respondents Quantity of Tanks per Year 
Bulk Tank Manufacturers 0 0%    -- 
Repair Facilities 2 25%     1 –    199 (< 25% damaged in accidents) 
Carriers 3 10%    -- 
Shippers 2 29%    -- 
Note: ‘--' indicates that information concerning the quantity of tanks per year was not gathered 
Table 3.16 Number of Respondents Working with Asphalt Cargo Tanks 
Stakeholder 
Number of 
Stakeholder 
Companies 
% of 
Stakeholder 
Respondents Quantity of Tanks per Year 
Bulk Tank Manufacturers 1 33%   10 –      99 
 1 33% 100 – 1,000 
Repair Facilities 1 13%     1 –    199 (< 25% damaged in accidents) 
 1 13% 200 –    499 (< 25% damaged in accidents) 
Carriers 3 10%   -- 
Shippers 0 0%     -- 
Note: ‘--' indicates that information concerning the quantity of tanks per year was not gathered 
Table 3.17 Number of Respondents Working with Compressed Gas Tube Trailers 
Stakeholder 
Number of 
Stakeholder 
Companies 
% of 
Stakeholder 
Respondents Quantity of Tanks per Year 
Bulk Tank Manufacturers 0 0%     -- 
Repair Facilities 2 25%     1 –     199  
Carriers 3 10%     -- 
Shippers 3 43%     -- 
Note: ‘--' indicates that information concerning the quantity of tanks per year was not gathered 
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Table 3.18 Number of Respondents Working with Non-Specification Tanks for 
Combustible Materials 
Stakeholder 
Number of 
Stakeholder 
Companies 
% of 
Stakeholder 
Respondents Quantity of Tanks per Year 
Bulk Tank Manufacturers 2 67%   10 –      99 
Repair Facilities 0 0%     1 –    199 (< 25% damaged in accidents) 
Carriers 5 17%     -- 
Shippers 0 0%     -- 
Note: ‘--' indicates that information concerning the quantity of tanks per year was not gathered 
Table 3.19 Number of Respondents Working with Portable Tanks 
Stakeholder 
Number of 
Stakeholder 
Companies 
% of 
Stakeholder 
Respondents Type of Portable Tank 
Bulk Tank Manufacturers 0 0%   -- 
Repair Facilities 0 0%   -- 
Carriers 1 10%   Pressurized UN Portable Tank 
 1 10%   Cryogenic UN Portable Tank 
Shippers 3 43%   Non-Pressurized UN Portable Tank 
 4 57%   Pressurized UN Portable Tank 
 2 29%   Cryogenic UN Portable Tank 
Note: ‘--' indicates that information concerning the type of portable tank was not gathered 
Table 3.20 Number of Respondents Working with Other Types of Bulk Packages 
Stakeholder 
Number of 
Stakeholder 
Companies 
% of 
Stakeholder 
Respondents Package Type 
Quantity of 
Tanks Per Year 
Bulk Tank Manufacturers 1 33% Food Grade Package > 1,000 
 1 33% Vacuum Package 100 – 1,000 
Repair Facilities 0 0%  -- 
Carriers 4 14% Other -- 
Shippers 1 14% Other -- 
Note: ‘--' indicates that information concerning the quantity of tanks per year was not gathered 
 
Chemical/petroleum carriers were also asked questions concerning the number of 
trips made per year.  In general, there was a wide range in the reported number of bulk tank 
deliveries of hazardous materials made per year.  Four carriers make between 100 and 999 
deliveries per year, eleven make between 1,000 and 9,999 deliveries per year, five reported to 
make between 10,000 and 50,000 deliveries per year, and nine reported making over 50,000 
deliveries per year. The seven shipper respondents represented shipping operations of 
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various sizes.  The majority of shipper respondents reported that their companies made 
between 10,000 and 50,000 highway shipments of hazardous materials using bulk tanks in 
North America, while one shipper reported to make between 1,000 and 9,999 shipments and 
two others to make over 50,000 shipments.  The types of hazardous materials shipped by 
these companies represent all classes of materials. 
Table 3.21 illustrates to hazardous material classes transported by 29 carriers and 7 
shippers.  The majority of carriers who responded to the survey transport Class 3 – 
flammable and/or combustible liquids (transported by 90% of respondents), Class 8 – 
corrosive substances (transported by 83% of respondents), and Class 9 – miscellaneous 
hazardous materials/products, substances, or organisms (transported by 72% of 
respondents). 
Furthermore, both carrier and shipper respondents agree that the majority of bulk 
packages are owned by carriers, a sizeable number of bulk packages are owned by shippers, 
and few are owned by lessors (Tables 3.22 and 3.23). 
Hazardous material bulk package researchers were also asked a series of 
demographic questions.  The primary focus of the respondents research include risk analysis 
of hazardous materials transportation by alternate modes (including rail and waterways), risk 
assessment of the safety of hazardous materials transportation, and bulk package 
performance research (including procedures to determine package integrity, examination of 
tank behavior, and manufacturing characteristics that affect tank integrity and the dynamic 
safety of tank trucks, tank design, baffles design, and anti-slosh). Related bulk package 
research involving the respondents include:  
 All aspects of cargo tank performance. 
 The relationship between accident environments and cargo environments or how 
the conveyance protects the cargo from severe accidents. 
 The effect of infrastructure quality on accident probability. 
 Accident likelihood.  
 Consequences given that an accident has occurred. 
 Rollover, stability and control. 
 Bulk package risk assessment. 
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Table 3.21 Hazardous Material Classes Transported by Respondents to Carrier and 
Shipper Surveys 
Hazardous Material Class 
Number of 
Carriers 
% of Carrier 
Respondents 
Number of 
Shippers 
% of Shipper 
Respondents 
Class 2 23 79% 5 71% 
Division 2.1 – Flammable gases 9 31% 3 43% 
Division 2.2 – Non-flammable, non-
toxic gases 
11 38% 4 57% 
Division 2.3 – Toxic gases 3 10% 3 43% 
Class 3 – Flammable liquids  
(and combustible liquids) 
26 90% 4 57% 
Class 4 3 10% 4 57% 
Division 4.1 – Flammable solids 0 0% 0 0% 
Division 4.2 – Spontaneously 
combustible materials 
2 7% 2 29% 
Division 4.3 – Water-reactive 
substances/dangerous when wet 
materials 
1 3% 4 57% 
Class 5 13 45% 1 14% 
Division 5.1 – Oxidizing substances 10 34% 1 14% 
Division 5.2 – Organic peroxides 3 10% 1 14% 
Class 6 13 45% 2 29% 
Division 6.1 – Toxic substances 13 45% 2 29% 
Division 6.2 – Infectious substances 0 0% 0 0% 
Class 8 – Corrosive substances 24 83% 5 71% 
Class 9 – Miscellaneous hazardous 
materials/products, substances, or 
organisms 
21 72% 3 43% 
Note: More than one class of material may be hauled by carriers or shipped by chemical/petroleum shippers.   
Table 3.22 Bulk Package Ownership (as Reported by Carrier Respondents) 
Number of Respondents 
Ownership Split 
% Carrier Owned % Shipper Owned % Lessor Owned 
10 100% 0% 0% 
11 80% – 99% 0 – 19% 0% 
3 80% – 99% 0% 0 – 19% 
2 60% – 79% 20% – 39% 0% 
1 0% – 19% 80% – 99% 0% 
1 0% – 19% 0% 80% – 99% 
1 0% 0% 100% 
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Table 3.23 Bulk Package Ownership (as Reported by Shipper Respondents)  
Number of Respondents 
Ownership Split 
% Carrier % Shipper % Lessor 
1 100% 0% 0% 
1 80% – 99% 0 – 19% 0% 
1 60% – 79% 20% – 39% 0% – 19% 
1 60% 40% 0% 
1 40% 60% 0% 
1 20% – 39% 60% – 79% 20% – 39% 
1 0% 100% 0% 
 
Years of experience of the researchers ranged from three years to 35 years, with a 
median of 20 years.  Only one of the researcher survey respondents was employed by an 
organization that maintained data regarding cargo tank accident performance measures.  
Additionally, to relate hazardous material researcher’s responses to other stakeholder groups, 
researchers were asked to indicate with which types of bulk tanks they are most interested.  
Figure 3.8 illustrates the reported interest of the hazardous materials researcher groups. 
 
Figure 3.8 Researcher Interest in Specific Bulk Packages 
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3.3.2.3 Types of Accident Damage Protection and Accident Prevention Measures 
Implemented 
Manufacturers, carriers, and shippers were asked questions concerning the 
implementation of accident damage protection and accident prevention measures to gauge 
the types of strategies currently adopted by the industry, and also to determine who might be 
key motivators in adopting future strategies.  A summary of the survey results is provided in 
Table 3.24. 
Table 3.24 Number of Companies (by Stakeholder Group) that Have Incorporated 
Accident Damage Protection and Prevention Measures Beyond Federal Standards 
  
Bulk Package 
Manufacturers Carriers Shippers 
No additional measures specified 1 8 1 
Accident damage protection measures    
 
Fittings Protection Beyond Federal Standards 2 8 2 
 
Additional Shell Protection 2 1 0 
 
Increased Tank Wall Thickness 2 5 1 
  Other 0 2 5 
Accident prevention measures    
 
Lowered center of gravity 1 10 3 
 
Wider wheel-base 2 8 2 
 
Electronic stability control 2 13 1 
 
Truck-mounted roll stability control (RSC) 2 13 2 
 
Trailer-mounted roll stability control (RSC) 2 12 3 
 
Improved Brakes (including disc and hybrid drum-disc 
brake configurations) 
2 8 1 
 
Electronic Data Recorders (EDRs) N/A 10 2 
 
Tire Pressure Monitors 2 15 2 
 
Automated Transmissions N/A 9 1 
 
Speed Limiters N/A 21 3 
 
Truck-Specific Navigation (including Global Position 
System (GPS) navigation aids) 
N/A 10 2 
 
Truck Conspicuity (devices that make the truck more 
visible) and Enhanced Lighting/Signaling beyond that 
which is required by regulations 
2 9 0 
 
From the manufacturers that replied to the survey, the incorporation of accident 
damage protection measures beyond federal standards into standard tank designs is not a 
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generally adopted practice in the bulk package manufacturing industry.  There was one 
response for each of “never”, “occasionally – only at the request of our customers” and 
“usually – a standard feature on our bulk tanks” for the following accident damage 
protection measures:  
 Fitting protection beyond federal standards. 
 Additional shell protection. 
 Increased tank wall thickness. 
The accident prevention measures that have been incorporated into standard tank 
design by at least one manufacturer include lowered center of gravity, electronic stability 
control or trailer-mounted roll stability control (RSC), and truck conspicuity and enhanced 
lighting/signaling beyond what is required by regulation.  The other accident measures 
included in the survey (wider wheel track, advanced braking technology such as disc and 
hybrid drum-disk brake configurations, and tire pressure monitors) tend to only be included 
at the request of a customer.   
Of the carriers that replied to the survey, 41% indicated they would consider 
additional design features offered while 28% indicated that they have a company policy that 
identifies additional requirements.  The additional design features considered or specified 
primarily include fittings protection beyond federal standards and, to a lesser extent, 
increased tank wall thickness.  Only one carrier identifies additional shell protection as a 
company-specified accident damage protection measure required for the vehicles/cargo 
tanks used for their deliveries.  There are a number of different accident prevention design 
features incorporated into bulk packages owned by carriers (Figure 3.9).  However, there is 
no generally accepted accident prevention measure used by all carriers who specify or 
consider additional design features above and beyond the minimum federal requirements for 
bulk packages used to transport hazardous materials.  Furthermore, 28% of carrier survey 
respondents reported that they do not specify additional design features above and beyond 
the minimum federal requirements for bulk tanks used to transport hazardous materials. 
The majority of shipper respondents have a company policy that identifies additional 
design features above and beyond the minimum federal requirements for bulk tanks used to 
transport hazardous materials.  These additional requirements include the following accident 
damage protection:  
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 Fitting protection beyond federal standards. 
 Elimination of bottom outlets for certain products. 
 Thicker shell. 
 Higher test pressure. 
 
Figure 3.9 Accident Prevention Design Features Above and Beyond the Minimum 
Federal Requirements Specified or Considered for Carrier-Owned Bulk Packages 
In addition, several shippers reported that they require a variety of accident 
prevention measures.  The accident prevention measures most often required include 
lowered center of gravity, trailer-mounted roll stability control (RSC), and speed limiters. 
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3.3.2.4 Best Ways to Reduce Conditional Probability of Release 
All of the stakeholder groups were asked questions concerning the most effective 
means to improve accident damage performance of bulk packages.  In addition to 
responding to the questions asked, several survey respondents also provided suggestions for 
reducing the probability of accident occurrence.  Suggested accident prevention measures 
and protection devices are summarized in Table 3.25.   
Table 3.25 Measures to Reduce the Risk of a Spill and/or The Volume of Lading 
Released in a Crash 
 Identified By: 
Measure 
Bulk Package 
Manufacturer 
Repair 
Facility Carrier Shipper 
Researcher / 
Government 
For Improved Accident Protection      
Top fitting protection 
enhancements (enlarge and 
increase robustness of ‘spill 
boxes’) 
✓  ✓  ✓ 
Improved bottom fittings 
protection / protective cages 
around any piping 
 ✓ ✓ ✓  
Remove bottom fittings     
 
✓ 
Locate manual valves close to 
the tank 
   ✓  
Use the trailer frame to provide 
valve and piping protection 
  ✓ ✓  
Provide fitting securement of all 
closures 
   ✓  
Reduce unnecessary fittings    
 
✓  
Ensure piping, vents, piping 
protection, dolly legs, and rear 
tires do not extend beyond the 
profile of the tank 
  ✓   
Use a ‘wheels back’ trailer 
design to add additional 
protection in rear-end collisions 
   ✓  
Install under-ride protection   
 
✓   
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Table 3.25 (cont.) 
 Identified By: 
Measure 
Bulk Package 
Manufacturer 
Repair 
Facility Carrier Shipper 
Researcher / 
Government 
Stronger bulkheads  
 
✓    
Continuous frame rails   
 
✓    
Better dome lids 
 
 
✓ 
 
✓   
Better internal valves 
 
 
✓    
Self-closing stop valves / 
Emergency valves 
✓     
Increase material thickness 
(shell and head) 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Use stainless steel whenever 
possible 
  ✓   
Use rupture-resistant material 
and/or self-sealing materials 
    ✓ 
Use compartmented tanks     
 
✓  
Incorporate an isolation layer     
 
✓ 
Add side impact protection 
(perhaps designing ‘airbags’) 
  ✓   
Use DOT specification tanks 
even for non-regulated materials 
   ✓  
Strap together tube tanks on 
trailers 
   ✓  
Proper maintenance of 
equipment, valves and domes 
  ✓   
Employ an effective inspection 
and maintenance program 
   ✓  
Make sure load is secure and 
valves and manholes are 
properly closed and secure 
  ✓   
Maintain spill kits and provide 
training on how to use them 
  ✓   
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Table 3.25 (cont.) 
 Identified By: 
Measure 
Bulk Package 
Manufacturer 
Repair 
Facility Carrier Shipper 
Researcher / 
Government 
To Prevent Accidents      
Accident avoidance technology 
 
✓     
Increase roll/yaw stability limits 
through tank designs and 
mountings, baffles, or stability 
control devices 
    
✓ 
Driver / personnel training 
 
✓     
Road design 
 
✓     
Identifying operational factors 
 
✓     
Reduce speed limit 
    
 
✓ 
Manufacturers. With regards to the most effective means to improve accident 
damage protection, the general opinion is that, in the words of one manufacturer, “the 
current requirements of 49 CFR 178-345-8 are very effective in protecting against 
accident[s].” Nonetheless, top-fitting protection enhancements were identified as beneficial. 
Repair facilities. In addition to identifying the measures/devices in Table 3.25, 
repair facilities rated existing measures/devices for their effectiveness.  They indicated that 
lowered center of gravity, electronic stability control (ESC), and improved brakes (including 
disc and hybrid drum-disc brake configurations) were the most effective accident prevention 
measures, followed by wider wheel-base and speed limiters. 
Carriers. In addition to identifying the measures/devices in Table 3.25, it was also 
suggested that a redesign may be necessary to improve safety because “without a complete 
redesign of tanks as they are today, safety in design is at its current limit.”  
Shippers. Shippers suggested that the most effective means to improve accident 
damage protection was to ensure appurtenances attached to cargo tanks are kept within the 
profile of the tank, strap together tube tanks on trailers, apply enhancements to the tanks’ 
damage protection system, and increase the shell thickness.   
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Researchers. Researchers also suggested reducing the energy delivered to the 
container by properly designing the conveyance. 
3.3.2.5 Tank Parts and Appurtenances to Include in the Proposed Database 
Identification of bulk package design performance measures is the main goal of an 
accident damage database.  To achieve this goal, tank parts and appurtenances that may 
influence bulk package performance should be included.  To determine which parts of the 
tank are usually damaged, the stakeholders were asked to consider three types of accidents 
that may or may not result in lading loss: the first type of accident consists of incidents in 
which the bulk package experiences a rollover; the second type consists of incidents in which 
there are one or more additional vehicles involved in the crash; and the third type consists of 
incidents in which the vehicle transporting hazardous materials is the only vehicle involved 
and it does not rollover.  Of the parts of the tank most likely to be damaged in each of the 
accident scenarios, the stakeholders were also asked to identify which would most likely 
result in a release of lading.  Survey responses are summarized in Tables 3.26 through 3.28 
respectively.   
Another consideration when determining variables to include in an accident damage 
database is how manageable the data collection will be. Therefore, manufacturers, carriers, 
shippers, and researchers/government officials were asked to indicate their interest in having 
the following tank parts evaluated in terms of their contribution to a reduction in the 
probability and severity of a hazardous material spill resulting from a crash involving a bulk 
package (Table 3.29): 
 Roll stability devices (e.g., electronic stability control or roll stability control 
devices). 
 Accident prevention devices (e.g., improved brakes, increased nighttime visibility 
devices). 
 Accident protection devices (e.g., rollover damage protection device, rear-end 
tank protection, stop-valves, and shear sections).  
 Wet lines. 
 Valve design and location. 
 Tank shape.  
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Table 3.26 Tank Parts Usually Damaged or Resulting in Loss of Lading When the 
Bulk Package Overturns 
 Identified By: 
Tank Part 
Bulk Package 
Manufacturer 
Repair 
Facility Carrier Shipper 
Researcher / 
Government 
Tank shell       
Tank heads      
Support structure: rings, 
bolsters, baffles, and bulkheads 
     
Jacket material      
Top fittings: valves, pipe 
nozzles, piping, hydraulic 
assemblies, pressure relief 
devices, clean out caps, domes, 
etc. 
     
Rupture disc (on cryogenic 
trailers) 
     
Bottom fittings / piping      
Rear fittings / piping      
Vapor recovery system      
Rollover protection      
Frame rails      
Ladders, fenders, hose trays, 
tool boxes 
     
Axles, suspension, landing gear, 
fifth wheel plate 
     
Wheels, rims, and tires      
Note:  denotes tank parts likely to be damaged and  denotes tank parts most likely to result in a 
release if damaged. 
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Table 3.27 Tank Parts Usually Damaged or Resulting in Loss of Lading When There 
are One or More Additional Vehicles Involved in the Crash 
 Identified By: 
Tank Part 
Bulk Package 
Manufacturer 
Repair 
Facility Carrier Shipper 
Researcher / 
Government 
Tank shell 
     
Tank heads      
Bulkheads      
Jacket material      
Underride and rear end 
protection 
     
Front bumper, fairing and 
radiator 
     
Pressure relief devices      
Bottom fittings / piping      
Rear fittings / piping      
Internal valves      
Manways      
Frame rails      
Ladders, fenders, hose trays, 
tool boxes 
     
protective cage      
Drain lines      
Rollover protection      
Axles, suspension, landing gear, 
fifth wheel plate 
     
Note:  denotes tank parts likely to be damaged and  denotes tank parts most likely to result in a 
release if damaged. 
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Table 3.28 Tank Parts Usually Damaged or Resulting in Loss of Lading When the 
Vehicle Transporting Hazardous Materials is the Only Vehicle Involved and it Does 
Not Rollover 
 Identified By: 
Tank Part 
Bulk Package 
Manufacturer 
Repair 
Facility Carrier Shipper 
Researcher / 
Government 
Tank shell      
Tank heads      
Support structure: rings, 
bolsters, baffles, and bulkheads 
     
Rupture disc      
Internal valves      
Front bumper, fairing and 
radiator 
     
Frame rails      
Jacket material      
Underride and rear end 
protection 
     
Top fittings: vents, valves, pipe 
nozzles, piping, hydraulic 
assemblies, pressure relief 
devices, clean out caps, 
manways, etc. 
     
Bottom fittings / piping      
Rear fittings / piping      
Ladders, fenders, hose trays, 
tool boxes 
     
Axles, suspension, landing 
gear, fifth wheel plate 
     
Note:  denotes tank parts likely to be damaged and  denotes tank parts most likely to result in a 
release if damaged. 
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Table 3.29 Stakeholder Interest in Tank Part Evaluation 
 Rated Interest  / Relevance Average 
Difficulty in 
Providing 
Information  
(as assessed 
by Repair 
Facilities) Tank Part 
Bulk Package 
Manufacturer Carrier Shipper 
Researcher / 
Government 
Roll stability devices  
(e.g., electronic stability 
control or roll stability control 
devices). 
66% 75% 71% 57% 39% 
Accident prevention devices  
(e.g., improved brakes, 
increased nighttime visibility 
devices). 
83% 75% 81% N/A N/A 
Accident protection devices  
(e.g., rollover damage 
protection device, rear-end 
tank protection, stop-valves, 
and shear sections).  
33% 70% 71% 62% 44% 
Wet lines. N/A 35% 28% 46% 55% 
Valve design and location. 33% 65% 66% 41% 44% 
Tank shape. 33% 60% 47% 57% 39% 
Tank wall thickness and 
material strength/toughness. 
33% 65% 57% 57% 39% 
Baffle and bulkhead location. 17% 54% 42% 47% 39% 
Notes: 
For bulk package manufacturers: Interest in the evaluation of tank parts was averaged in the following manner: 
(# of companies most interested  x 100% + # of companies that would also find the evaluation useful x 50%) 
/ total number of companies. 
For carriers and shippers: Interest in the evaluation of tank parts was averaged in the following manner: (# not 
interested  x 0 % + # somewhat interested  x 33% + # interested x 66% + # very interested x 100% ) / (# not 
interested + # somewhat interested + # interested + # very interested).   
For researchers/government officials: Relevance of the evaluation of tank parts was averaged in the following 
manner: (# not relevant  x 0% + # somewhat relevant  x 33% + # relevant x 66% + # very relevant x 100% ) 
/ (# not relevant + # somewhat relevant + # relevant + # very relevant).   
For evaluating the difficulty in providing information: (# of repair facilities opining it’s very easy  x 0% + # of 
repair facilities opining it’s easy  x 33% + # of repair facilities opining it’s difficult x 66% + # of repair facilities 
opining it’s very difficult x 100% ) / (Total number of repair facilities responding to the question). 
N/A = Not available 
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 Tank wall thickness and material strength/toughness. 
 Baffle and bulkhead location. 
Repair facilities were asked to evaluate the difficulty in providing bulk tank design 
information associated with the above tank parts and identify additional design features that 
should be evaluated for accident damage performance. 
Manufacturers.  Of the suggested items to be evaluated in a possible database, the 
bulk package manufacturers who responded to the survey are most interested in evaluations 
of roll stability devices and accident prevention devices.  Evaluations of accident protection 
devices, valve design and location, tank shape, tank wall thickness and material 
strength/toughness, and baffle and bulkhead locations were also identified to be useful. 
Repair Facilities.  Repair facility respondents indicated that existing venting 
requirements should be evaluated by the proposed possible accident damage database.  
Additionally, type and thickness of accident damage material and stressed areas and 
bulges/indentations between baffles of the tank should be included.    
Carriers. The majority of carrier respondents indicated that they were either 
interested or very interested in all of the items suggested above with the exception of wet 
lines.  Lowered center of gravity and corrosion resistance were also identified as 
performance measures to evaluate. 
Shippers.  The majority of shipper survey respondents indicated that they were 
either “interested” or “very interested” in the evaluation of roll stability devices, accident 
prevention devices, accident protection devices, valve design and location, and tank size.  
Shipper opinions ranged between “not interested” and “very interested” when considering 
the evaluation of tank shape, tank wall thickness and material strength/toughness, and tanks 
with a lowered center of gravity.  In comparison, shippers were less interested in the 
evaluation of baffle and bulkhead location and wet lines.   
Researchers.  In general researcher’s opinions on which package design information is 
useful to their research differed greatly from researcher to researcher.  Those who were 
interested in bulk tank performance and conditional probability of release indicated that the 
most useful package design information is type(s) of accident protection devices followed by 
type(s) of roll stability devices, tank shape, tank wall thickness, and baffle and bulkhead 
location.  Presence of wet lines, type of wet line construction, and valve design and location 
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were data fields judged to be not as useful to researchers focusing on bulk package 
performance.  Additional package design information to consider included the presence and 
type of top fittings protection, package capacity, type of mounts, and design center of gravity 
height.  For other researchers, including those who study risk associated with routing and 
evaluate hazardous material risks for other modes, package design information is less useful.   
3.3.2.6 Accident Data to Include in the Proposed Database 
The stakeholders were asked to indicate how useful the following accident 
information is for their business (Table 3.30): 
 Crash root cause (i.e., driver condition, location constraints). 
 Crash description (i.e., time of crash, number of vehicles). 
 Package design information (i.e., head thickness, cross-section shape, and 
dimensions). 
 Package damage/rupture information (i.e., damage location, damage type, size 
and depth of damage, wall thickness of damaged cargo tank). 
 Injury/fatality information (i.e., number of fatalities due to released lading). 
 Accident costs (i.e., repair costs, clean-up costs). 
 
Manufacturers. The bulk package manufacturers who responded to the survey had 
varying opinions on what would be most useful; however, they all agreed that the above 
categories of information would be at least somewhat useful.  Injury and fatality information 
as well as accident costs were rated the least useful overall.  
Carriers.  Throughout the survey carriers stressed the importance of including root cause 
information in such a database.  This desire for a process to evaluate crash root cause was 
confirmed by 97% of survey respondents indicating that this was either useful or very useful.  
Other accident information that the majority of carriers said they find useful or very useful 
include crash description (90% of survey respondents), accident costs (86% of survey 
respondents), package damage/rupture information (76%), and injury and fatality 
information (69%).  Package design information was regarded as only somewhat useful by a 
majority of survey respondents.  One carrier indicated that the type of hazardous material, 
age of vehicles, and equipment manufacturer would also be very useful for their business. 
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Table 3.30 Stakeholder Interest in Accident Information Evaluation 
 Rated Usefulness 
Accident Information 
Bulk Package 
Manufacturer Carrier Shipper 
Researcher / 
Government 
Crash root cause  
(i.e., driver condition, location 
constraints). 
78% 88% 81% 90% 
Crash description  
(i.e., time of crash, number of vehicles). 
66% 79% 62% 78% 
Package design information  
(i.e., head thickness, cross-section shape, 
and dimensions). 
66% 56% 71% 95% 
Package damage/rupture information  
(i.e., damage location, damage type, size 
and depth of damage, wall thickness of 
damaged cargo tank). 
66% 67% 71% 90% 
Injury/fatality information  
(i.e., number of fatalities due to released 
lading). 
44% 68% 52% 85% 
Accident costs  
(i.e., repair costs, clean-up costs). 
44% 77% 39% 62% 
Notes: 
Interest in the usefulness of accident information was averaged in the following manner: (# opining it’s not 
useful  x 0% + # opining it’s somewhat useful  x 33% + # opining it’s useful x 66% + # opining it’s very 
useful x 100% )/ total number of responders (per stakeholder group).   
 
Shippers.  Crash root cause, crash description, package design information, and 
package damage/rupture information were identified as the most useful accident 
information for shippers.  Opinions varied as to whether the other types of accident 
information were useful or not.  The least useful information was accident costs.  
Additionally, shippers believed that contributing causes (not just root cause), on-board video 
data, years of driver experience, and type of roadway/roadway class were all very useful 
accident information for their business.   
Researchers.  The majority of researcher survey respondents were interested in 
crash root cause, package design and package damage/rupture information while less interest 
was expressed regarding the collection of crash description, injury and fatality information 
and accident costs.  Interest was also expressed for the collection of the following types of 
accident data:  
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 Accident reconstruction data (i.e., initial speeds, masses, etc.). 
 Evacuation information. 
 Business disruption information. 
 Number of shipments of the package type. 
 Type of cargo. 
 Whether the package was loaded or empty. 
 Type of maneuver. 
 How much material was released. 
 Road and environment condition. 
Researchers were also asked to rate how relevant several package damage/rupture 
information descriptors are to their research.  Overall the following information was 
identified as relevant or very relevant by the majority of respondents:  
 Location of damage resulting in the most hazardous materials spilled.  
 Location of damage resulting in a hazardous material spilled. 
 Location of damage that did not result in a spill.  
 Dimensions of the crack, gouge, puncture, or rupture where the most hazardous 
material spilled.  
 Dimensions of cracks, gouges, punctures, or ruptures where hazardous material 
spilled.  
The following package damage or rupture information was identified as at least 
somewhat relevant by all but one respondent:  
 Location of initial point of impact. 
 Cause(s) of lading loss. 
 Dimensions of damage at non-spill locations. 
 Whether the crack or tear occurred because of damage to the fitting or 
appurtenance. 
 Location of damaged fitting. 
 Type of damaged fitting. 
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Furthermore, the following data are, in general, the least relevant package 
damage/rupture information:  
 Dimensions of dent, crack, puncture, or rupture at initial point of impact. 
 Shell or head thickness at initial point of impact, the location where the most 
hazardous material was spilled, locations resulting in a hazardous materials spill, 
and non-spill damage locations. 
 Whether the damage occurred near a previous repair. 
 Whether the previous repair influenced the structural integrity of the tank.  
 Whether the cargo tank was repaired to specification, repaired to non-
specification, or scrapped. 
Finally, researchers were asked what additional aspects a cargo tank performance 
database could easily accommodate.  The following is a list of the additional fields that 
should be considered: 
 Accident cause. 
– Vehicle speed. 
– Type of maneuver being undertaken at the time of the accident. 
– Road and environment conditions (dry, wet, ice/snow, visibility). 
 Material-related consequences. 
– Hazardous material type (UN/NA number, proper chemical name,  
and CAS #) 
– Hazardous material state (gas, liquid, or solid). 
– Load or fill volume. 
– Release amount. 
– Area affected. 
– Timeframe affected. 
– Topography or road slope characteristics at the incident site. 
– Type of response including number of units/personnel involved. 
 Maintenance information. 
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– Tank retest dates. 
– Repair description. 
– Repair location (on tank). 
– Name of inspection facility. 
– Name of repair facility. 
 Driver experience. 
 Location of accident (latitude and longitude). 
 Whether the tank rolled for a significant distance. 
Common accident identifier so that the proposed tank performance database can be 
matched with information on the same accident from other databases. 
3.3.2.7 Effectiveness of Existing Databases to Address Industry Issues 
The manufacturers and repair facilities that indicated that they were familiar with the 
Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS), the Hazardous Materials 
Incident Reporting System (HMIRS) and the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) also 
indicated, in general, that these databases were only somewhat useful in addressing industry 
issues.  On the other hand, the majority of carriers indicated they were familiar with MCMIS 
and HMIRS and thought that these two databases were useful in addressing industry issues. 
Ten carriers were also familiar with the Large Truck Crash Causation Study (LTCCS) and 
also found the database to be useful in addressing industry issues.  With regards to the 
researchers who responded to the survey, three of the four researchers familiar with MCMIS 
indicated that it is somewhat effective in addressing industry issues, while five of the six 
respondents familiar with HMIRS indicate that it is effective.  Similarly, all of the 
respondents familiar with FARS, Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA), and LTCCS 
think that these databases are effective in addressing industry issues. 
3.4 Information Collected By Existing Databases 
Several existing accident and hazardous materials data collection processes collect 
information that could be used to evaluate highway bulk package accident performance.  
These include:  
 71 
 
 Federal Motor Carriers Safety Administration (FMCSA)’s Motor Carrier 
Management Information System (MCMIS). 
 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)’s Hazardous 
Materials Incident Reporting System (HMIRS). 
 University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI)’s Trucks 
Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA). 
 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)’s National 
Automotive Sampling System (NASS) General Estimates System (GES). 
Additionally, the Railway Supply Institute (RSI) - Association of American Railroads 
(AAR) Tank Car Accident Database (TCAD) is an existing data collection process used for a 
comparable purpose in railroad transport.  It is anticipated that similar information would be 
collected by database that can be used to evaluate highway cargo tank and portable tanks’ 
performances in accidents.   
This section provides a comprehensive review of information collected by existing 
databases.  Information collected by each database was grouped into the following five 
categories:  
 Administrative Variables. These include identification numbers, information 
concerning the individual or agency submitting the report, and internal report 
tracking and validation information. 
 Accident Descriptors.  These include accident location, time and date, as well as 
external variables that may contribute to the root cause of the accident, such as 
weather conditions at the time of the accident. 
 Driver Descriptors.  These include driver identification information, employer 
information, and driver performance information. 
 Pre-Crash Vehicle Descriptors.  These include general vehicle/package, carrier, 
and cargo information. 
 Post-Crash Vehicle Descriptors.  These include variables describing the accident, 
accident severity, and damage sustained by the vehicle or lading retention system.   
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3.4.1 Administrative Variables 
3.4.1.1 Database Report Identifier 
All of the databases examined assign a unique identifier to each incident report 
submitted. 
3.4.1.2 Other Agency Identifiers  
Both HMIRS and MCMIS record identifiers assigned by other agencies.  For 
example, the HMIRS indicates that if another report is filled out by another federal agency 
such as the FMCSA, the report number should be provided.  On the other hand, FMCSA 
provides a field to record the DOT number, a unique report number designated by the state.  
HMIRS provides fields identifying whether a police report was filed and, if so, what the 
police report number was.  Similar fields are provided for fire/EMS responder reports.  
3.4.1.3 Reporting Requirements 
While HMIRS provides an indication of what type of incident occurred (hazardous 
material spill, undeclared shipment, or a non-release accident), MCMIS only provides an 
indication of whether or not the incident is federal or state recordable. 
3.4.1.4 From Whom/Where the Report Was Obtained  
By providing a trace to the original source of the information, missing or incorrect 
data fields can be completed or corrected.  The HMIRS and MCMIS databases provide a 
trace to the individual who completed the report, while the RSI-AAR TCAD traces to the 
reporting railroad but not the individual completing the report.  Since the GES database is 
meant to be a sample that is not traceable to an actual event, the GES database traces to the 
police jurisdiction and also includes fields pertaining to each sampling stage.  Case weight 
information is also recorded so that the importance of each case can be adjusted such that it 
is appropriately representative of its population. 
3.4.1.5 Report Tracking and Validation Information 
Two of the strategies for making data available for analysis employed by existing 
databases include: 
 73 
 
 Processing the data before inclusion in the database.  This strategy ensures that 
the data used in subsequent analyses has been validated; however, data only 
becomes available after a certain lag period.  This is the strategy used by GES. 
 Adding raw incident reports to the database and verifying the reports after 
information has been added.  By adding reports prior to verification, data can be 
used for preliminary analyses.  In such cases, the status of the report 
(raw/validated) as well as the date that the status last changed should be 
recorded.  This is the strategy used in MCMIS and TCAD.     
3.4.2 Accident Descriptors 
3.4.2.1 Geographic Location Identifiers 
Identifiers such as state, county, city, and highway number, recorded by TIFA, 
HMIRS and MCMIS, provide links to actual crashes; however, this location information is 
not accurate enough to provide roadway information.  By providing fields for crash location 
coordinates (latitude and longitude), additional information, such as number of lanes or 
divided highway, could be determined.  Coordinate information should be readily available 
as most operators or police officers use devices that provide location information.  
Additional fields that may be useful to include are the ones that indicate whether the crash 
occurred in a construction zone, on a bridge, or under an overpass. 
3.4.2.2 Relational Location Descriptors 
While the GES database does not provide location identifiers in the crash record, 
descriptions of the location of the accident in relation to the roadway and nearest junction 
are recorded. TIFA records contain a geographic code, type of route signing (e.g., interstate, 
U.S. highway, state highway, county road), traffic way identifiers, mile point to the nearest 
0.1 mile, and latitude and longitude in decimal degree format.  Additionally, the accident’s 
relation to a junction (e.g., at an intersection) and relation to roadway (e.g., on a shoulder) are 
recorded.   
Similarly, the RSI-AAR TCAD records include the location of the nearest railroad 
station, the state or province, and the type of track. Information concerning the roadway 
design is also recorded. 
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3.4.2.3 Time Descriptors 
The date of the incident facilitates referencing a particular crash across multiple 
databases if report numbers are not provided.  Recording the year of the crash is important 
for a variety of reasons including understanding what regulatory requirements might be in 
place, what technology is in use, and to monitor trends.  Additionally, the amount of traffic 
on the road often depends on the month, day of week, and hour.  Therefore, if the 
denominator used is annual average daily traffic (AADT), adjustments can be made to 
account for peak or off-peak traffic.  Furthermore, information concerning the date, hour, 
and minute of the crash enables light levels to be determined and recorded. 
3.4.2.4 Roadway Descriptors 
GES includes roadway variables such as access control, number of travel lanes, 
alignment, profile, traffic control device, and speed limit. TIFA records include type of land 
use, whether the crash occurred on the National Highway System or within a special 
jurisdiction, roadway function class, whether the traffic way was divided, the number of 
travel lanes, roadway speed limit, roadway profile, alignment and surface type, traffic control 
device (if applicable), and whether the traffic controls were functioning.  While not 
appropriate for direct use, highway package performance may be influenced by variables 
such as highway class, level of service, type of pavement, type of median, and type of lane 
markers.  On the other hand, the RSI-AAR TCAD only records the railroad responsible for 
track maintenance. 
3.4.2.5 Population Density 
GES includes variables describing the population density.  This information provides 
an indication of both roadway design and the amount of traffic anticipated to be on the 
road.   
3.4.2.6 Driving Conditions 
Driving conditions influence highway risk because poor driving conditions can affect 
the performance of a driver or vehicle. For example, driving on dry roads as opposed to wet 
or icy roads is preferable, but not always possible. The type of crash resulting from wet or icy 
roads has different characteristics than the type of crash resulting from dry road driving 
conditions.  The following roadway conditions are currently recorded:  
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 Light Condition.  The general light conditions at the time of the crash, including 
roadway illumination fixtures, is recorded in MCMIS and GES (both obtained 
from Police Accident Reports).   
 Temperature.  The RSI-AAR TCAD records the temperature at the time of the 
crash.   
 Weather Condition.  The GES, MCMIS, and HMIRS record weather (general 
atmospheric) conditions at the time of the crash. 
 Road Surface Condition.  The road surface condition, recorded in GES and 
MCMIS databases, records whether the road was dry or wet or covered in snow, 
slush, ice, sand, dirt or oil at the time of the crash.  These conditions influence 
the amount of friction between tires and road surface.   
 Work Zone.  Driving in construction zones may affect the risk of transporting 
hazardous materials.  Factors such as altered driving patterns, smaller lane sizes, 
uneven lanes, and loose stones/construction debris may be scattered along the 
roadway surface.  GES includes a variable for work zone. 
 School Bus.  The presence of a school bus can change traffic patterns and cause 
vehicles to stop relatively unexpectedly.  Therefore, hazmat risk may be affected.  
This variable is included in the GES database.   
3.4.2.7 Number of Vehicles Involved 
GES, TIFA, and MCMIS include a set of variables recording the number of vehicles 
involved in the accident.  The number of vehicles includes all trucks, buses and other 
vehicles, such as cars and bicycles, involved in the crash. The RSI-AAR TCAD records the 
number of railcars in the consist, the number of cars derailed, the location (in the train) of 
the first car involved, and the number of tank cars derailed.  Generally, the greater the 
number of rail cars involved, the more severe the accident. 
3.4.2.8 Number of People Involved 
GES, TIFA and MCMIS also include a set of variables recording the number of 
motorists as well as the number of non-motorists involved in the crash.  If the number of 
injuries or fatalities is used as a measure of the severity of the accident, the total number of 
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people involved in the accident could be used as the denominator to establish the rate of 
injury for a given accident. 
3.4.2.9 Event Descriptions 
The crash or collision of motor vehicles is typically described in police accident 
reports as one of the following accident types based on the pre-crash situation (NTSB 2009):  
 Single driver. 
 Right side or left side road departure includes driving off the road, loss of 
control, loss of traction, or attempting to avoid a collision with another 
vehicle/pedestrian/animal. 
 Forward impact includes striking a parked vehicle, stationary object, pedestrian 
or animal, or driving off the road as the road ends. 
 Multiple vehicles, same traffic-way/same direction. 
 Rear-ending includes striking a stopped vehicle, a slower moving vehicle or a 
decelerating vehicle. 
 Forward impact includes striking a vehicle due to loss of control/traction or due 
to an attempt to avoid a collision with another vehicle/object. 
 Sideswipe angle includes striking a vehicle in a different lane or striking a vehicle 
that is attempting to enter the lane. 
 Multiple vehicles, same traffic-way/opposite direction. 
 Head-on collision due to a lateral move. 
 Forward impact includes striking a vehicle due to loss of control/traction or due 
to an attempt to avoid a collision with another vehicle/object. 
 Sideswipe collision due to a lateral move. 
 Multiple vehicles, changing traffic-way/vehicle turning.  
 Turning across path when originating from opposite direction (i.e., left-hand turn 
into oncoming traffic) or when originating from same direction. 
 Turning into path in the same direction or in the opposite direction. 
 Multiple vehicles, intersecting paths (T-bone collisions). 
 Multiple vehicles, backing into a vehicle or other object. 
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Both GES and MCMIS record the above-mentioned descriptions. HMRIS also 
records a description of events as well as plans for further examination of the incident in a 
narrative format.  TIFA records contain more refined data including the first event causing 
injury/property damage and the manner of collision. Similarly, the RSI-AAR TCAD includes 
fields for accident type. 
3.4.2.10 Vehicle Role 
GES examines each vehicle involved and identifies the following variables:  
 Travel speed of each vehicle involved. 
 Travel path of the vehicle involved both before and after a driver made a 
corrective action to avoid an accident. 
 The critical event leading to the vehicle's first impact in the crash. 
 Vehicle’s action prior to the critical event. 
 Corrective action the driver attempted to avoid the crash. 
 Whether the vehicle was in control during various phases of the crash sequence 
including: 
 Prior to the corrective action. 
 Following the corrective action. 
 Prior to the critical event. 
 The initial point of impact that produced property damage or personal injury. 
 The event resulting in the most severe property damage or injury. 
Similarly, TIFA records the truck’s travel speed, the first event causing injury or 
property damage, vehicle maneuver prior to accident, crash avoidance maneuver, the most 
harmful event, the events related to the record’s motor vehicle, and whether the vehicle 
struck another vehicle or was struck by another vehicle (if applicable).  
3.4.3 Driver Descriptors 
3.4.3.1 Driver Contact Information 
FMCSA records driver name and contact information in MCMIS but does not make 
this information available to the public.  Therefore, driver contact information is not used 
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for risk analysis. GES records driver’s zip code that allows driver performance to be 
evaluated based on geographic region.   
3.4.3.2 Driver’s License 
MCMIS also records the driver’s license number, but this information is not available 
to the public.  While the whole license number may not be necessary or available, in a 
database constructed for risk assessment it may be useful to record license class.  Therefore, 
adverse effects of drivers operating cargo tank motor vehicles without the proper license 
could be offset.  TIFA records the non-commercial license state and type.   
3.4.3.3 License Status 
In addition to the license information itself, TIFA records include information 
concerning the status of the license, compliance (whether it is appropriate for the type of 
vehicle driven), endorsements, and previous convictions including: license restrictions, 
number of previous crashes, and number of previous suspensions/revocations, driving while 
intoxicated convictions, speeding convictions, and other harmful moving violations 
convictions.  The dates of the first and last crash/suspension/conviction are also recorded.   
3.4.3.4 Employer 
While GES records include employer information for the driver of each vehicle, 
HMIRS and MCMIS record carrier information for the hazardous material cargo tank truck 
involved in the crash.  TIFA records include both employer information for the driver of 
each vehicle and a description of the operating authority (e.g. private, for hire).  The 
inclusion of these fields in a database designed for risk analysis enables the degree of risk 
associated with each carrier to be determined.  In terms of package performance, employer 
information can be used to correlate maintenance practices.   
3.4.3.5 Driver Description 
TIFA records include driver height and weight.  This enables field of vision and 
other factors within the vehicle to be approximated.  
3.4.3.6 On Duty 
Whether the cargo tank was attended or not would enable the analysis of parked 
cargo tank motor vehicles in a crash scenario. Any spills occurring when the cargo tank is 
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unattended would likely be larger than spills occurring when the employee is near the tank 
because emergency shut-off valves could not be activated in a timely fashion. 
3.4.3.7 Occupants 
GES and TIFA records the number of occupants (including driver) per vehicle.  The 
presence of individuals other than the driver in a hazardous material cargo tank motor 
vehicle may indicate driver distraction.  On the other hand, the presence of a passenger may 
increase driver alertness particularly when traversing long distances.   
3.4.3.8 Alcohol Involvement 
GES, TIFA, and the RSI-AAR TCAD record the involvement of alcohol in the 
crash. GES also records whether the driver was drinking in the vehicle. Both GES and 
MCMIS record whether violations were charged as well as the severity of those charges.     
3.4.3.9 Driver Condition 
In addition to alcohol, driver performance can be influenced by the presence of 
drugs or other factors such as physical/mental impairment. GES records both driver 
presence and driver physical/mental impairment, and MCMIS records driver condition.  
TIFA records include an indication of the general driver condition if it is a contributing 
factor to the crash and any violations charged.   
3.4.3.10 External Factors 
Factors external to the vehicle can also influence driver performance; therefore, GES 
records what, if anything, obscured the driver’s vision or distracted the driver. 
3.4.3.11 Driver Input 
TIFA and GES record the driver’s action in the event of a crash. This field may vary 
from the action taken by the vehicle if equipment fails. GES also records the object a driver 
tried to avoid. 
3.4.3.12 Hours Worked 
The presence of this field in a motor carrier crash database is important because 
fatigue can also lead to poor driver performance. The current maximum number of hours 
motor carrier employees can work is 10 hours per day. 
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3.4.4 Pre-Crash Vehicle/Package Descriptors 
Pre-crash vehicle descriptors may include the manufacturer of a vehicle and vehicle 
identification and specification. Each database reviewed has a slightly different structure. 
GES records characteristics for each vehicle involved in a crash independently, while 
HMIRS and FMCSA contain one record per crash.  Because railroad tank cars operate in 
trains rather than as single vehicles, the RSI-AAR TCAD records each tank car involved 
individually in a separate table that can be linked to the accident information table. 
3.4.4.1 Mode of Transport 
PHMSA records information for multiple modes (highway, rail, air, and water) so 
HMIRS requires a field identifying the mode in which the incident occurred.   
3.4.4.2 Vehicle Identification 
Vehicles in the GES database are recorded both by vehicle identification number 
(VIN), if available, and by a number assigned in the police accident record.  MCMIS not only 
records vehicle identification number, but also contains fields for vehicle license number and 
state.  TIFA records include VIN, truck fuel code, weight code, series, and length. The RSI-
AAR TCAD records every tank car’s unique reporting mark and number. 
3.4.4.3 Vehicle Use 
Emergency vehicles such as ambulances and vehicles with non-emergency special 
uses such as hearses and farm equipment are identified in a GES accident report. MCMIS 
provides a field identifying whether the vehicle carries passengers or cargo. Furthermore, 
GES records if a trailer was being towed behind the vehicle at the time of the crash, and 
GES, HMIRS, and MCMIS record what type of cargo trailer was being towed. 
3.4.4.4 Vehicle Description 
GES, MCMIS and TIFA focus on the performance of motor vehicles and therefore 
include descriptions of the motor vehicle.  In the case of hazardous materials highway 
transportation, the vehicle described is the tractor or chassis.  GES includes variables such as 
vehicle make and model, body type, number of axles, and model year.  The MCMIS database 
records the number of axles, vehicle configuration as well as a rough categorization of the 
gross rated weight.  TIFA records the unit type (whether in-transport, not in transport 
within the traffic way, not-in-transport outside the traffic way, or construction or utility 
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motor vehicle), vehicle make, model, body type, model year, cab style, whether the vehicle 
has trailing units, the vehicle’s configuration, straight truck body style (if applicable), power 
unit make and year, the number of power unit axles, a rough categorization of the gross 
rated weight.  Additionally, the presence of accident prevention measures is recorded.  These 
include headway detection/forward crash warning, side/object detection, lane departure 
warning, rollover warning, electronic stability control, power unit tracking, trailer tracking, 
and speed limiter devices. 
3.4.4.5 Cargo Tank Designs 
TIFA records basic descriptions of the cargo body type, style, the number of axles 
on the trailer, and the vehicle configuration (e.g. straight truck and full trailer).  Since HMIRS 
focuses on the performance of cargo tanks, its records include designs for the hazardous 
material cargo tank involved. Related data fields include: 
 Material of construction. 
 Head type. 
 Package capacity. 
 Quantity of hazardous material in the package.  
 Number of containers in the shipment. 
 Design pressure. 
 Shell thickness. 
 Head thickness. 
 Service pressure. 
 Valve or device type (if failed). 
 Manufacture name. 
 Manufacture date. 
 
The RSI-AAR TCAD expands on the above fields by including the following fields:  
 Year car was built. 
 Tank class specification. 
 Category of car types. 
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 Original certificate of construction number. 
 Tank test pressure. 
 Tank specification identifier. 
 Stenciled car specification. 
 Tank shell material specification. 
 Tank shell material grade. 
 Tank shell minimum thickness. 
 Tank shell maximum thickness. 
 Tank shell inside diameter at center. 
 Tank head material specification. 
 Tank head material grade. 
 Tank head material thickness. 
 Tank inside diameter at head. 
 Tank capacity. 
 Truck capacity. 
 Tank insulation or thermal protection type. 
 Tank insulation thickness. 
 Center sill type. 
 Coupler type. 
 Head shield type. 
 Heater type. 
 Presence of bottom fittings. 
3.4.4.6 Bulk Cargo Tank Hazardous Material Placard 
Hazardous material placards identifying the quantity of hazardous material must be 
displayed on cargo tanks carrying a variety of hazardous materials. Other markings such as 
proper shipping names and material identification numbers are required on cargo tanks 
carrying materials poisonous by inhalation, marine pollutants, and elevated temperature 
materials. Since emergency responders must be able to identify the hazardous material 
placards, the placards are easily identifiable. The presence of placards is recorded by TIFA, 
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GES and MCMIS databases but is not recorded by the HMIRS database because the 
placards are assumed to be present on all cargo tanks included in the database.  In addition 
to the presence of a hazardous material placard, the GES and HMIRS databases also record 
hazardous material placard numbers.  
3.4.4.7 Hazardous Material Descriptors 
While other motor vehicle databases record whether the vehicle carried hazardous 
material or not, TIFA and HMIRS records also include various properties of the hazardous 
material being transported.  The hazard class of a hazardous material, and the hazardous 
material identification number are recorded.  Additionally, in HMIRS, fields are provided to 
record packing group and identification markings such as toxic by inhalation, serious marine 
pollutant, radioactive indicators, hazardous material waste numbers and material shipment 
approval numbers, if applicable.  Similarly, the RSI-AAR TCAD records the type of cargo, 
lading name, lading classification, and Standard Transportation Commodity Code (STCC).  
For tank cars that are empty, the RSI-AAR TCAD records last lading in car tank, previous 
lading name, and previous lading classification. 
3.4.5 Post-Crash Vehicle/Package Descriptors 
3.4.5.1 Type of Accident 
HMIRS provides several “Yes” or “No” fields indicating whether or not the 
following events occurred:  
 No release. 
 Spillage. 
 Material loss. 
 Serious bulk release. 
 Fire. 
 Explosion. 
 Water sewer involved. 
 Gas dispersion. 
 Environmental damage. 
 Vehicle overturn. 
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Although some of the above accident types may generally be more serious than 
others, these fields do not provide information regarding the severity of the accident.  
Further information is required to determine risk associated with each event.  Additionally, 
the occurrence of a fire is recorded by GES and the occurrence of a hazardous material 
release is recorded by both GES and MCMIS.  TIFA records whether a rollover occurred 
and where it happened (on roadway, etc.), whether a jackknife occurred and the event order 
in which it happened, whether an underride or override occurred, the involvement of 
hazardous materials in the accident and whether those materials released.   
3.4.5.2 Hazardous Material Release 
In addition to identifying accidents in which a hazardous material release occurred, 
HMIRS records the quantity of hazardous material release.  This information provides an 
indication of the severity of the incident.  However, it should be noted that HMIRS records 
all incidents regardless of whether or not a crash occurred (non-accident releases).   
3.4.5.3 Vehicle/Package Damage Descriptors 
Damage descriptors are to be used to determine vehicle or package performance in 
accidents. GES focuses on vehicle damage while HMIRS focuses on package damage.  
Damage can be described in terms of the following: 
Damage Component.  HMIRS provides codes to be used to indicate damage 
component for different bulk and non-bulk containers.  Table 3.31 lists codes for cargo tank 
component failure.   
Damage Type.  HMIRS also records how a failure occurred. Table 3.32 shows the 
codes used for cargo tanks. 
Damage Cause.  GES records what vehicle factors may have contributed to the 
cause of the crash. The factors recorded are shown in Table 3.33.  TIFA also records route 
causes that may have contributed to the crash.  These include roadway conditions, vehicle 
defects, and other special circumstances.  On the other hand, HMIRS records causes of 
lading retention system failure. The factors shown in Table 3.34 are associated with 
hazardous material releases regardless of whether or not a crash occurred.  
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Table 3.31 "What Failed" Codes for Cargo Tank Motor Vehicles in HMIRS 
Code What Failed Code What Failed 
101 Air Inlet 136 Locking Bar 
105 Bolts or Nuts 137 Manway or Dome Cover 
106 Bottom Outlet Valve 138 Mounting Studs 
107 Check Valve 139 O-Ring or Seals 
110 Cover 141 Piping or Fittings 
115 Discharge Valve or Coupling 142 Piping Shear Section 
116 Excess Flow Valve 143 Pressure Relief Valve or Device – 
Non-reclosing 
117 Fill Hole 144 Pressure Relief Valve or Device – 
Reclosing 
118 Flange 145 Remote Control Device 
119 Frangible Disc 146 Sample Line 
120 Fusible Pressure Relief Device or 
Element 
148 Sump 
121 Gasket 150 Tank Shell 
122 Gauging Device 151 Thermometer Well 
123 Heater Coil 152 Threaded Connection 
124 High Level Sensor 153 Vacuum Relief Valve 
125 Hose 154 Valve Body 
126 Hose Adaptor or Coupling 155 Valve Seat 
127 Inlet (Loading) Valve 156 Valve Spring 
131 Lifting Lug 157 Valve Stem 
132 Liner 158 Vapor Valve 
133 Liquid Line 159 Vent 
134 Liquid Valve 160 Washout 
135 Loading or Unloading Lines 161 Weld or Seam 
Source: PHMSA 2004 
Table 3.32 "How Failed" Codes for Cargo Tank Motor Vehicles in HMIRS 
Code How Failed Code How Failed 
301 Abraded 307 Gouged or Cut 
302 Bent 308 Leaked 
303 Burst or Ruptured 309 Punctured 
304 Cracked 310 Ripped or Torn 
305 Crushed 311 Structural 
306 Failed to Operate 312 Torn Off or Damaged 
Source: PHMSA 2004 
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Table 3.33 The GES Vehicle Crash Causes  
Code Cause Code Cause 
0 None 10 Wipers 
1 Tires 11 Wheels 
2 Brake System 12 Mirrors 
3 Steering System – Tie Rod, Kingpin, Ball 
Joint, etc. 
13 Driver Seating and Control 
4 Suspension – Springs, Shock Absorbers, 
McPherson Struts, Control Arms, etc. 
14 Body, Doors 
5 Power Train – Universal Joint, Drive 
Shaft, Transmission, etc. 
15 Trailer Hitch 
6 Exhaust System 50 Hit-and-Run Vehicle 
7 Headlights 97 Vehicle Contributing Factors – No 
Details 
8 Signal Lights 98 Other Vehicle Contributing Factors 
9 Other Lights 99 Unknown if Vehicle Has Contributing 
Factors 
Source: NHTSA 2010 
Table 3.34 HMIRS Lading Loss Causes  
Code Cause Code Cause 
501 Abrasion 521 Inadequate Preparation for 
Transportation 
502 Broken Component or Device 522 Inadequate Procedures 
503 Commodity Self-ignition 523 Inadequate Training 
504 Commodity Polymerization 524 Incompatible Product 
505 Conveyer or Material Handling 
Equipment Mishap 
525 Incorrectly Sized Component or Device 
506 Corrosion – Exterior 526 Loose Closure, Component, or Device 
507 Corrosion – Interior 527 Misaligned Material, Component, or 
Device 
508 Defective Component or Device 528 Missing Component or Device 
510 Deterioration or Aging 529 Overfilled 
511 Dropped 530 Overpressurized 
512 Fire, Temperature, or Heat 531 Rollover Accident 
515 Human Error 532 Stub Sill Separation from Tank (Tank 
Cars) 
517 Improper Preparation for Transportation 533 Threads Worn or Cross Threaded 
518 Inadequate Accident Damage Protection 536 Vandalism 
519 Inadequate Blocking and Bracing 537 Vehicular Crash or Accident Damage 
520 Inadequate Maintenance   
Source: PHMSA 2004 
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Damage Location.  GES includes a field to record the most severely damaged area as 
well as up to five specific areas of damage.  TIFA records include the principal impact point 
in terms of degrees around the vehicle and bulk package (no distinction is made between the 
vehicle and trailer) and the extent of the damage.  In the HMIRS, a description of package 
failure such as size and location of holes or cracks is requested in narrative format in Form 
5800.1.  In the RSI-AAR TCAD, codes are used in its database fields to specify damage 
location on tank head (e.g., below, on, or above center line) and shell (e.g., end or center, 
bottom or top).  Additional fields also use some codes to record puncture location, shape, 
and geometry on tank head and shell.  Similarly, different fields use another set of codes to 
record rupture types by specifying the total number of circumferential fractures and number 
of tubs.  For top and bottom fittings and other attachments, codes are used to specify 
damage component, type, and cause.   
3.4.5.4 Property Damage 
In addition to vehicle damage, vehicular crashes often result in non-vehicle property 
damage.  Actual property damage estimates and costs associated with initial emergency 
response, clean-up, and remediation are recorded in HMIRS.  Similarly, the RSI-AAR TCAD 
records track wayside equipment, track structure property damage estimates, and an estimate 
of the total reportable damage. 
3.4.5.5 Evacuation 
Certain hazardous material releases require evacuation of the surrounding neighborhood.  
Occasionally, evacuations occur for non-release events when the danger of a release event 
remains. HMIRS records if an evacuation took place, total number of employees and public 
evacuated, total evacuated, and the number of hours the evacuation lasted. Similarly, the 
RSI-AAR database records the total number of persons evacuated. 
3.4.5.6 Road Closure 
Since Form 5800.1 is required in the event of a road closure, HMIRS contains a field 
indicating whether a major artery was closed as a result of the incident and how long it was 
closed. 
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3.4.5.7 Injury/Fatality 
Another measure of crash severity is the number of injuries and fatalities resulting 
from the crash.  GES records the most severe injury level involved in the crash overall and 
in each vehicle, including fatalities. The number of people requiring medical attention is also 
recorded.  TIFA records include the number of casualties by degree of injury (none, C, B, A, 
K, and unknown) additionally, individual occupant injury/fatality information is recorded.  
MCMIS, HMIRS, and the RSI-AAR TCAD record the number of fatalities separately from 
the number of injuries.  HMIRS records additional detail concerning the fatalities and 
injuries associated with an incident.  The fields provided regarding fatalities include:  
 Whether the incident resulted in a fatality. 
 The number of employee fatalities due to a hazardous material release. 
 The number of responder fatalities due to a hazardous material release. 
 The number of general public fatalities due to a hazardous material release. 
 The number of non-hazardous material fatalities. 
Similarly the fields recording information pertaining to injuries include:  
 Whether the incident resulted in a serious injury. 
 The number of employee hospitalized injuries due to a hazardous material 
release. 
 The number of responder hospitalized injuries due to a hazardous material 
release. 
 The number of general public hospitalized injuries due to a hazardous material 
release. 
 The number of non-hazardous material hospitalized injuries. 
The RSI-AAR TCAD also includes the following fields to provide more information 
about injuries and fatalities: 
 The number of fatalities by reporting railroad. 
 The number of fatalities for all railroads involved. 
 The number of total fatalities. 
 The number of employee fatalities. 
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 The number of passenger fatalities. 
 The number of other fatalities. 
 The number of injuries by reporting railroad. 
 The number of injuries for all railroads involved. 
 The number of total injuries.  
 The number of employee injuries. 
 The number of passenger injuries. 
 The number of other injuries. 
3.5 Data Limitations of Existing Databases 
3.5.1 Insufficient Package Damage Descriptors 
In order to perform package performance studies to estimate the conditional 
probability of release for bulk packages with various design elements in accidents, detailed 
data on the nature of damages suffered by packages involved in accidents are also necessary.  
This is an area where the existing DOT 5800.1 form reporting process already records 
various details of damage to packages and design features that resulted in releases in HMIRS.  
From this the number of incidents in which various types of damage occurred can be 
calculated.  However, the current process does not record information in sufficient detail to 
address some of the pertinent questions.  HMIRS records the “what” and “why” associated 
with a package failure. The “where” to indicate failure locations may be a potential avenue to 
improve. Experience from the RSI-AAR TCAD shows that the following additional 
information, grouped as pre- and post-crash package descriptors, may be useful.   
3.5.1.1 Pre-Crash Package Descriptors 
Suitable adaptations of the following fields are some possible additional data to 
collect in HMIRS: 
 Tank shape (e.g., cylindrical, oval, etc.). 
 Tank inside diameter or cross-section length for non-cylindrical. 
 Insulation/thermal protection type and thickness. 
 Structural reinforcement information. 
– Ring reinforcement. 
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– Jacket material and thickness. 
– Head shield material and thickness. 
– Top fittings protection or recessed design. 
– Bottom fittings protection or absence of bottom fittings. 
 Fittings, manway, and other appurtenances’ location. 
In addition, a bulk package “certificate of construction,” a form created by truck 
manufacturing facility that contains specific design configuration data, may be requested to 
ensure the accuracy of the data collected. 
3.5.1.2 Post-Crash Package Descriptors 
The following approaches may be implemented to record additional damage data in 
HMIRS:   
 Introduce new fields and codes to indicate damage location on tank head and 
shell. 
 Introduce new fields and codes to record puncture type and geometry on tank 
head and shell. 
 Introduce new fields and codes to record rupture type and configurations. 
 Introduce new fields and codes to indicate indentation location, diameter, and 
depth on tank head and shell in non-release accidents. 
3.6 Identification of Data Needs  
To define data needed for an effective bulk package accident performance study, 
the larger context in which a packages’ accident performance can be evaluated.  In this 
thesis, its conditional probability of release given involvement in an accident is 
considered.  Figure 3.10 is an influence diagram that summarizes the relationship of major 
factors affecting hazardous materials transportation safety.  Hazardous materials 
transportation risk is a function of: 
 The probability of a crash occurring.  This is influenced by route choice, driving 
maneuvers, vehicle condition (i.e., brakes), and vehicle and package design 
characteristics (i.e., roll stability). 
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Figure 3.10 Hazardous Materials Transportation Risk Influence Diagram 
 The probability of a hazardous materials release given an accident.  This is 
influenced by two elements:  
– The package’s resistance to damage, which is affected by package design and 
package condition.  
– The impact type and severity, which can be described by the accident 
characteristics.   
 The consequences given a crash and a hazardous materials release.  These are 
also influenced by route choice and environmental conditions, (i.e., proximity to 
population centers or areas sensitive to the effects of a release) and the type of 
hazardous material. 
In addition to whether or not there was a release of product and if so, the quantity 
and other details about the release, the most important types of data to be collected for 
analysis of the bulk packages accident performance are: 
 Their design characteristics,  
 The circumstances of accidents in which they are involved, and 
 The nature of the damage they experience.   
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These factors are explored in greater detail as shown in the influence diagram (Figure 
3.11).  Service history and condition may also influence bulk package performance to a lesser 
degree.   
In Figure 3.11, the majority of variables are included in one of the following groups: 
commodity characteristics, package design, package condition, and crash characteristics.  
Several additional variables that do not fit into these groups but should be considered for 
inclusion in a possible accident damage database include:  
 Trailer/truck frame design. 
 Attachment to trailer/truck frame. 
 Vehicle speed prior to crash avoidance maneuver. 
 Whether a release occurred 
 Amount of commodity spilled. 
Package Cross-Section Shape.  The package cross-section shape (round, oval, etc.) may 
be a significant factor affecting performance of bulk packages in accidents. Its influence is 
propagated through a series of package design characteristics as well as crash characteristics 
(by affecting package stability) to affect the package’s resistance to damage, and impact type 
and severity.  Bulk packages are principally designed as pressure vessels to safely contain 
product under normal operating conditions, and the criteria relating to accident conditions is 
limited.  The inclusion of this variable in a possible accident damage database would enable 
the following questions to be addressed:  
 Do different cross-section shapes affect accident performance in general?   
 If so, in what manner? 
Number, Capacity, and Order of Compartments in Package.  The number and 
capacity of compartments in the package provide an indication of its length and also 
influence the number and location of voids between compartments.  Therefore, both the 
number and capacity of compartments in the bulk package are likely significant factors in the 
estimation of the conditional probability of release.  Questions that could be addressed by 
including these variables in an accident damage database are: 
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Figure 3.11 Conditional Probability of Release Influence Diagram 
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 Does the number of compartments in a bulk package affect package 
performance?   
 Does compartment capacity influence component-specific conditional 
probability of release?   
 Does the order in which compartments are placed affect package performance?   
Cross-Section Maximum and Minimum Height and Width; Center of Gravity.  
The cross-section height and width and the overall loaded center of gravity are the remaining 
variables that describe the package dimensions.  Since package height and width can vary 
along the length of the package, which is typical for lower center-of-gravity designs, the 
maximum and minimum height and width should be recorded for each compartment.  The 
following questions could be addressed with the inclusion of these variables in an accident 
damage database:  
 Does a lower center of gravity affect bulk package accident performance? 
 What affect does varying cross-section height and width have on package 
performance? 
3.6.1 Design Characteristics Affecting Package Resistance to Damage Only 
Accident Damage Protection.  Two categories of accident damage protection are 
provided in 49 CFR §178.345-8: accident damage protection for the “upper 2/3 of the tank 
circumference” which mainly provides protection in rollover accidents, and accident damage 
protection for the “lower 1/3 of the cargo tank circumference” which mainly provides 
protection for multiple vehicle, non-rollover, accidents.       
Currently, bottom accident damage protection is required to “extend no less than 6 
inches beyond any component that may contain lading in transit” (49 CFR §178.345-8(b)(1)) 
or, if provided for a lading discharge opening equipped with an internal self-closing stop-
valve, may be “provided by a sacrificial device located outboard of each internal, self-closing 
stop-valve and within 4 inches of the major radius of the tank shell or within 4 inches of a 
sump, but in no case more than 8 inches from the major radius of the tank shell” (49 CFR 
§178.345-8(b)(2)).  If an accident damage protection device is impacted during the accident, 
recording which design (non-sacrificial or sacrificial) was used would enable a statistical 
analysis to evaluate the relative performance of these two approaches.     
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Rollover accident damage protection devices are provided in the upper 2/3 of a 
cargo tank for those opening closures (i.e., valves, manholes) that do not achieve 125 percent 
of the strength that would be provided by the accident damage protection device.  One or 
more of these devices may be used.  By recording the provision of continuous rollover 
protection or for individual appurtenances, the design criteria in federal regulation could be 
evaluated.  
Number and Placement of Baffles.  In addition to providing longitudinal 
deceleration protection, baffles may be used as circumferential reinforcements if welded to 
the cargo tank shell over more than fifty percent of the total circumference of the tank.  Use 
of baffles as stiffeners can increase the structural integrity of the tank; however, they also 
may result in local inconsistencies in tank performance in the event of an accident.  In 
combination with recording the number and placement of other circumferential 
reinforcements, the following questions could be addressed:  
 How does spacing of baffles affect bulk package performance? 
 How does the performance of baffles or baffle attachment rings compare in 
accident scenarios? 
Additionally, recording the proximity of shell failure to a baffle might enable a 
statistical analysis of the impact of baffles on shell integrity during an accident.   
Number and Placement of Stiffeners.  In addition to using baffles as stiffeners, 
ring stiffeners are used alone or in combination with other stiffening measures.  Therefore, 
questions similar to those concerning baffles may also be addressed with regard to stiffeners. 
Presence of Jacket.  Previous studies involving railroad tank cars have found that, 
all other things being equal, jacketed tank designs have a lower conditional probability of 
release (CPR) than non-jacketed tank designs. (Anderson & Kirkpatrick, 2006).  In order to 
evaluate the same effect for highway tanks, the presence of a jacket on the tank should be 
recorded.  The amount of jacket deformation incurred in an accident could be used in 
conjunction with jacket design characteristics, to describe the energy absorption capabilities 
of a package. Saccomanno et al. (1993) suggested that energy absorption characteristics are a 
critical element in estimating the risk of hazardous materials transportation.     
Jacket Material and Thickness.  Recording the jacket material and thickness in an 
accident damage database could enable the following questions to be addressed:  
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 Do different types of jacket material perform differently, and if so, how? 
 How does jacket thickness affect bulk package accident performance? 
Insulation Type.  A layer of insulation is often provided between the jacket and the 
tank to reduce temperature changes of the lading while in transit.  The insulation may 
provide additional energy absorption in the event of an accident.  For these reasons, 
recording the presence and type of insulation would enable assessment of these effects on 
bulk package performance.  
Head Material and Design Thickness(es).  The head material and design 
thicknesses are listed on the cargo tank name plate and therefore should be simple to record 
in an accident damage database.  They should be included in an accident damage database 
since these factors explain a substantial amount of the variability in the conditional 
probability of release for railroad tank cars (Treichel et al. 2006).  Because strength, 
toughness, and the design thickness depend, in part, on the type of material, it should be 
included in the accident damage database.  These variables would enable a statistical analysis 
to be performed to address the following questions: 
 Do different types of head material perform differently and if so how? 
 What are the relationships between head thickness and material and CPR? 
Shell Material and Design Thickness(es).  Similar to the head parameters, shell 
material and design thickness should be simple to record in an accident damage database.  
Since shell thicknesses can vary from the top of the tank to the bottom, thicknesses should 
be recorded for all three locations (top, side, and bottom).  Questions that could be 
addressed by recording these variables include:  
 Do different types of shell material perform differently, and if so, how? 
 What are the relationships between shell design thickness and material and bulk 
package performance? 
Weld Material.  Rollover accidents often result in twisting the cargo tank.  If this 
twisting exceeds the strength of the joint material, the bulkheads in a multiple-
compartmented bulk package may be torn at their seams, resulting in a leak that fills the void 
space between bulkheads.  The material then can be released through specification vents.  
Therefore, while weld material information is not listed specifically on the name plate or 
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specification plate, recording the weld material is important because its strength may be a 
factor affecting conditional probability of release in rollover accidents.      
Design Temperature Range.  The design temperature range is listed on the cargo 
tanks’ name plate and therefore should be simple to record in the accident damage database.  
Recording the design temperature range would enable the following question to be 
addressed:  
 Does design temperature range affect bulk package performance? 
Maximum Allowable Working Pressure.  The maximum allowable working 
pressure is also listed on the cargo tanks’ name plate.  It refers to “the maximum pressure 
allowed at the top of the tank in its normal operating position” (49 CFR 178.320 (a)).  
Therefore, the maximum allowable working pressure is a proxy for the overall pressure the 
bulk package can sustain.  Recording the maximum allowable working pressure would enable 
the following question to be addressed:  
 Is there a relationship between maximum allowable working pressure and the 
conditional probability of release? 
Pressure Relief Valve Design.  Pressure relief valves enable venting of gaseous materials 
in order to maintain a specified pressure and temperature within the bulk package.  Although 
interest in the evaluation of valve design and location is moderate, both small diameter 
fittings far from accident damage and “small” fittings on the vessel top centerline were 
identified as major sources of lading loss in rollover accidents.  According to 49 CFR 
178.345-10 (h), “each pressure relief device must be permanently marked with the following: 
(1) manufacturer’s name, (2) model number, (3) set pressure in psig, and (4) rated flow 
capacity in [standard cubic feet per hour (SCFH)] at the rating pressure, in psig”.  When 
vents are used, “such vents must be set to open at not less than 1 psig and must be designed 
to prevent loss of lading through the device in case of vehicle overturn” (49 CFR 178.345-10 
(b)(2)).  By recording these variables in conjunction with an estimate of the amount of lading 
loss from the vent, the following questions could be addressed: 
 Is there a relationship between valve flow capacity and estimates of the 
conditional probability of release? 
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 Is there a relationship between set pressure and estimates of the conditional 
probability of release? 
 Do valve/vent designs affect bulk package performance?  
Additionally, recording the placement of the valve (particularly if it was included in 
the damaged area) in relation to other tank components, such as stiffening rings and baffles, 
would enable the following questions to be addressed:  
 Is there a relationship between valve placement and safety performance of bulk 
packages? 
 Is there a relationship between valve location relative to circumferential 
reinforcements and accident performance? 
Void Space Vent Design.  Vents within the void space between bulkheads in a 
multi-compartmented cargo tank, under normal operating conditions, ensure there is no 
lading within the void space.  However, in rollover accidents in which the bulkhead is torn 
from the shell of the tank, these open vents may enable lading to seep from the tank.  
Although the current void space vent specifications call for non-sealable vents, modifications 
to enable such vents to automatically seal in the event of a rollover may be considered in the 
future.  If such a design change was implemented, even on a trial basis, recording the design 
of the vent as well as an estimation of the amount of lading loss from the vent, the following 
questions could be addressed:  
 Does void space vent design have an effect on bulk package performance? 
Manhole Design.  In addition to valves, the surveys indicated that manhole 
assembly characteristics should be recorded in a possible accident damage database.  This is 
of particular interest in rollover accidents.  Regulations require that manholes be designed 
such that “shock impact due to a rollover accident on the roadway or shoulder where the fill 
cover is not struck by a substantial object” will not result in the cover opening (49 CFR 178-
345-5(d)).  The questions that could be addressed by recording manhole assembly test 
pressure (which, as of 2004 is required to be permanently marked on the outside of the 
manhole), shape, and placement include: 
 How does round manhole performance compare to oval? 
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 Does test pressure of a manhole assembly affect the performance of bulk 
packages in accidents? 
 Does the placement of manhole assemblies affect the bulk package performance? 
Surface Area Susceptible to Corrosion.  The exposed surface area is a function of 
the compartment capacity of the cargo tank.  It directly influences the amount of material 
corroded, particularly at the typical meniscus location when the tank is full and at the edge of 
fluid when the tank has only residue lading.  If corrosion occurs, the actual shell and head 
thicknesses are reduced compared to design shell and head thicknesses; thereby affecting 
tank stiffness and the package’s resistance to damage.  Recording variables describing the 
surface area susceptible to corrosion would enable the following question to be addressed:  
 Is package performance related to conditions found in areas susceptible to 
corrosion? 
3.6.2 Package Maintenance Characteristics 
Amount Corroded/Actual Thickness(es).  Corrosion of the shell or head can 
affect tank stiffness and resistance to damage.  However, determining and recording the 
overall amount of corroded material is time-consuming as compared to recording the 
presence and depth of corrosion at the location of the damage.  As an alternative, the actual 
shell or head thickness at the rupture location would enable statistical analysis to address the 
following questions: 
 Does tank corrosion affect conditional probability of release in accidents? 
 If there is an effect, is there a functional relationship between corrosion depth 
and conditional probability of release? 
Presence of Pre-existing Stress Flaw(s).  In some cases, stress fractures have been 
found in the vicinity of the bulk packages’ attachment to the trailer or chassis frame.  If the 
presence of existing stress fractures or other such flaws are recorded, the following questions 
could be addressed:  
 Does the presence of pre-existing stress flaws affect bulk package performance? 
 Is there a relationship regarding the proximity of stress fractures or other flaws 
to accident damage with regard to susceptibility of lading loss? 
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Previous Repair Location Size and Materials.  Repairs to the cargo tank that 
involve replacement of a section of the tank shell might result in higher stresses adjacent to 
repair welds.  These higher stresses may affect the conditional probability of release.  
Consequently, information concerning the repair location, repair size, repair material and 
weld material should be recorded in an accident damage database.  By recording these 
variables the following questions could be addressed:  
 Is the package performance affected by the presence and/or location of past 
repairs?   
 Does the proximity of repairs to damage affect accident performance?  
 Does repair size affect package performance? 
3.6.3 Crash Characteristics 
The crash characteristics identified in Figure 11 can be subdivided into three 
categories: impacted object characteristics, bulk package motion characteristics, and the 
resultant impact characteristics.    
Impacted Object.  The impacted object characteristics can be described by 
identifying the object impacted.  By recording which objects damaged the lading retention 
system, the following question could be addressed:  
 Is there a relationship between the type of object impacted and cargo tank 
performance? 
Bulk Package Motion Variables.  The bulk package motion characteristics can be 
described by the choices made by the driver of the bulk package vehicle.  These include bulk 
package speed prior to the maneuver, maneuver prior to impact (e.g., braking, swerving), 
bulk package speed immediately prior to impact, and package motion (e.g., rolling, sliding).  
By recording these variables, one would be able to address the following questions:  
 What is the nature of the relationship between the closing speed of the bulk 
package relative to the impacted object and the conditional probability of release? 
 What is the nature of the relationship between package motion and the 
conditional probability of release?  For example, if a package is both rolling and 
sliding along the ground, is it more susceptible to lading loss than if it were only 
rolling or only sliding? 
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Impact Variables.  Impact characteristics can be described by damage type, shape, 
size, and location on the bulk package, as well as components damaged and location of 
lading loss (on the bulk package).  These variables represent factual data that can be 
consistently recorded.  Along with closing speed immediately prior to impact, they can be 
used as proxy variables in lieu of recording impact energy and forces, both of which are 
difficult to determine during data collection.     
3.6.3.1 Type of Damage  
As discussed in section 4.2.5.3, in Form 5800.1, the type of damage is only recorded if the 
bulk package fails.  Labeled “Failure Type,” Form 5800.1 allows for  the following options: 
abraded, bent, burst or ruptured, cracked, crushed, failed to operate, gouged or cut, leaked, 
punctured, ripped or torn, structural, and torn off or damaged.  However, when the type of 
damage is only recorded for instances that resulted in lading loss, the probability of a 
particular type of damage resulting in lading loss cannot be determined.  Instead of reporting 
failure type, an accident damage database should record the types of damage sustained by the 
lading retention system, and for each type of damage, provide an indication as to whether it 
resulted in lading loss.  Including the type of damage in the accident damage database would 
enable analyses to address “What is the relationship between different types of damage and 
conditional probability of release?” 
Damage Shape and Size.  The area of damage refers to the geometric shape and 
size of the damage.  In conjunction with the closing speed of the bulk package and the 
object(s) impacted in the crash, the area of damage is an important factor in determining the 
force of the impact.  Therefore the area of damage plays a vital role in determining the 
conditional probability of release.  Area of damage has been used as a variable in both Selz 
and Heberling’s Improving Crashworthiness of Front Heads of MC-331 Cargo Tank Motor 
Vehicles (2000) where amount of deformation and size of damage was considered and 
Lupker’s LPG Rail Tank Cars Under Head-On Collisions (1990) where non-symmetrical 
deformation began to occur when the deformation was one order of magnitude greater than 
the shell thickness.  By recording the damage shape and size, statistical analyses can be 
performed to confirm the findings of Selz and Heberling (2000) as well as answer the 
following questions:  
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 Is there a particular way a cargo tank deforms, as evident by the deformation 
shape, that is more susceptible to lading loss? 
 How large can the indentation be before non-symmetrical indentation occurs? 
 How large can the indentation be before the bulk package ruptures? 
Shape and Size of Failure.  Similarly, the shape and size of the hole in the lading 
retention system should be recorded in an accident damage database.  While these variables 
will not contribute directly to the probability of whether a release occurs, they can be used to 
estimate the amount of lading loss.     
Location of Damage/Failure.  The location of damage is one of the variables 
collected by the RSI-AAR TCAD that has proven to be helpful in developing estimates for 
the conditional probability of release and likely to be useful in release estimates for bulk 
packages.  Because of the large number of shapes and sizes of cargo tanks and portable 
tanks, recording location information would be facilitated by use of a diagram based on the 
package dimensions previously entered (length, height and width, container shape, and 
package capacity) in the accident damage report, and cordoning sections of the cargo tank 
similar to those recorded in the RSI-AAR TCAD (Figure 3.12) where: 
 1 represents tank car head damage below the centerline,  
 2 represents tank car head damage on the center line,  
 3 represents tank car head damage above the centerline,  
 4 (not shown) represents head destroyed,  
 5 (not shown) represents shell destroyed,  
 6 represents shell damage at either end on the bottom half of the tank car,  
 7 represents shell damage at the center on the bottom half of the tank car,  
 8 represents shell damage at either end on the top half of the tank car, 
  9 represents shell damage at the center on the top half of the tank car, and  
 10 (not shown) represents damage in the vicinity of the sump.   
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Source: TCAD Coding Instructions 2005. 
Figure 3.12 Tank Car Damage Locations 
 
Unlike tank cars, cargo tank trucks and trailers are not symmetric in their design; 
therefore, the identification of the location of damage is more complex.  The following 
location-identification scheme could be used (Figure 3.13):  
 1 represents cargo tank front head damage below the centerline. 
 2 represents cargo tank front head damage on the centerline. 
 3 represents cargo tank front head damage above the centerline. 
 4 (not shown) represents front head destroyed. 
 5 represents cargo tank rear head damage below the centerline. 
 6 represents cargo tank rear head damage on the centerline. 
 7 represents cargo tank rear head damage above the centerline. 
 8 (not shown) represents rear head destroyed. 
 9 represents damage at the bottom front driver-side of the cargo tank. 
 10 represents damage at the bottom middle driver-side of the cargo tank. 
 11 represents damage at the bottom rear driver-side of the cargo tank. 
 12 represents damage at the top front driver-side of the cargo tank. 
 13 represents damage at the top middle driver-side of the cargo tank. 
 14 represents damage at the top rear driver-side of the cargo tank. 
 15 represents damage at the bottom front passenger-side of the cargo tank. 
 16 represents damage at the bottom middle passenger-side of the cargo tank. 
 17 represents damage at the bottom rear passenger-side of the cargo tank. 
 18 represents damage at the top front passenger-side of the cargo tank. 
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 19 represents damage at the top middle passenger-side of the cargo tank. 
 20 represents damage at the top rear passenger-side of the cargo tank. 
 21 (not shown) represents damage to the piping and/or undercarriage below the 
cargo tank. 
 
 
Figure 3.13 Possible Cargo Tank Damage Location Identification Scheme Using a 
DOT 406 Container as an Example 
Questions that could be addressed by collecting the location of damage include:  
 Is there a relationship between location and damage vulnerability? 
 What is the performance of the lading retention system(s) relative to 
withstanding forces involved in accidents? 
 What is the conditional probability of release for each area?   
Components Damaged.  In addition to the location of damage, a list of the 
components damaged within the area should be collected and an indication provided as to 
whether they failed.  For example, if “7”, the rear head above the centerline, was listed as the 
location of damage, the vapor recovery system should be identified if it also sustained 
damage.  If the damage to the vapor recovery system resulted in lading loss, an indication of 
failure should be provided.  In addition to questions regarding damage location, recording 
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which components were damaged within the identified location would enable a statistical 
analysis to address the following:  
 Does placement of cargo tank components affect the conditional probability of 
release (i.e., does any particular location for a manhole significantly reduce the 
conditional probability of release)? 
 Are there location-specific effects in terms of component design damage 
resistance?  
3.7 Variable Evaluation 
Each variable was evaluated both for its importance in an accident damage database 
based on survey and interview feedback and for ease of obtaining the information (Table 
3.35).  Variables identified as essential (12 in addition to variables recorded by PHMSA’s 
Form 5800.1, 28 total) should be included in an accident damage database.  Other variables 
may be considered for future inclusion if there is sufficient interest among stakeholders.  
Those variables currently required to be reported in Form 5800.1 are shaded in gray in Table 
3.35 to illustrate the benefits of a greater compliance of reporting these variables.  
Table 3.35 Variable Evaluation 
 
Include in Accident  
Damage Database 
Ease of Obtaining 
Information 
Variable 
E = Essential to Include                           
1 = Very Important To Include 
10 = Somewhat Important To 
Include 
1 = Very Easy To Obtain 
10 = Difficult To Obtain 
Commodity Characteristics 
Proper Shipping Name E 1 
Hazardous Class/Division Code E 1 
Identification Number E 1 
Amount E 1 
Package Design Characteristics 
Package Specification E 1 
Package Cross-Section Shape 3 2 
Number of Compartments In Package E 1 
Capacity of Each Tank E 1 
Tank Outage 2-4 5 
Order of Tank Placement In The Package 2-4 1 
Cross-Section Maximum Height 2-4 4 
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Table 3.35 (cont.) 
 
Include in Accident  
Damage Database 
Ease of Obtaining 
Information 
Variable 
E = Essential to Include                           
1 = Very Important To Include 
10 = Somewhat Important To 
Include 
1 = Very Easy To Obtain 
10 = Difficult To Obtain 
Package Design Characteristics Cont’d 
Cross-Section Minimum Height 2-4 4 
Cross-Section Maximum Width 2-4 6 
Cross-Section Minimum Width 2-4 6 
Overall Loaded Center of Gravity 1 8 
Bottom Accident Damage Protection E 1 
If Not Sacrificial, Extension Beyond Lading-
Retention Components 
3 2 
If Sacrificial, Distance from the Major Radius 
of the Cargo Tank Shell 
3 2 
Rollover Accident Damage Protection E 1 
Number of Baffles 2 1 if not jacketed, 8 if 
jacketed 
Placement of Baffles 2 1 if not jacketed,  
8 if jacketed 
Number of Ring Stiffeners 2 1 if not jacketed,  
8 if jacketed 
Placement of Ring Stiffeners 2 1 if not jacketed,  
8 if jacketed 
Presence of Jacket E 1 
Jacket Material E 1 
Jacket Thickness E 6 
Insulation Type E 6 
Head Material E 1 
Front Head Design Thickness E 1 
Rear Head Design Thickness E 1 
Shell Material E 1 
Top Shell Design Thickness E 1 
Side Shell Design Thickness E 1 
Bottom Shell Design Thickness E 1 
Weld Material 5-7 1 
Design Temperature Range 5-7 1 
Maximum Allowable Working Pressure 1 1 
Pressure Relief Valve Design 1 2 
Pressure Relief Valve Placement 5-7 1 
Pressure Relief Valve Distance From Bulk 
Package Stiffeners 
5-7 6 
Void Space Vent Design 10 2 
Manhole Test Pressure 5-7 1 
Manhole Shape 5-7 1 
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Table 3.35 (cont.) 
 
Include in Accident  
Damage Database 
Ease of Obtaining 
Information 
Variable 
E = Essential to Include                           
1 = Very Important To Include 
10 = Somewhat Important To 
Include 
1 = Very Easy To Obtain 
10 = Difficult To Obtain 
Package Design Characteristics Cont’d 
Manhole Placement 5-7 1 
Maintenance/Repair Characteristics 
Amount Corroded 6-8 8 
Actual Front Head Thickness 6-8 8 
Actual Rear Head Thickness 6-8 8 
Actual Top Shell Thickness 6-8 8 
Actual Side Shell Thickness 6-8 8 
Actual Bottom Shell Thickness 6-8 8 
Presence of Pre-existing Stress Flaw(s) in 
Damage Location 
6-8 6 
Presence of Pre-existing Stress Flaws(s) at 
Rupture Location 
6-8 6 
Previous Repair Location 6-8 6 
Previous Repair Distance from Rupture 6-8 6 
Previous Repair Size 6-8 6 
Previous Repair Material 6-8 1 
Previous Repair Weld Material 6-8 1 
Presence of Corrosion at Rupture Location 6-8 6 
Depth of Corrosion at Rupture Location 6-8 6 
Crash Characteristics 
Impacted Object 1 1 
Impacted Object Speed 2 1 if stationary object,  
5 if moving object 
Bulk Package Speed Immediately Prior to 
Impact 
2 1 if event recorder data are 
available,  
otherwise 5 
Closing Speed at Moment of Impact 2 1 if “Impact Object Speed” 
and “Bulk Package Speed 
Immediately Prior to 
Impact” is also recorded, 
otherwise 5 
Bulk Package Motion Immediately Prior to 
Impact 
2 1 if decelerating (braking) or 
rolling over, 5 otherwise 
Type of Damage* E 1 if subjective evaluations 
are used 
Whether the Type of Damage Sustained 
Resulted in Failure* 
E 1 
Damage Shape 2 4 
Damage Size 2 4 
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Table 3.35 (cont.) 
 
Include in Accident  
Damage Database 
Ease of Obtaining 
Information 
Variable 
E = Essential to Include                           
1 = Very Important To Include 
10 = Somewhat Important To 
Include 
1 = Very Easy To Obtain 
10 = Difficult To Obtain 
Crash Characteristics Cont’d 
Rupture/Puncture Shape 2 3 
Rupture/Puncture Size 2 3 
Damage Location (on the cargo tank) E 1 
Damaged Components* E 1 
Whether Damage Sustained by the 
Component Resulted in a Release* 
E 1 
Release Occurred E 1 
Amount of Commodity Spilled E 4 
Others 
Trailer/Truck Frame Design 5 1 
Attachment to Trailer/Truck Frame 5 1 
Package Stability 5 8 
Vehicle Speed Prior to Crash E 
1 if event recorder data are 
available, 5 otherwise 
Avoidance Maneuver 1 1 
Notes:  
  
1. Variables shaded gray are recorded by Form 5800.1 
2. Variables denoted with an asterisk are partially recorded by Form 5800.1 
 
Table 3.35 shows that, in addition to the variables collected in PHMSA Form 5800.1, 
the following fields are required for developing a basic statistical understanding of cargo tank 
performance and for computing the component-specific conditional probability of release 
for highway bulk packages transporting hazardous materials:  
 Bottom accident damage protection. 
 Rollover accident damage protection. 
 Presence of jacket. 
 Jacket material. 
 Jacket thickness. 
 Insulation type. 
 Head material. 
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 Front head design thickness. 
 Rear head design thickness. 
 Shell material. 
 Top shell design thickness. 
 Side shell design thickness. 
 Bottom shell design thickness. 
 Type of damage (replaces “Type of Failure” on Form 5800.1). 
 Whether the type of damage sustained resulted in failure. 
 Damage location (on the bulk package). 
 Damaged components (replaces “What Failed” on Form 5800.1). 
 Whether the damage sustained by the component resulted in a release. 
 Release occurred. 
 Amount of commodity spilled. 
3.8 Selected Level of Detail 
The various data fields outlined above were grouped into six levels (Appendix B) 
ranging from Level 1, which are the variables needed for the most basic conditional 
probability of release (CPR) calculation, to Level 6, which includes the variables required for 
assessment of detailed package and component design elements as well as various inferential 
statistics, including the effect of tank maintenance and repair history.   
These differing levels represent increasingly detailed performance measures and a 
corresponding increase in the effort required by carriers to complete the reports.  This 
illustrates the trade-off between the value of the information collected and the level of effort 
required to collect such data.  A decision regarding the most appropriate balance is crucial to 
the success of whatever data collection system might ultimately be developed for assessing 
accident performance of highway bulk packages. 
The TRB oversight panel for the project consisted of representatives from 
stakeholder industries and government agencies as follows:  
 Dr.William R. Rhyne, HM-07 Oversight Panel Chair. 
 Dr. Daniel Blower, University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute. 
 Dr. Cheryl A. “Cherry” Burke, Dow Chemical Company. 
 110 
 
 Mr. John F. Cannon, Brenner Tank LLC. 
 Mr. John L. Conley, National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. 
 Mr. Roger D. Sims, P.E., Sims Professional Engineers. 
 Mr. Todd Treichel, RSI-AAR Railroad Tank Car Safety Research and Test 
Project. 
 Mr. Charles H. Hochman, Office of Hazardous Materials Technology, Pipeline 
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. 
 Mr. Douglas W. “Doug” Scheffler, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Office of 
Standards Evaluation and Development. 
 Dr. William C. Rogers, NCFRP Transportation Research Board Cooperative 
Research Programs. 
This committee was asked to identify what degree of refinement is desired in the 
accident data reporting system.  They suggested that a possible future database should 
contain fields corresponding to Level 4: Component-Specific CPR Statistics Accounting for 
the Influence of Accident Protection and Accident Characteristics.  These fields include:  
 Presence and type of bottom accident damage protection 
 Presence and type of rollover accident damage protection 
 Presence of jacket   
 Type of jacket material 
 Damage location on the bulk package 
 Whether the damage sustained by the component resulted in a release 
 Vehicle speed prior to crash 
 Type of impacted object 
Fields should also be included that describe the extent of package damage and, if a 
release occurred, to quantify the dimensions of the breach.   
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGIES1 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter identifies possible methodologies for systematic collection of the 
necessary performance data.  This is achieved through a literature review, an examination of 
existing accident and hazardous materials data collection processes, and an analysis of 
accident severity thresholds.  Industry surveys and interviews are used to identify preferable 
methodologies for further implementation.  
Strategies previously employed to collect data on various aspects of hazardous 
materials transportation are reviewed.  The review includes literature that evaluates several 
existing databases and accident data collection processes that could either be modified to 
collect cargo tank and portable tank performance data or that could be emulated by this 
project’s proposed database.   
Accident definitions used by several different databases are reviewed for relevance in 
assessing highway bulk package accident performance.  Unintentional releases are 
distinguished from intentional releases (i.e., criminal acts resulting in a release); and non-
release events are distinguished from release events.  The accident damage database 
developed in this report will focus on collecting data from unintentional, accident-caused 
damage regardless of whether a release occurred.  In addition, severity thresholds for 
inclusion or exclusion in existing databases are reviewed.  The effect of specific severity 
threshold levels on the total number of accidents recorded in a database is illustrated using 
data from an existing accident database and the implications of different threshold levels are 
                                                          
1 This chapter was developed to fulfill the requirements of the Transportation 
Research Board (TRB)’s Hazardous Materials Cooperative Research Program (HMCRP) 
project HM-07 entitled “Accident Performance Data of Bulk Packages Used for Hazardous 
Materials Transportation.”   This chapter appears as part of Chapter 3 in HM-07’s final 
deliverable which was accepted for publication.   
Philip J. Daum, Christopher P. L. Barkan, M. Rapik Saat, and Laura E. Ghosh, 
Feasibility Study for Highway Hazardous Materials Bulk Package Accident Performance 
Data. Hazardous Materials Cooperative Research Program (HMCRP) Report, 
Transportation Research Board, 2013. 
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discussed.  Finally, a basis is provided for defining the possible range of accidents to be 
included in the data collection program. 
Industry interviews and surveys also collected opinions concerning the systematic 
collection of the necessary performance data.  Three dichotomies are used in the survey: (1) 
voluntary versus mandatory data reporting; (2) an extension of Form DOT F 5800.1 versus a 
new program; and (3) a government-sponsored versus industry-sponsored program.  A 
preliminary set of possible data collection protocols based on each approach are developed 
and prioritized based on their pros, cons, and ease of implementation.  Four options are 
prioritized and further examined to address questions such as how data will be collected, 
where they will be housed, who will collect them, and how confidential data will be 
protected.   
One of these data collection approaches, the possible implementation of a 
government-sponsored extension of Form DOT F 5800.1, with mandatory participation, 
was refined into a system with details about the elements of the data set to be collected.  
These elements are identified and grouped according to logical associations.  Implementation 
considerations are then discussed.  These include electronic data collection tools that offer 
logical response options based on previous responses, a possible prototype database 
management system, and security access-control considerations.   
4.2 Literature Review 
Data collection strategies previously employed to analyze various aspects of 
hazardous materials transportation were evaluated for relevance to this project.  There are 
several existing databases and accident data collection processes that could either be 
modified to collect cargo tank performance data or that could be emulated by this project’s 
proposed database.  The following pieces of literature provided an introduction to a variety 
of databases that will be examined in further detail. 
HMCRP Report 1: Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident Data for 
Root Cause Analysis (Battelle Memorial Institute 2009).  This study examines multiple 
existing databases including:  
 Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS) 
 Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting System (HMIRS) 
 Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) 
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 Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA) 
 Large Truck Crash Causation Study (LTCCS) 
 Railroad Accident/Incident Reporting System (RAIRS) 
 Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) 
Each of the above databases was evaluated for the potential to perform a root cause 
analysis.  In addition to providing an overview of the data collection process, the report 
discusses thresholds for exclusion/inclusion, examines accuracy and completeness of the 
data, and determines the degree of interconnectivity with other databases. 
National Automotive Sampling System (NASS) General Estimates System 
(GES) Analytical User’s Manual 1999-2008 (NHTSA 2010).  In this study, the purpose 
and design of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) General 
Estimates System database is discussed.  The document describes the GES sample design 
process, provides a summary of the imputation process used and documents the variable 
names and associated codes contained in the database.   
Databases and Needs for Risk Assessment of Hazardous Materials Shipments 
by Trucks (Hobeika and Kim 1993).  This study evaluates 12 hazardous material truck 
databases in terms of reliability and their associated risk assessment problems.  While there 
are databases providing exposure (referent/denominator) information, this information is 
not usually obtained for a particular accident/crash incident.  The dichotomy between crash 
databases and exposure databases, according to Hobeika and Kim (1993), reduces the 
reliability of hazardous material transportation risk analyses.  Hobeika and Kim (1993) assert 
that the 12 databases analyzed in the paper lack sufficient information, pertaining to 
incidents, exposure or consequences, needed to perform risk analysis.  The paper discusses 
reporting requirements, compares national hazardous material statistics to state hazardous 
material statistics, and provides a brief discussion on the merits of using geographic 
information systems (GIS) and automatic vehicle identification (AVI) for the purposes of 
data collection.  
4.3 Accident Definitions  
In general, release incidents involving bulk packages in transit can be classified as 
accident- or non-accident caused.  The former are the result of unintentional application of 
external forces, including a crash between vehicles or impact with stationary objects, while 
 114 
 
the latter are due to causes such as improperly secured or defective valves, fittings and tank, 
and venting of non-atmospheric gases from safety-relief devices.  Typically, non-accident-
caused releases have higher frequency (Barkan et al. 2000) but lower consequences compared 
to accident-caused releases.   
An accident damage database should contribute to transportation safety by enabling 
risk analyses to include the conditional probability of release given that a bulk package is 
involved in an accident.  The analysis of data on unintentional, accident-caused releases will 
enable better-informed decisions regarding bulk tank design, accident protection technology 
and operational strategies.  On the other hand, there are a number of potentially useful 
security strategies that could be examined by recording intentional release events (i.e., 
criminal acts resulting in a release).  However, the recording of intentional release events may 
require some different data that could affect the effectiveness and cost of the overall data 
collection process.  Therefore, the proposed accident damage database will focus on 
collecting data from unintentional, accident-caused damage.  
In order to estimate the conditional probability of release for bulk packages and their 
various design elements, detailed data on the nature of damages suffered by packages 
involved in accidents is necessary.  Of particular importance relative to current highway 
accident databases is that data are needed on crashes involving hazardous material bulk 
packages, whether or not some or all of the contents leaked in accidents.  This is an area 
where the existing Form DOT F 5800.1 already collects various details of damaged packages 
when a release has occurred or the damages to the bulk package cost above $500.  However, 
the current process does not record information in sufficient detail to address some of the 
pertinent questions concerning bulk package performance.  
Furthermore, in terms of assessing portable and cargo tank performance, accidents 
in which a tank was involved but not damaged should be distinguished from accidents in 
which the tank did suffer damage, whether or not a release occurred.  A similar distinction 
exists in the RSI-AAR tank car database with regard to recording derailed cars versus 
derailed cars that suffered damage to the tank or appurtenances.  The former is an estimator 
of exposure of the vehicle to accidents, whereas the latter is an estimate of the exposure of 
the tank itself to damaging events.   
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4.3.1 Implications of Different Accident Severity Thresholds 
The implications of setting an accident severity threshold beyond which accidents should 
be recorded were examined using data from PHMSA’s HMIRS.  All en route or in transit 
incidents or accidents concerning cargo tanks, cylinders, or intermodal tanks between 
January 1, 2005 and May 1, 2010 yielded a total of 2,074 records involving cargo tanks that 
resulted in more than $500 in damage.  These records were used to calculate the cumulative 
percentage of reported incidents with respect to the total cost of each event.  The incident 
costs reported in Form DOT F 5800.1 ranged between $0 and $2,285,000 with 90 percent of 
the accidents incurring a cost less than $203,500 and 50 percent of the accidents incurring a 
cost less than $9,000 (Figure 4.1).  The relationship illustrated is more sensitive in the lower 
range of incident costs and indicates higher severity cost thresholds lead to a lower number 
of recorded incidents.   
 
Figure 4.1 Cumulative Percentages of Reported Incidents by Total Cost 
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By definition, low severity accidents are limited in the extent of damage incurred, and 
rarely involve a release, and therefore pose little risk.  The lower the threshold, the more 
accidents need to be recorded.  The result is greater cost and time to collect the data, and a 
higher cost to maintain the database.  Data on lower consequence accidents may be of less 
value in terms of the objectives of a database.  On the other hand, lower consequence 
accidents may provide useful predictive information for lower frequency, higher  
consequence events.  Furthermore, the larger sample size combined with the more rapid 
accumulation of data will enable more statistical power and enable inferences to be made 
sooner, especially in the early years of a new database.  Consequently, there is a trade-off to 
be considered in establishing thresholds.  From a technical standpoint, standardized 
reporting criteria are important to understand because they provide a baseline rate upon 
which to base consistent risk estimates. 
4.4 Existing Data Collection Strategies and Their Reporting Thresholds 
Existing accident and hazardous materials data collection processes were reviewed 
for their ability to be adapted to evaluate cargo tank and portable tank performance in 
highway accidents.  These existing programs include the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
Safety Administration (PHMSA)’s Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting System 
(HMIRS), the Federal Motor Carriers Safety Administration (FMCSA)’s Motor Carrier 
Management Information System (MCMIS), the University of Michigan Transportation 
Research Institute (UMTRI)’s Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA), and NHTSA’s 
National Automotive Sampling System (NASS) General Estimates System (GES).  
Additionally, several existing data collection processes used for a comparable purpose in 
other modes were examined.  These include the Railway Supply Institute (RSI) - Association 
of American Railroads (AAR) Tank Car Accident Database (TCAD), the U.S. DOT Federal 
Railroad Administration (FRA) Railroad Accident/Incident Reporting System (RAIRS), and 
the U.S. Coast Guard’s Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE).   
Most similar accident database systems have some type of criteria that determine 
whether or not an event should be reported (for example damage cost, or quantity released).  
Furthermore, in some databases, there are tiered thresholds, in which incidents of greater 
magnitude have more detailed reporting requirements.  Reporting thresholds have both 
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practical and analytical implications for the resultant database and these should be 
understood when developing a new database.   
This section summarizes accident definitions and accident severity thresholds for 
inclusion or exclusion in existing accident databases.  Additionally, the information recording 
process for each dataset is described. 
4.4.1 Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS) 
The MCMIS data collection starts with the police filing the police accident reports 
(PAR), compiling and submitting the PARs to the appropriate state agency in which reports 
involving accidents that met the MCMIS criteria are reported to FMCSA via electronic filing 
or manually using a Web interface.  FMCSA then records the information into the MCMIS 
Crash database, which contains four major files – Registration, Crash, Inspection, and 
Company Safety Profile.  The most pertinent and relevant to this project is the Crash file.  
The MCMIS Crash file is intended to record all serious crashes of trucks and buses 
involved in commerce.  A crash is considered serious if there is: 
 A fatality. 
 An injury requiring immediate medical attention away from the accident location. 
 A vehicle had to be towed from the accident location due to disabling damage. 
4.4.2 Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting System (HMIRS) 
Under 49 CFR 171.16, all road, rail, water, or air hazardous material carriers must 
submit a Form DOT F 5800.1 within 30 days of a reportable incident that falls under the 
following criteria: 
 The National Response Center (NRC) is notified due to:  
– An injury or fatality directly resulting from hazardous material exposure, an 
evacuation of more than an hour, a major artery road closed for more than 
an hour, or change of an operational flight pattern or aircraft routine. 
– A fire, breakage, or spillage involving radioactive materials. 
– A fire, breakage, or spillage involving infectious materials. 
– A marine pollutant release. 
– A situation poses a continuous danger to life at the accident location. 
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 An unintentional hazardous material release or discharge of such materials. 
 An undeclared hazardous material is discovered. 
 Any structural damage to the lading retention system or damage that requires 
repair to a system intended to protect the lading system of a hazardous material 
cargo tank with a minimum capacity of 1,000 gallons (even if there was no 
release). 
For clarity, PHMSA’s incident reporting guidelines (PHMSA 2004) provides the 
following examples of the damage incurred by a bulk package that is required to be reported:   
 Outlet valve damage affecting seating and requiring replacement. 
 Lading retention system damage, including damage to charged outlet lines, that 
could have resulted in loss of contents. 
 Damage requiring professional inspection or recertification. 
 Damage requiring repair due to compromised integrity. 
A reportable incident can occur whenever a carrier is involved: during 
loading/unloading, in transit or in temporary storage en route between the origin and final 
destination.  For each incident, the cost of damages must be provided if total damage 
exceeds $500.  The resulting database contains incident reports pertaining to non-accident-
caused as well as accident-caused hazardous material releases and near misses. 
Corrections and updates must be filed within a year of an incident by submitting 
Form DOT F 5800.1 again and checking the “A supplemental (follow-up) report” box on 
the form.  Filing methods available include XML submissions, online Form DOT F 5800.1 
reporting application, PDF attachment in email and by fax.  PHMSA performs newspaper 
searches and compares the list of incidents reported to NRC to identify unreported 
incidents.  Delinquent carriers who fail to report incidents within the specified timeframe are 
notified by phone. 
4.4.3 Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA) 
The Center for National Truck and Bus Statistics at the University of Michigan 
Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI) manages the TIFA database.  It is a subset of 
FARS focusing on all medium and heavy trucks with greater than 10,000-lb Gross Vehicle 
Weight Rating (GVWR), and expanded with supplemental survey data.   
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NHTSA has a contract with an agency in each state to provide information on fatal 
crashes using standard FARS forms. FARS analysts are state employees who attend formal 
training programs and receive on-the-job training.  A supplemental phone survey is 
performed by the Center for National Truck and Bus Statistics at the University of Michigan 
Transportation Research Institute to complete the TIFA database record for each accident.   
TIFA has the same accident definitions and reporting criteria as FARS.  Specifically, 
a crash is included if there is: 
 A fatality that occurs as a result of a crash. 
 A fatality that occurs within 30 days of a crash. 
 One motor vehicle in transport on a public road. 
4.4.4 National Automotive Sampling System (NASS) General Estimates System 
(GES) 
Maintained by NHTSA, GES is populated by data obtained from a nationally 
representative probability sample of police-reported crashes (NHTSA 2010).  After selection 
of the police jurisdictions, the GES data collector organizes a select subsample of police 
accident reports into six strata depending upon vehicle type, injury severity, and vehicle tow 
status.  A systematic sample of crashes is then selected based on different sampling ratios.  
Of particular interest to this project is Group 2:  NASS crashes involving at least one 
medium or heavy truck in which a vehicle was towed due to damage or at least one person 
involved had an injury requiring medical treatment.    
4.4.5 Large Truck Crash Causation Study (LTCCS) 
FMCSA and NHTSA jointly undertook the Large Truck Crash Causation Study 
(LTCCS) as a one-time initiative to compile a nationally representative sample of nearly 
1,000 injury and fatal crashes involving large trucks that occurred between April 2001 and 
December 2003.  Each crash involved at least one large truck with a gross vehicle weight 
rating (GVWR) greater than 10,000 lbs. and one fatality or serious injury, where a serious 
injury is either an incapacitating or non-incapacitating but evident injury. 
4.4.6 RSI-AAR Tank Car Accident Database (TCAD) 
The RSI-AAR TCAD provides an example of how a database designed for container 
performance could be structured, maintained and operated.  Compared to other accident 
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databases, the RSI-AAR project records more details about the parts of tank cars that failed 
in release accidents, but it also records data on accidents involving tank cars without a 
release, including certain details of the damage suffered in these accidents.  This information 
provides denominator data that can be used to calculate a conditional probability of release 
statistic for specific designs of tank cars damaged in accidents.  This project focuses on 
methodologies to implement a program that would collect the same type of information as 
the RSI-AAR TCAD; however, there are a number of operational and institutional 
differences between the highway transport and rail industries that make such an 
implementation challenging.  These differences are discussed in Appendix C.  
As part of the RSI-AAR Railroad Tank Car Safety Research and Test Project, the 
TCAD is maintained by an independent contractor working for the project sponsors, RSI 
and AAR.  Since 1970, data have been gathered and compiled from a variety of sources with 
the goal of recording accident circumstances, mechanical and design characteristics of each 
tank car involved in the accident, and details on the damage suffered by the tank cars during 
the accident.  Accident information sources for the RSI-AAR project include the FRA 
RAIRS, railroads, tank car owners, news clip service and AP articles, weekly accident 
summaries prepared by the University of Illinois based on Chemtrec reports, and 
government agencies’ accident investigation reports.  The contractor is responsible for 
gathering information from all these different sources, merging the information, resolving 
conflicting information, and pursuing missing data.  Detailed damage data are usually 
provided by repair shops.  Information on the design parameters of each car come from the 
rail industry's Universal Machine Language Equipment Register (UMLER), which is a 
registry of nearly all North American rolling stock that contains extensive information on 
individual tank cars' design parameters.  Additional design information is provided by the 
tank car certificates of construction which must be completed for every tank car and updated 
when significant changes to a car are made throughout the course of its service life.  The 
contractor is responsible for entering all relevant information into the database and ensuring 
its accuracy and integrity.  For quality assurance (QA), quarterly reports are published for 
project director and project sponsor review. 
 121 
 
4.4.7 Railroad Accident/Incident Reporting System (RAIRS) 
The U.S. DOT Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) requires that all railroad accidents 
in which damage to track and equipment exceeds a specified monetary threshold must be 
reported to RAIRS.  The threshold is adjusted periodically for inflation, and in 2011, was 
$9,400.    Compliance with RAIRS reporting requirements appears to be quite high and 
RAIRS plays an important role in the rail industry's ability to monitor its performance and 
measure safety trends in general, and understand the circumstances of accidents involving 
tank cars in particular.  Besides basic information about the circumstances of the accident, 
RAIRS has an extensive set of detailed accident cause codes that enable understanding of the 
relationship between accident cause and various outcomes, including tank car performance.  
RAIRS data frequently form the principal basis for understanding the circumstances of 
accidents involving tank cars reported in the RSI-AAR TCAD. 
4.4.8 Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) 
The U.S. Coast Guard maintains the MISLE system to support their Marine Safety and 
Operations Programs.  As part of the system, the Marine Casualty and Pollution Database 
contains data related to marine casualty investigations reportable under 46 CFR 4.03 and 
pollution investigations reportable under 33 CFR 153.203.  The database contains 
information collected by U.S. Coast Guard personnel concerning vessel and waterfront 
facility accidents and marine pollution incidents throughout the United States and its 
territories. 
4.5 Limitations of Existing Databases 
4.5.1 Insufficient Denominator Data 
Perhaps the biggest limitation of the existing accident databases to perform package 
performance studies to estimate the conditional probability of release for bulk packages is 
insufficient understanding of the denominator data.  In other words, how often are packages 
exposed to various accident conditions in which they might fail?  Detailed damage 
information is needed for packages in accidents whether or not a release took place. 
Beginning in 2005, the restructured HMIRS requires non-release accidents to be 
reported if they involve a cargo tank with a minimum 10,000-gallon capacity and the lading 
retention system is damaged.  These are classified as type C records, as opposed to type A 
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for release incidents and type B for undeclared hazardous material shipment.  HMCRP 
Report 1 (Battelle Memorial Institute 2009) suggests that there may be significant 
underreporting involving type C records, based on comparisons between HMIRS and 
MCMIS and TIFA.  Substantial improvement to HMIRS for package performance statistical 
studies would be achieved if type C record underreporting could be reduced or eliminated.  
Underreporting could be reduced by cross-checking accident records in HMIRS with the list 
of (1) hazardous material fatal accidents in TIFA, (2) rollover accidents involving cargo tanks 
in MCMIS, and (3) repaired cargo tanks by auditing hazardous-material-authorized repair 
shops.  Periodic audits would increase the number of incidents being reported and result in 
better statistical analyses. 
4.5.2 Accident Underreporting 
Underreporting is a term to describe the discrepancy between the total number of 
reportable incidents and the number of incidents actually reported.  In HMCRP Report 1, 
Battelle (2009) sought to “bound the probable HMIRS reporting rate” by comparing 
HMIRS reports resulting in a fatality with FARS records involving vehicles transporting bulk 
quantities of hazardous materials.  Bulk hazardous materials accidents resulting in a fatality 
were found to be reported between 26.9 percent and 59.7 percent of the time.  Since a Form 
DOT F 5800.1 is only required to be filed if the fatality is related to the release of hazardous 
materials, the FARS data comparison is not a direct indication of underreporting.   
To further quantify the amount of underreporting for all crashes resulting in damage 
to the lading retention system, PHMSA HMIRS records between March 1, 2011 and 
September 30, 2011 were matched to FMCSA MCMIS crash files and a news article dataset 
primarily using location date and description of events.  During this period, PHMSA HMIRS 
database contained 123 reports of accidents of which 98 resulting in lading loss.  FMCSA 
MCMIS crash files contained 754 reports of which 95 resulted in lading loss.  It should be 
noted that not all 754 accidents resulted in damage to the lading retention system; however, 
at least 95 records (those resulting in lading loss) correspond to accidents in which the bulk 
package was damaged.  The news article dataset was developed using news-source reported 
crashes identified through Google News Alert service.  It included fields for date, time, 
location, state, and a description of what events occurred and consequences of those events, 
whether the bulk package overturned, and whether a release occurred. Between March 1, 
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2011 and September 30, 2011, 127 hazardous materials bulk package accidents were 
identified in news sources.  Of these 127 accidents, 103 resulted in lading loss.  The 
combined dataset consisted of 924 accidents (Figure 4.2) of which 236 resulted in a release 
(Figure 4.3).  This corresponds to an accident rate of 132 per month, of which 34 result in a 
release. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Venn Diagram of Hazmat Accidents 
 
Figure 4.3 Venn Diagram of Hazmat Releases 
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Since not all of the FMCSA MCMIS records are of accidents that resulted in damage 
to the lading retention system, the combined dataset serves to identify the limits of 
underreporting.  The lower bound considers only those FMCSA accidents in which a release 
occurred (all release accidents are required to be reported to PHMSA).  Of the 278 records 
in which damage to the bulk package is confirmed, 155 accidents were not reported to 
PHMSA.  This corresponds to an underreporting rate of 56 percent.  The upper bound 
considers all FMCSA crash data involving a hazardous materials bulk package even though 
reporting all of these accidents may not be required.  Of these 924 accidents, 801 are not 
reported to PHMSA.  If all 924 accidents resulted in damage to the bulk package, the 
underreporting rate would be 87 percent.  Therefore, between 13 and 44 percent of 
accidents in which a bulk package was damaged are reported to PHMSA. 
4.5.3 Poor Quality of Reported Information 
The reports submitted to PHMSA HMIRS have varying degrees of completeness and 
response consistency.  Battelle’s analysis of the HMIRS data showed that “some obvious 
Q/A checks are not being performed” (Battelle Memorial Institute, 2009).  A brief analysis 
of the accidents reported to PHMSA from January 1, 2006 to June 4, 2011 was undertaken 
to identify the percentage of accident reports that result in poor quality data (Table 4.1).  A 
total of 1,176 incidents were reported.  Of these, the type of bulk container was identified 
for 997 (85 percent) incidents.  A description of what failed was identified for 961 (82 
percent) incidents.  Reporting rates for bulk package design parameters such as package 
capacity, package amount, material of construction, design pressure, shell thickness and head 
thickness range between 67 percent and 45 percent.  Finally, a comparison of the number of 
reported incidents satisfying PHMSA’s classification of a serious bulk release was compared 
to the number of incidents for which damages over $500 are reported.  This analysis 
indicated that the cost of damages was incorrectly reported for at least 38 (3 percent) serious 
bulk releases.  Data checking and greater reporting compliance would result in better 
estimates of the conditional probability of release.   
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Table 4.1 Critical Fields Percent Reported for Incidents in PHMSA HMIRS from 
January 1, 2006 to June 4, 2011 
Field 
Number of 
Incidents 
Percent of Total 
Number of Incidents 
Total Number of Reported Incidents    1,176 -- 
Container Specification/Non-Specification Container 997 85% 
What Failed 961 82% 
Package Capacity 745 63% 
Package Amount 709 60% 
Material of Construction 784 67% 
Design Pressure 623 53% 
Shell Thickness 543 46% 
Head Thickness 528 45% 
Note: “--“ indicates this value is not applicable. 
 
4.6 Industry Experience 
Several interviews were conducted with individuals having intimate knowledge of 
existing databases such as HMIRS, MCMIS, and TCAD.  These interviews were conducted 
to determine potential challenges with data collection, understand how the data are analyzed, 
and gain insights into how the data could be used to enhance the industry’s safety 
performance.   
4.6.1 PHMSA’s Hazardous Intelligence Portal (HIP) Designers Interview 
The Hazardous Intelligence Portal (HIP) is PHMSA’s current effort to provide a 
platform to collect and share hazardous material intelligence from several groups 
representing different transport modes within the U.S. Department of Transportation.  HIP 
currently collects data from 15 sources; and it is anticipated that additional sources will be 
incorporated into the portal in the future.  This effort was undertaken to organize a 
dashboard-type view of key data regarding the multi-modal transportation of hazardous 
materials by company, enable comprehensive queries of data from multiple sources, and 
improve the prioritization and efficiency of inspections by regulatory agencies.   
As part of this effort, HIP designers have worked closely with HMIRS data to 
update Form DOT F 5800.1.  The main focus in updating Form DOT F 5800.1 is to 
increase data quality through both increasing data governance (only allowing acceptable 
answers) and replacing most freeform questions with drop-down list selection, yes/no, and 
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check-box answers.  They indicate that the main limitations for using the PHMSA data for 
risk assessment include: 
 Insufficient commodity flow data to provide cargo tank exposure estimates (for 
which the incorporation of RFID tags on cargo tanks may be a solution).  
 Incorrect and incomplete damage reporting.  
 Inability to correct for this inconsistent reporting because they do not investigate 
cargo tank (highway) accidents.  
 Significant underreporting of accidents with no follow-up to ensure accidents 
have been reported after initial notification has been provided.  
By contrast to their ability to determine standard industry injury and fatality rates, 
PHMSA is unable to determine baseline rates for tank damage and hazardous material spills.   
Furthermore, based on their experience with the current database, PHMSA identified 
the following future potential challenges:  
 Reconciling differences between and performing analyses on combined data 
from old and new versions of data-reporting forms.   
 Transferring accident reports from paper to digital in which the inclusion of free-
form answers introduces a significant amount of difficulty.  
 Cleansing data so that new reports match previously submitted reports (again 
this typically arises with the presence of free-form answers).   
4.6.2 FMCSA’s Hazardous Materials Division Interview 
The interview with a representative of FMCSA identified the following two sources 
that will enable cargo tank exposure estimates:  
 The Motor Carrier Identification Report (Application for U.S. DOT Number) 
(MCS-150) currently collects information including the annual number of miles 
traveled from 60,000 carriers who transport some quantity of hazardous 
materials.   
 The Combined Motor Carrier Identification Report and Hazardous Materials 
Permit Application (MCS-150B) also collects information including the annual 
number of miles traveled from motor carriers who transport certain types of 
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hazardous materials requiring a safety permit.  Note that those carriers who have 
registered with the MCS-150B are a subset of all carriers transporting hazardous 
materials as some hazardous materials are not part of the HM Safety Permit 
program.  For example, transporting liquid propane gas containing less than 
eighty-five percent methane does not require a safety permit. 
 FMCSA’s Unified Registration System (URS) will replace the MCS databases 
and, in addition to the annual number of miles traveled, will include the quantity 
and type (type and specification number) of cargo tanks that a motor carrier uses.  
However, only carriers who transport cargo tank trailers and cargo tank motor 
vehicles will be required to list the quantity and type of tank.  Carriers who 
transport portable tanks will not be required to identify the quantity and type of 
portable tanks they transport. 
The interview also considered the possibility of local law enforcement officers 
providing much of the information needed for an accident damage database.  Unfortunately 
there are not enough individuals with the appropriate training and the expertise to reliably 
enter accurate and consistent accident damage information in a report.  For example, 
although there are approximately 33,000 police jurisdictions across the United States, only 
7,500 to 10,000 state level motor carrier inspectors are trained through the motor carrier 
safety assistance program.  Furthermore, additional training would be required to obtain 
basic hazardous materials bulk package knowledge and even fewer individuals have been 
trained to conduct post-crash root-cause analysis.  Inspectors are typically not allowed to 
provide comments beyond their level of training; therefore, many would not be permitted to 
inspect the package.  Consequently, the data required for an accident damage database would 
not be recorded unless a supplemental report was initiated.  On the other hand, basic police 
reports may indicate that a cargo tank was involved and, if so, would include carrier 
information.  Thus, police report data could be used to identify those carriers who have had 
incidents and are required to submit Form DOT F 5800.1.   
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4.6.3 RSI-AAR Tank Car Accident Database Feedback 
Since 1970, the database has been periodically evaluated for its effectiveness in aiding 
the industry in achieving various improvements in the safety of hazardous materials 
transportation by rail.  The rail industry associations that sponsor that database indicate a 
savings of at least 11 times the cost of the implementation since inception.  Periodic cost-
benefit analyses have consistently indicated positive returns on investment in terms of 
improved safety and business operations.  Furthermore, industry-managed database has 
contributed to a greater degree of trust in the industry and contributed to consensus in 
regulatory proposal development.  Regulators have been provided with analyses using data 
recorded in the TCAD to assess the need for and nature of new regulations.  This has 
resulted in more pragmatic, effective, and fact-based regulatory proposals.  
4.7 Approaches to Data Collection 
The following three dichotomies were considered to facilitate decisions regarding the 
different approaches for development of such a database:  
 Voluntary versus mandatory data reporting.  
 An extension of Form DOT F 5800.1 versus a new program.  
 Government-sponsored versus industry-sponsored program. 
4.7.1 Voluntary Versus Mandatory Data Reporting 
4.7.1.1 Voluntary Data Reporting 
In this approach companies transporting hazardous material(s) would decide whether 
or not to participate in the data reporting process.  There could be guidelines or incentives 
but the decision to participate would be strictly voluntary.  By its nature, voluntary reporting 
results in self-selection which might introduce some biases into the dataset that could be 
difficult to account for during data analysis.  Voluntary reporting may be successful if 
incident information cannot be traced back to the individual or company because concerns 
about possible repercussions regarding the accident would be minimized.  Individuals or 
companies submitting voluntary reports would need to recognize sufficient value from 
participation in the program.  If the program was augmented by incentives such as an 
improved federal safety rating, the perceived value of participation might be enhanced.  A 
successful voluntary program in which there was substantial stakeholder participation with a 
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large number of high-quality reports could offset the uncertainty related to the self-selection 
bias.  Furthermore, a successful program might result in greater accuracy in the submitted 
data because of the vested interest of the contributors. 
4.7.1.2 Mandatory Data Reporting 
Mandatory data reporting would involve a statutory or regulatory mandate that 
requires certain information to be reported to an organization that would compile and 
manage the database.   Since the approach is mandatory, the vested interest of individual 
contributors may be lower; therefore, efforts to ensure compliance would be required.  
Providing incentives would encourage contributors to increase data accuracy and improve 
compliance.  A successful mandatory program would have near 100% reporting with high 
accuracy, resulting in a bias-free analysis. 
4.7.2 Extended Form DOT F 5800.1 Versus New Program 
4.7.2.1 An Extension of Form DOT F 5800.1 
The Form DOT F 5800.1 records approximately 70 percent of the information 
identified as necessary to evaluate bulk package accident performance and estimate 
component-specific conditional probability of release.  In order to increase the capability of 
Form DOT F 5800.1 to calculate bulk package performance, the following additional fields 
would need to be recorded:  
 Bottom accident damage protection. 
 Rollover accident damage protection. 
 Presence of jacket. 
 Jacket material. 
 Jacket thickness. 
 Insulation type. 
 Type of damage (replaces “Type of Failure” in Form DOT F 5800.1). 
 Whether the type of damage sustained resulted in failure. 
 Damage location (on the bulk package). 
 Damaged components (replaces “What Failed” in Form DOT F 5800.1). 
 Whether the damage sustained by the component resulted in failure. 
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In order to calculate various conditional probabilities, these new data fields would 
also need to be linked to crash reports in PHMSA’s HMIRS database.  An extension of 
Form DOT F 5800.1 may be desirable as it would minimize the additional burden on 
individuals and companies required to file reports.  However, this option does not address 
carrier and shipper concerns about data confidentiality and the improper use of data and 
analyses in ways that could harm contributors. This might influence the degree of candor in 
reporting.  One possibility that may enable the collection of additional data while 
maintaining the current level of reporting is the development of a possible “no-fault” 
appendix form, specific to the highway mode. This form could be used to collect additional 
data to describe the results of a root-cause analysis and the tank damage observed as a result 
of crashes.  Using a “no-fault” form would protect against improper use of data and analyses 
in ways that could harm contributors.      
4.7.2.2 New Program 
In contrast to an extension of Form DOT F 5800.1, a new program could be set up 
to independently collect all the information necessary to compute the conditional probability 
of release.  If not linked to PHMSA’s HMIRS database, the anonymity of reporting could be 
preserved if the new program only collects information related to accident damage and not 
accident identification information such as date, time, location (of accident), and 
carrier/shipper information.  Furthermore, a new program may have more flexibility in 
terms of adding or removing information fields in the future. 
4.7.3 Government Versus Industry Sponsored 
4.7.3.1 Government Sponsored 
In a government-sponsored program, either agency staff or a contractor would 
develop and manage the database.  Such a program could be subjected to Freedom of 
Information Act requirements and may be less flexible to changes but would have the 
stability and resources of a government program.   
4.7.3.2 Industry Sponsored 
In an industry-sponsored approach, data would be collected and housed by an 
industry association, a consortium of industry associations, or by a contracted private firm, 
research organization, or university.  Industry would decide how to respond to requests for 
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data analyses, including requests from government agencies.  An industry group or 
consortium could hire a contractor to collect, compile, and analyze additional information 
from different sources such as police accident reports. Since this approach relies on industry 
funding, the value of such a database would need to be accepted by the majority of industry 
potential participants.  Such an approach may result in greater potential anonymity because 
procedures and policies can be implemented to protect the information against the improper 
use of data and analyses in ways that harm contributors.   
4.8 Industry Opinion 
In addition to the surveys conducted to determine what information different 
stakeholders believe would be most useful in an accident damage database, the survey 
explored the preferences stakeholders may have regarding the database.  Due to the potential 
differences in the use of bulk package accident performance data, five surveys, targeting 
package manufacturers, carriers, shippers, repair facilities, and researchers/government 
organizations, were developed.  Questions were tailored to each survey group to maximize 
collecting information best known by those industry sectors.   Copies of the surveys, and an 
explanation of their development, can be found in Appendix A. 
4.8.1 Database Structure Preferences 
The survey respondents were asked to identify whether the proposed accident 
database should be mandatory or voluntary, sponsored by industry or government, and a 
new process/database or built on existing programs (i.e., add fields to Form DOT F 5800.1 
and increase reporting compliance).  Opinions varied within industry groups concerning the 
preferred database approaches; however, the reasons for choosing one approach over 
another tended to be similar across stakeholder groups, regardless of the preferred approach.     
In general, the respondents were fairly evenly split as to their preference between mandatory 
verses voluntary reporting (Figure 4.4, Table 4.2), 67% of respondents were in favor of an 
industry versus government-sponsored approach (Figure 4.5, Table 4.3), and 63% of 
respondents were in favor of building off of an existing database verses a new database 
approach (Figure 4.6, Table 4.4).   
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Figure 4.4 Survey Respondent Preferences for Mandatory vs. Voluntary Bulk 
Package Accident Performance Data Collection Program 
Table 4.2 Main Concerns Expressed by Survey Respondents Regarding Mandatory 
or Voluntary Bulk Package Accident Performance Data Collection Program  
Main Concerns Addressed By: 
Mandatory Approach Voluntary Approach 
 Increased workload justification/fairness  
 Fear of legal liability leads to unreported 
incidents if not mandatory  
 Small sample sizes from which to draw 
conclusions if reporting is not mandatory 
 Increased workload with little perceived benefit  
 Fear of legal liability leads to underreporting  
 Small sample size for particular cargo tank type 
 Time lag between crash and report submittal 
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Figure 4.5 Survey Respondent Preferences for Industry vs. Government-Sponsored 
Bulk Package Accident Performance Data Collection Program 
Table 4.3 Main Concerns Expressed by Survey Respondents Regarding Industry- vs. 
Government-Sponsored Bulk Package Accident Performance Data Collection 
Program 
Main Concerns Addressed By: 
Industry-Sponsored Approach Government Sponsored Approach 
 Industry has the expertise (knowledge / 
experience) to correctly interpret the data. 
 Industry will be better able to keep the program 
on track. 
 The industry is overregulated as it is, but has 
good self-regulation. 
 Increased ability to change what is being 
reported. 
 Industry-sponsored approaches lead to more 
homogeneous samples. 
 Government is better equipped to keep the 
program on track and deal with enforcement 
issues (if mandatory approach is also adopted). 
 Government is better able to absorb costs of 
maintaining such a database. 
 Government has the expertise (knowledge/ 
experience) to correctly interpret the data. 
 Data will be available for researchers to analyze. 
25% 
65% 
67% 
86% 
100% 
75% 
35% 
33% 
14% 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Researchers
Carriers
Manufacturers
Shippers
Repair Facilities
Preference (%) 
Industry-Sponsored Government-Sponsored
 134 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Survey Respondent Preferences for New Bulk Package Accident 
Performance Data Collection Program vs. Accident Performance Data Collection 
Built Off of Existing Program 
Table 4.4 Main Concerns Expressed by Survey Respondents Regarding New Bulk 
Package Accident Performance Data Collection Program vs. Accident Performance 
Data Collection Built Off of Existing Program. 
Main Concerns Addressed By: 
New Bulk Package Data Collection Program Built Off Existing Program 
 Maintain familiarity with reporting 
 Reduce amount of information reported 
 Newer reporting technology leads to a better 
understanding of events and better quality data 
 Quicker enactment 
 Ability to improve efficiency and simplify 
reporting 
 Reduce redundant reporting 
4.8.2 Anticipated Voluntary Program Participation 
Overall, the survey respondents believe that there would be little participation in a 
voluntary database if one were to be adopted. This contrasted with respondents’ replies 
regarding whether they would participate in such an effort. 
4.8.2.1 Manufacturers 
The manufacturers who replied to the survey indicated that liability considerations 
and, to a lesser extent, confidentiality and paperwork are of greatest concern when 
considering participation in a voluntary program.  As a result, while two manufacturers 
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indicated they would be willing to participate in such a voluntary effort, one indicated that 
they probably would not.   
4.8.2.2 Repair Facilities 
Six of the repair facilities indicated that they would, or most likely would, be willing 
to provide data to populate a voluntary program while only one indicated they probably 
would not participate in a voluntary program.  The concerns identified by repair facilities are 
primarily the amount of paperwork accompanying such an effort followed by confidentiality, 
liability considerations, and cost.   
4.8.2.3 Carriers 
Of the 29 carriers who responded to the survey, 26 (90%) indicated they would, or 
most likely would, be willing to provide data to populate a voluntary program.  Figure 4.7 
shows the carriers greatest concerns with participation in a voluntary program.  However, 
this positive response is from individuals who chose to participate in the survey.  
Consequently, the responses to this question may be skewed in favor of participation in 
another voluntary effort. 
 
Figure 4.7 Carrier Concerns with Participating in a Voluntary Program 
4.8.2.4 Shippers 
Of the seven shippers who responded to the survey, six (85%) indicated they would, 
or most likely would, be willing to provide data to populate a voluntary program.  However, 
this positive response is from individuals who chose to participate in the survey.  
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Consequently, the responses to this question may be skewed in favor of participation in 
another voluntary effort.  The primary concerns identified by shippers are confidentiality, 
paperwork, and liability.  
4.9 Data Collection Process Options 
The combination of the three dichotomous choices and the possible option to 
improve compliance with the existing Form DOT F 5800.1 result in the following nine 
options:  
 Option A: Improved compliance with existing Form DOT F 5800.1 with 
damage reporting modifications. 
 Option B: Government-sponsored extension of Form DOT F 5800.1 with 
mandatory participation. 
 Option C: Government-sponsored extension of Form DOT F 5800.1 with 
voluntary participation. 
 Option D: Government-sponsored new database with mandatory participation. 
 Option E: Government-sponsored new database with voluntary participation. 
 Option F: Industry-sponsored extension of Form DOT F 5800.1 with 
mandatory participation. 
 Option G: Industry-sponsored extension of Form DOT F 5800.1 with voluntary 
participation. 
 Option H: Industry-sponsored new database with mandatory participation.  
 Option I: Industry-sponsored new database with voluntary participation. 
Based on the survey results Option G, an industry-sponsored extension of Form 
DOT F 5800.1 with voluntary participation, was considered the most desirable by 
respondents. However, Option B, a government-sponsored extension of Form DOT F 
5800.1 requiring mandatory participation, is regarded as the best option to develop useful 
statistics within a suitable timeline.  Both of these options are discussed further in the 
following section, together with the option to improve compliance with existing Form DOT 
F 5800.1 (Option A).  Since these three options are based on extending Form DOT F 
5800.1, a fourth option, Option D, a government-sponsored new database requiring 
mandatory participation, is also discussed.  
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A preliminary prioritization of each approach was developed based on their pros, 
cons, and ease of implementation.  Four options were selected and further examined to 
address questions such as how data will be collected, where it will be housed, who will 
collect it, and how confidential data will be protected.  These four options were critically 
examined for possible implementation. 
4.9.1 Best Potential Options 
Four options are discussed in this section.  For each option, who will collect data, 
how data will be collected, where it will be housed, how privileged data will be protected and 
the ease of implementing such a system are considered.   
4.9.1.1 Option A: Improved Compliance with Existing Form DOT F 5800.1 with Damage 
Reporting Modifications 
During the stakeholder interview process, Form DOT F 5800.1 was often identified 
by individuals and organizations as suitable for developing conditional probability of release 
and other useful statistical estimates.  This would require that: 
 Failure descriptions would be modified to include damage descriptions regardless 
of whether or not a release occurred.  
 Compliance would be increased in two areas: reporting that an accident had 
occurred and accurately reporting package design and accident characteristics.    
As mentioned in Chapter 3, Form DOT F 5800.1 collects approximately seventy 
percent of the information identified as essential for estimating conditional probability of 
release.  The modification of fields to record the damage type and identify the components 
damaged, regardless of whether or not a release occurred would enable a general estimate of 
the conditional probability of release.  However, the HMIRS (the database of accident 
reports submitted through Form DOT F 5800.1) is currently incomplete due to 
underreporting and the poor quality of reported information. 
Who Would Collect Data.  PHMSA would continue to collect the accident data. 
How Data Would Be Collected.  The data would continue to be collected using Form 
DOT F 5800.1. 
Where Data Would Be Housed.  The data would be housed in PHMSA’s HMIRS 
database. 
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How Privileged Data Would Be Protected.  The data fields in Form DOT F 5800.1 are 
non-privileged; therefore, protection is not currently provided. 
Ease of Implementation.  PHMSA is currently working on updating the data reporting 
process to improve data quality (e.g., the responses would be selected from a drop-down list 
as opposed to a free-form data entry field).  Additionally, PHMSA is working with other 
DOT organizations to facilitate incident identification; thereby ensuring greater compliance 
(reduce underreporting).  Additionally, compliance officers may be employed to ensure 
greater reporting compliance.    
Modifying the form to ask for damage type and identification of damaged 
components may be more difficult and time consuming to implement. It may require a 
formal notice, review, and comment process as described in the Administrative Procedure 
Act.  The previous change to Form DOT F 5800.1 took over two years to complete.    
4.9.1.2 Option B: Government-Sponsored Extension of Form DOT F 5800.1 with 
Mandatory Participation 
In addition to the information already collected using Form DOT F 5800.1 and the 
damage reporting modifications discussed as part of Option A, the following variables, at a 
minimum, are identified to be essential for estimating cargo tank performance:  
 Bottom accident damage protection. 
 Rollover accident damage protection. 
 Presence of jacket. 
 Jacket material. 
 Jacket thickness. 
 Insulation type. 
 Type of damage (replaces “Type of Failure” in Form DOT F 5800.1). 
 Whether the type of damage sustained resulted in failure. 
 Damage location (on the tank). 
 Damaged components (replaces “What Failed” in Form DOT F 5800.1). 
 Whether the damage sustained by the component resulted in failure. 
Extending Form DOT F 5800.1 to include these additional variables would result in 
the ability to determine a reasonable estimate of the component-specific conditional 
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probability of release combined with strategies to increase package performance in the event 
of an accident.   
Who Would Collect Data.  Since most of the necessary information is collected in Form 
DOT F 5800.1, the most logical choice to collect the additional data is PHMSA; however 
any government agency with the capability of making the reporting of accident data 
mandatory could also collect the additional accident data as long as the PHMSA report 
number was referenced in the extension database. 
How Data Would Be Collected.  The data would be submitted to the government 
agency through an extended version of Form DOT F 5800.1 or a supplementary form.   
Where Data Would Be Housed.  The data would be housed in an updated version of 
the HMIRS database or a database that references the corresponding HMIRS report 
number. 
How Privileged Data Would Be Protected.  Since the option is an extension of Form 
DOT F 5800.1, similar to the information in the HMIRS, the additional data will be subject 
to current Freedom of Information laws and will therefore not be protected, unless a “no-
fault” provision is being used. 
Ease of Implementation.  Modifying the current Form DOT F 5800.1 to include the 
proposed fields would require an amendment to the current laws governing compliance.  
Therefore, this option may be difficult to implement because the process to change or 
establish new regulations must follow the procedures outlined in the Administrative 
Procedure Act.    
4.9.1.3 Option D: Government-Sponsored New Database that is Independent of Form 
DOT F 5800.1 with Mandatory Participation 
This option focuses on methods to reduce the risk that data from a government-
sponsored program is used in a manner detrimental to database contributors. This could be 
achieved by using a “no-fault” system to report information regarding incidents and 
associated bulk container damage.  In this system access would be restricted and individual 
or company names, and certain other details of the accident that would enable identification 
of the parties involved would not be recorded. With this method, compliance with report 
submission would need to be addressed to ensure participation.  Furthermore, the quality of 
data provided would need to be checked to encourage complete and consistent reporting. 
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Who Would Collect Data.  This option calls for mandatory data reporting by industry.  
A government agency would be required to carry out the compliance checks to assure 
reports are being submitted for all crashes in which the lading retention system is damaged.   
How It Would Be Collected.  To assure confidential, mandatory reporting, an electronic 
form could be created that would provide the necessary quality checks for complete and 
consistent reporting.  This could be achieved by providing options from which a respondent 
selects the most appropriate response and limiting the number of free-form answers.  
Furthermore, the new program would include a method for conducting compliance checks 
to assure the reporting of all highway incidents involving the bulk transportation of 
hazardous material resulting in damage to the lading retention system.     
Where Data Would Be Housed.  There are multiple options for how the data will be 
stored.  In a confidential reporting system, the data will be vetted for completeness and 
consistency prior to submittal of the incident report.  Furthermore, there may be no 
possibility of correcting submitted reports.  Therefore, the “no-fault” factual data could be 
added to the database and made available to the public upon receipt of the report.   
How Privileged Data Would Be Protected.  Many details of the accident that enable 
the identification of the parties involved in the accident (e.g., individual or company name, 
date and location of the accident) are not required for estimating cargo tank performance 
and developing component-specific conditional probability of release.  With a new database, 
focusing solely on data fields that enable the development of cargo tank performance 
estimates, an anonymous reporting system could be developed.  The data collected would be 
available to the public per the current Freedom of Information laws; however, anonymity 
could be maintained due to the large number of bulk hazmat incidents that occur per month 
(approximately 132 per month).     
Ease of Implementation.  Since this option requires establishing new regulations 
according to the procedures outlined in the Administrative Procedure Act, the 
implementation may require a lead-time of two or more years.  The database would also be 
less flexible for subsequent modifications. 
4.9.1.4 Option G: Industry-Sponsored Extension of Form DOT F 5800.1 with Voluntary 
Participation 
This option involves referencing the PHMSA’s HMIRS database and requesting the 
data fields required for determining cargo tank performance and estimating the component-
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specific conditional probability of release that are not included in Form DOT F 5800.1.  
There are two variations that could be considered.  In one, the entire database would be 
consolidated; however, an alternative approach would involve development of a separate 
database for the physical characteristics of all bulk packages that could be drawn upon as 
needed.  Each is described briefly below.  In both cases the database would be developed 
and maintained by a private sector organization or consortium of organizations on behalf of 
the carriers, shippers, and/or manufacturers of bulk packages transporting hazardous 
materials. 
 Carriers and/or shippers transporting hazardous materials would provide both 
accident damage information and package design information for all reportable 
incidents.  Package design information would be limited to name plate and 
specification plate information as well as external visual information.   
 A variation of the first approach would involve creation of a separate database 
that contains package design parameters for all bulk packages.  The advantage of 
this approach would be that the collection of more detailed information would 
be feasible.  Accident data would be recorded using the extended Form DOT F 
5800.1 as described above, but physical parameter data for bulk packages 
involved would come from a second database.  The ISO tank container 
information may be available from the Universal Machine Language Equipment 
Register (UMLER) provided they are all registered in that database.  In this 
approach, the success of the accident damage database depends upon widespread 
participation in the package design parameter database.   
Who Would Collect Data and How It Would Be Collected.  In the first approach a 
private sector organization would collect the accident damage information through an online 
or paper form.  The process will require tracking and follow-up that will take multiple 
months to complete, as different data sources become available.  The data collection process 
will need to be standardized by employing consistent definitions and criteria.  Using an 
online form will enhance data quality and result in more reliable statistical development in a 
shorter timeframe.   
In the second approach, package design information for all major models of cargo 
tanks would be collected initially and then kept up to date on an ongoing basis.  Accident 
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damage information would be collected from the carriers using the extended Form DOT F 
5800.1 along with the vehicle identification number (VIN) of the tank involved.  This VIN 
would be used to identify the appropriate package design record from the tank 
characteristics database during data analyses.   
Where Data Would Be Housed.  The accident damage data in both approaches would 
be housed with a private sector organization. The first approach would store basic package 
design information along with the accident damage database, while the second approach 
calls for a separate database.   
How Privileged Data Would Be Protected.  Potential measures to protect any sensitive 
or proprietary information include using a flexible submittal deadline, limiting access to the 
database, controlling use of the information, approving all analysis of the information and 
controlling the analysis distribution.  A flexible submittal deadline involves allowing for 
information to be updated or submitted after potential litigation has been completed.  The 
system would need to allow for updates to the initially submitted report.  Time-based 
reminders may be beneficial as they encourage contributors to complete the initial report 
once litigation has finished.  Access to information in the database could be limited to 
information provided by the requestor.  For example, an individual company would only be 
able to view their submitted accident reports.  Only individuals employed by, or authorized 
by the organization would have access to the entire database, and only under strictly 
controlled terms of confidentiality.  An oversight panel selected by the sponsoring 
organization would strictly control use of the database and the specifications for any analyses 
to be commissioned. When using this database they would be required to: 
 Redact non-conditional probability of release information upon combining 
information in the HMIRS and the extension information.  
 Only present information in aggregate.   
 Require oversight panel review and approval of all proposed analyses.  
Finally, completed analyses would be reviewed and approved by the panel who 
would also decide on distribution of results of each study. 
Ease of Implementation.  This approach depends upon the willingness of the industry 
organizations to host such a database, encourage their members to participate in such an 
effort, issue appropriate access to companies and consultants, and bear the associated costs.  
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One benefit of such a system is that alterations to the data collected (such as adding or 
subtracting data fields) may be implemented within a short timeframe.   
PHMSA staff are currently updating their data reporting system to incorporate more 
multiple choice options and pull-down menus, rather than free-form individual answers.  
This will improve consistency and probably the reliability and completeness of reporting as 
well.  Such capability is best supported by an online program that can be easily adjusted to 
add, subtract, or modify fields as the need arises.  However, not all respondents will have 
reliable convenient Internet access, so a paper-based system will also be needed.  For these 
cases, a printable version of the data entry form should be made available. 
4.10 Selected Data Collection Process for Further Implementation 
These four approaches to data collection: Option A - Improved compliance with 
existing Form DOT F 5800.1 with damage reporting modifications, Option B – 
Government-sponsored extension of Form DOT F 5800.1 requiring mandatory 
participation, Option D – Government-sponsored new database that is independent of 
Form DOT F 5800.1 requiring mandatory participation, and Option G – Industry-
sponsored extension of Form DOT F 5800.1 with voluntary participation , were presented 
to the TRB oversight panel for the project.  The committee was comprised of 
representatives from stakeholder industries and government agencies as follows: 
 Dr.William R. Rhyne, HM-07 Oversight Panel Chair. 
 Dr. Daniel Blower, University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute. 
 Dr. Cheryl A. “Cherry” Burke, Dow Chemical Company. 
 Mr. John F. Cannon, Brenner Tank LLC. 
 Mr. John L. Conley, National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. 
 Mr. Roger D. Sims, P.E., Sims Professional Engineers. 
 Mr. Todd Treichel, RSI-AAR Railroad Tank Car Safety Research and Test 
Project. 
 Mr. Charles H. Hochman, Office of Hazardous Materials Technology, Pipeline 
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. 
 Mr. Douglas W. “Doug” Scheffler, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Office of 
Standards Evaluation and Development. 
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 Dr. William C. Rogers, NCFRP Transportation Research Board Cooperative 
Research Programs. 
The members of the committee were asked to evaluate the four options based on the 
following criteria (refer to Appendix D):  
 Primary evaluation tools for HM-07: 
– Ease of implementation. 
– Program utility. 
 Criteria required for success: 
– Participant acceptance. 
– Preservation of anonymity/confidentiality. 
– Participation in program/compliance. 
– Accuracy and completeness of the reports. 
– Container type representation. 
 Cost/benefit criteria: 
– Value of program realized by sponsors. 
– Cost of program. 
 Long term capability criteria: 
– Stability/longevity of program. 
– Ability to expand program to evaluate other factors affecting hazardous 
materials release. 
Using the evaluation criteria above, the committee suggested undertaking a more 
detailed consideration of the feasibility and efficiency of Option B, “Government-sponsored 
extension of Form DOT F 5800.1 with mandatory participation”.  This represents a logical 
option that would incorporate some means to compel participation.  It is possible and 
preferable that participation be compelled through an industry-based agreement. 
The details of the possible implementation of Option B with a Level 4 degree of data 
refinement, plus fields describing the extent of damage and package breach, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, are examined here in further detail.  The information to be collected for the 
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database are identified and grouped according to logical associations.  A review is also 
conducted of: 
 implementation considerations, such as offering logical response options based 
on previous responses,  
 a possible prototype database management system including an appropriate 
schema for storing recorded accident and incident data, and  
 security access control considerations. 
4.10.1 Collection of Data 
A new addendum to Form DOT F 5800.1, for the purposes of evaluating highway 
bulk package performance, would be used to collect information in the following categories:   
 Administrative variables. 
 General package design characteristics. 
 Compartment specific design characteristics. 
 Commodity information. 
 Damage information. 
 Accident information. 
The specific data for these categories are discussed in the subsequent sections.  
PHMSA’s HMIRS includes much of the package design, commodity and accident 
information needed for evaluating package performance.  Additionally, for those incidents 
that resulted in a release, the database also includes identification of components that failed.  
These variables could be imported into the bulk package performance database for incidents 
in which the bulk package consists of a single container.  However, the underreporting and 
data quality issues in PHMSA’s HMIRS need to be addressed prior to use in the addendum.   
The following database is focused solely on highway bulk package performance.  
Therefore, it will not contain information for other modes.  Furthermore, in the dataset 
created by information gathered through the addendum, a single report may contain 
information corresponding to more than one commodity if an incident involves a multi-
compartment bulk package.  This differs from the current HMIRS which contains a report 
for each commodity transported by the bulk package at the time of the accident.  Finally, the 
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database created by information gathered through the addendum includes bulk tank capacity 
and commodity quantity by compartment instead of commodity type.    
4.10.1.1Administrative Variables 
As with the existing databases, administrative variables are necessary to properly 
track information (Table 4.5).  At a minimum, the bulk package performance database 
should include: a link to the Form DOT F 5800.1 report, a report submittal time-stamp to 
track participation, and a variable to record whether the information submitted was verified. 
Table 4.5 Administrative Variables 
Variable Possible Responses 
PHMSA Incident ID Numerical Value 
Report Timestamp Date and Time 
Quality Check Verified 
Not Verified 
4.10.1.2General Package Design Characteristics 
Several general highway bulk package design characteristics are already available in 
the existing Form DOT F 5800.1 records (Table 4.6): 
 The response to Question 24 identifies the type of bulk package. 
 The response to Question 26a identifies the specification of the bulk package.   
 The response to Question 27 identifies the number of compartments in the 
package.  
 The response to Question 28 identifies the package’s general material type.   
These general bulk package design characteristics could be imported from PHMSA’s 
HMIRS into the highway bulk package performance database.  
Additionally, the bulk package performance database should include whether the 
cargo tank is mounted on a trailer or on a chassis (Table 4.7) and if the bulk package is 
jacketed. 
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Table 4.6 General Package Design Characteristics Available from Existing Form 
DOT F 5800.1 Fields 
Variable Possible Responses  
Packaging Type Cargo Tank 
Portable Tank 
General Material 
Type 
Aluminum 
Stainless Steel 
Carbon Steel 
Composite Materials 
Combination 
 Cargo Tank Portable Tank 
Cargo Tank 
Specification 
DOT 406 
MC 306 
DOT 407 
MC 407 
DOT 412 
MC 312 
MC 331 
MC 338 
Asphalt Cargo Tank 
Compressed Gas Tube 
Trailer 
Other 
T1 
T2 
T3 
T4 
T5 
T6 
T7 
T8 
T9 
T10 
T11 
T12 
T13 
T14 
T15 
T16 
T17 
T18 
T19 
T20 
T21 
T22 
T50 
T75 
DOT Specification 51 
DOT Specification 56 
DOT Specification 57 
DOT Specification 60 
IM 101 – IMO Type 1 
IM 102 – IMO Type 2 
IMO Type 5 
Cryogenic Tank Container – IMO Type 7 
Tube Module 
Other 
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Table 4.6 (cont.) 
Variable Possible Responses  
Number of 
Compartments 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
N/A 
 
 
Table 4.7 Other General Package Design Characteristics 
Variable Possible Responses 
Mounting Trailer Mounted 
Truck Mounted 
Jacketed Yes 
No 
 Cargo Tank Portable Tank 
Other Spec CT Text-entered N/A 
Other Spec PT N/A Text-entered 
4.10.1.3Compartment Specific Design Characteristics 
The individual reporting their bulk package accident is instructed to identify the 
capacity of the package in Question 27 and working pressure, shell thickness, head thickness, 
and type of valve or device (if it failed) in Question 28.  However, for packages with multiple 
compartments, not all of the compartments would be damaged or compromised in 
accidents.  Therefore, the specific design characteristics for each compartment in the 
package should be collected (Table 4.8).  This information collected can be found on the 
specification plate associated with each compartment. 
To ensure data quality, the available responses for material thickness (Table 4.9) 
could be provided for various general material types.   
Additionally, the available responses for working pressure (Table 4.10) could be 
provided for some specifications.   
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Table 4.8 Compartment-Specific Package Design Characteristics 
Variable Possible Responses 
Tank Capacity Text-entered numerical value 
Tank Capacity Units of Measure GCF (Gas – Cubic Foot) 
LGA (Liquid – Gallon) 
Head Material (as listed on spec. plate) Text-entered 
Shell Material (as listed on spec. plate) Text-entered 
Front Head Thickness See Table 4.9 
Rear Head Thickness See Table 4.9 
Top Shell Thickness See Table 4.9 
Side Shell Thickness See Table 4.9 
Bottom Shell Thickness See Table 4.9 
Working Pressure See Table 4.10 
Table 4.9 Material Thickness Response Options 
Material Thickness Range (Inches) Corresponding Gauges 
Aluminum 0.100 inches to 0.500 inches 10 gauge (0.102 inches) 
9 gauge (0.114 inches) 
8 gauge (0.129 inches) 
7 gauge (0.144 inches) 
6 gauge (0.162 inches) 
5 gauge (0.182 inches) 
4 gauge (0.204 inches) 
3 gauge (0.229 inches) 
2 gauge (0.258 inches) 
1 gauge (0.289 inches) 
0 gauge (0.325 inches) 
00 gauge (0.365 inches) 
000 gauge (0.410 inches) 
0000 gauge (0.460 inches) 
Stainless Steel 0.100 inches to 0.500 inches 12 gauge (0.109 inches) 
11 gauge (0.125 inches) 
10 gauge (0.141 inches) 
9 gauge (0.156 inches) 
8 gauge (0.172 inches) 
7 gauge (0.187 inches) 
6 gauge (0.203 inches) 
5 gauge (0.219 inches) 
4 gauge (0.234 inches) 
3 gauge (0.250 inches) 
2 gauge (0.266 inches) 
1 gauge (0.281 inches) 
0 gauge (0.312 inches) 
00 gauge (0.344 inches) 
 150 
 
Table 4.9 Material Thickness Response Options 
Material Thickness Range (Inches) Corresponding Gauges 
Stainless Steel 
(cont.) 
0.100 inches to 0.500 inches 
(cont.) 
000 gauge (0.375 inches) 
0000 gauge (0.406 inches) 
00000 gauge (0.437 inches) 
000000 gauge (0.469 inches) 
Carbon Steel 0.100 inches to 0.240 inches 12 gauge (0.105 inches) 
11 gauge (0.120 inches) 
10 gauge (0.134 inches) 
9 gauge (0.149 inches) 
8 gauge (0.164 inches) 
7 gauge (0.179 inches) 
6 gauge (0.194 inches) 
5 gauge (0.209 inches) 
4 gauge (0.224 inches) 
3 gauge (0.239 inches) 
Composite 
Materials 
0.100 inches to  
0.500 inches 
N/A 
Combination 0.100 inches to  
0.500 inches 
N/A 
Table 4.10 Working Pressure Response Options 
Specification Pressure Range 
DOT 406 or MC 306 2.65–2.99 psig 
3.00–3.49 psig 
3.50–4.00 psig 
DOT 407 or MC 307 25–29 psig 
30–34 psig 
35–40 psig 
DOT 412 or MC 312 5–9 psig 
10–14 psig 
15–19 psig 
20–25 psig 
MC 331 100–199 psig 
200–299 psig 
300–399 psig 
400–500 psig 
MC 338 23.5–99 psig 
100–199 psig 
200–299 psig 
300–399 psig 
400–500 psig 
All Others Text-entered numerical value (in psig) 
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4.10.1.4Commodity Information 
Commodity information from Form DOT F 5800.1 can be imported from 
PHMSA’s HMIRS (Table 4.11) if there is only one compartment.  In Question 16, the 
individual reporting the accident identifies the hazard class and division.  In Question 17, the 
material’s identification number is reported.  The material’s packing group is reported as part 
of Question 18.  Finally, the amount of hazardous material in the package is reported as part 
of Question 27.  It is important to note that the accident data collection system presented 
here calls for commodity information to be provided for each compartment.  Thus, a 
package that contains more than one type of commodity will have only one record in the 
general accident dataset.  Furthermore, by providing logical responses from which the 
reporter must choose, the quality of the record will be improved. 
Table 4.11 Commodity Information 
Variable Possible Responses 
Hazardous Class Class 1 – Explosives 
Class 2 – Gases 
Class 3 – Flammable Liquids (and Combustible Liquids) 
Class 4 – Flammable Solids, Spontaneously Combustible Materials, etc. 
Class 5 – Oxidizing Substances and Organic Peroxides 
Class 6 – Toxic Substances and Infectious Substances 
Class 7 – Radioactive Materials 
Class 8 – Corrosive Substances 
Class 9 – Miscellaneous Hazardous Materials/Products, Substances or 
Organisms 
Non-Hazardous 
Hazardous Division See Table 4.12 
Packaging Group I 
II 
III 
Hazardous Material 
Identification Number 
NA or UN plus a text-entered numerical value consisting of four digits 
Packaged Amount Text-entered numerical value 
Packaged Amount Unit of 
Measure 
GCF 
LGA 
Class 1 – Explosives Division 1.1 – Explosives with a Mass Explosion Hazard 
Division 1.2 – Explosives with a Projection Hazard 
Division 1.3 – Explosives with Predominantly a Fire Hazard 
Division 1.4 – Explosives with No Significant Blast Hazard 
Division 1.5 – Very insensitive explosives with a mass explosion hazard 
Division 1.6 – Extremely Insensitive Articles 
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Table 4.12 Possible Responses for Hazardous Division  
Hazardous Class Possible Responses 
Class 2 – Gases Division 2.1 – Flammable Gases 
Division 2.2 – Non-Flammable, Non-Toxic Gases 
Division 2.3 – Toxic Gases 
Class 4 – Flammable Solids, 
Spontaneously Combustible 
Materials, etc. 
Division 4.1 – Flammable Solids 
Division 4.2 – Spontaneously Combustible Materials 
Division 4.3 – Water-Reactive Substances/Dangerous When Wet 
Materials 
Class 5 – Oxidizing 
Substances and Organic 
Peroxides 
Division 5.1 – Oxidizing Substances 
Division 5.2 – Organic Peroxides 
Class 6 – Toxic Substances 
and Infectious Substances 
Division 6.1 – Toxic Substances 
Division 6.2 – Infectious Substances 
4.10.1.5Damage Information 
The accurate recording of damage information is necessary to develop bulk package 
statistical performance metrics, regardless of whether the damage resulted in the release of 
lading.  When responding to Question 25 in Form DOT F 5800.1, the individual currently 
identifies which component failed, how it failed, and the cause of the failure.  However, 
damage information for incidents that did not result in a release and information concerning 
the location of the failure is not recorded in the current Form DOT F 5800.1. Thus, the bulk 
package performance database should record the general location of the damage (Table 
4.13).  To assist with the selection of the appropriate damage location, figures, such as 
Figures 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 could be provided.   
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Table 4.13 Damage Locations 
Possible Responses 
Cargo Tank (Figures 4.8 and 4.9) Portable Tank (Figure 4.10) 
1 - Front Head Damage Below Centerline 
2 - Front Head Damage on Centerline 
3 - Front Head Damage Above Centerline 
4 - Front Head Destroyed 
5 - Rear Head Damage Below Centerline 
6 - Rear Head Damage on Centerline 
7 - Rear Head Damage Above Centerline 
8 - Rear Head Destroyed 
9 - Bottom Front Driver-Side Damage 
10 - Bottom Middle Driver-Side Damage 
11 - Bottom Rear Driver-Side Damage 
12 - Top Front Driver-Side Damage 
13 - Top Middle Driver-Side Damage 
14 - Top Rear Driver-Side Damage 
15 - Bottom Front Passenger-Side Damage 
16 - Bottom Middle Passenger-Side Damage 
17 - Bottom Rear Passenger-Side Damage 
18 - Top Front Passenger-Side Damage 
19 - Top Middle Passenger-Side Damage 
20 - Top Rear Passenger-Side Damage 
21 - Damage to Piping and/or Undercarriage Below 
the Tank 
 
1 - Head Damage Below Centerline 
2 - Head Damage on Centerline 
3 - Head Damage Above Centerline 
4 - Head Destroyed 
5 - Shell Destroyed 
6 - Damage at Either End on Bottom Half of 
Tank 
7 - Damage at Center on Bottom Half of Tank 
8 - Damage at Either End on Top Half of Tank 
9 - Damage at Center on Top Half of Tank 
10 - Damage in Vicinity of Sump 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Example Figure of Damage Locations for a Trailer-Mounted Cargo Tank 
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Figure 4.9 Example Figure of Damage Locations for a Truck-Mounted Cargo Tank 
 
 
Figure 4.10. Example Figure of Damage Locations for a Portable Tank 
For each location where damage was sustained, the damaged components should be 
recorded (Table 4.14).  For the purposes of increasing the quality of information collected, 
the possible responses should be tailored such that only a logical list of components is 
available for selection.  For each damaged component, the type, dimensions, and whether it 
resulted in a release of lading should be identified (Table 4.15).  Finally, if the damage 
resulted in a release of lading, the amount of lading and the dimensions of the breach should 
be recorded (Table 4.16).  However, if multiple components release lading, the quantity lost 
from each of the leaking components may be difficult to ascertain.   
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Table 4.14 Component Damaged 
Possible Responses 
Cargo Tank Portable Tank 
Tank Head 
Tank Shell 
Air Inlet 
Bolts and Nuts 
Bottom Outlet Valve 
Check Valve 
Cover 
Discharge Valve or Coupling 
Excess Flow Valve 
Fill Hole 
Flange 
Frangible Disc 
Fusible Pressure Relief Device or Element 
Gasket 
Gauging Device 
Heater Coil 
High Level Sensor 
Hose 
Hose Adaptor or Coupling 
Inlet (Loading) Valve 
Lifting Lug 
Liner 
Liquid Line 
Liquid Valve 
Loading or Unloading Lines 
Locking Bar 
Manway or Dome Cover 
Mounting Studs 
O-Ring or Seals 
Piping or Fittings 
Shear Section 
Pressure Relief Valve or Device – Non-Reclosing 
Pressure Relief Valve or Device – Reclosing 
Remote Control Device 
Sample Line 
Sump 
Thermometer Well 
Threaded Connection 
Vacuum Relief Valve 
Valve Body 
Valve Seat 
Valve Spring 
Valve Stem 
Vapor Valve 
Vent 
Tank Head 
Tank Shell 
Bolts and Nuts 
Bottom Outlet Valve 
Check Valve 
Chime 
Closure (e.g., Cap, Top, or Plug) 
Cover 
Frangible Disc 
Fusible Pressure Relief Device or Element 
Gasket 
Gauging Device 
Hose 
Inlet (Loading) Valve 
Lifting Lug 
Liner 
Loading or Unloading Lines 
Manway or Dome Cover 
Outer Frame 
Piping or Fittings 
Pressure Relief Valve or Device – Reclosing 
Threaded Connection 
Vacuum Relief Valve 
Weld or Seam 
Other 
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Table 4.14 (cont.) 
Possible Responses 
Cargo Tank Portable Tank 
Washout 
Weld or Seam 
Other 
 
Table 4.15 Damage Information Collected for Each Component Damaged 
Variable Possible Responses 
Damage Type Abraded 
Bent 
Burst or Ruptured 
Cracked 
Crushed 
Failed to Operate 
Gouged or Cut 
Leaked 
Punctured 
Ripped or Torn 
Structural 
Torn Off or Damaged 
Vented 
Unknown 
Other 
Damage Width Text-entered numerical value 
Damage Width Units of 
Measure 
Inches 
Feet 
Damage Height Text-entered numerical value 
Damage Height Units of 
Measure 
Inches 
Feet 
Damage Depth Text-entered numerical value 
Damage Depth Units of 
Measure 
Inches 
Feet 
Whether Damage Resulted in 
a Release 
Yes 
No 
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Table 4.16 Information Collected for Each Component Resulting in Release. 
Variable Possible Responses 
Amount Released Text-entered numerical value 
Amount Released Units of 
Measure 
GCF (Gas – Cubic Foot) 
LGA (Liquid – Gallon) 
Breach Width Text-entered numerical value 
Breach Width Units of 
Measure 
Inches 
Feet 
Breach Height Text-entered numerical value 
Breach Height Units of 
Measure 
Inches 
Feet 
4.10.1.6Accident Information 
Basic accident information is currently recorded on the Form DOT F 5800.1.  
Question 37 requests the estimated speed of the bulk package prior to impact and whether 
the vehicle overturned.  A bulk package performance database should also record whether 
an object struck the bulk package or the bulk package struck an object, the type of object, 
and the object’s speed (if appropriate) (Table 4.17). 
Table 4.17 Accident Information 
Variable Possible Responses 
Vehicle Speed Prior to 
Crash 
0–4 mph 
5–9 mph 
10–14 mph 
15–19 mph 
20–24 mph 
25–29 mph 
30–34 mph 
35–39 mph 
40–44 mph 
45–49 mph 
50–54 mph 
55–59 mph 
60–64 mph 
65–69 mph 
75–79 mph 
80 mph or greater 
How Vehicle Speed Was 
Established 
Obtained from vehicle data recorders 
Estimated based on speed limit 
Driver estimated 
Other 
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Table 4.17 (cont.) 
Variable Possible Responses 
Overturned Yes 
No 
Variable Possible Responses 
Whether the Bulk 
Package Was Struck by 
or Struck an Object 
An object struck the bulk package 
The bulk package struck an object      
 Object Struck the Bulk Package Bulk Package Struck an Object 
Impacting Object Passenger vehicle 
Heavy vehicle 
Other 
Passenger vehicle 
Heavy vehicle 
Roadway 
Ground 
Concrete barrier 
Guard rail 
Lighting pole 
Other 
 Passenger Vehicle or Heavy 
Vehicle Other Objects 
Speed of Impacting 
Object Prior to Crash 
0–4 mph 
5–9 mph 
10–14 mph 
15–19 mph 
20–24 mph 
25–29 mph 
30–34 mph 
35–39 mph 
40–44 mph 
45–49 mph 
50–54 mph 
55–59 mph 
60–64 mph 
65–69 mph 
75–79 mph 
80 mph or greater 
N/A 
How the Impacting 
Object Speed was 
Established 
Obtained from vehicle data 
recorders 
Estimated based on speed limit 
Driver estimated 
Other 
N/A 
4.10.2 Technical Implementation Considerations 
The implementation of a modern data collection system should take advantage of the 
capabilities offered by information technologies and systems to increase both the quality of 
reported data and the ease of reporting.  Specifically, the implementation considerations 
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most appropriate for the bulk package performance database proposed here may include 
dynamic adjustments of the availability of questions and responses based on logic and 
previous responses, providing a text-based area for special cases, and performing automatic 
quality checks as much as possible.   
4.10.2.1Logical Presentation of Questions and Responses  
The reporting form can be designed to offer logical choices by dynamically adjusting 
which fields are displayed based on responses to earlier questions.  This will improve 
responders’ efficiency and reduce errors.  The following fields are candidates for such a 
dynamic form:  
 Any field collecting text-entered information corresponding to “Other” 
responses could be hidden if “Other” is not selected. 
 Whether the package is truck- or trailer-mounted can be hidden if “Portable 
Tank” is selected as the bulk package type. 
 Compartment-specific bulk package design questions can be hidden for all 
compartments greater than that selected. 
 Questions regarding a commodities’ hazardous division could be hidden until the 
hazardous class has been selected. 
 Diagrams and questions corresponding to the damaged area could dynamically 
reflect the type of bulk package involved in the accident.  At a minimum, 
damaged areas are recommended to be based on selections of “Portable Tank,” 
“Cargo Tank” and “Truck Mounted,” or “Cargo Tank” and “Trailer Mounted.”   
A fuller implementation of this concept may designate damaged areas based on 
the bulk package specification and number of compartments, in addition to how 
the bulk package was mounted (if appropriate).   
 Identification of components damaged within a damaged area could be hidden 
until that part of the bulk package is selected. 
 Questions concerning the damage type, its dimensions, and whether or not a 
release occurred could be hidden until a particular component is selected. 
 Questions concerning the amount released and the dimensions of the breach 
could be hidden until a release had been verified.    
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 Questions concerning the speed of the object impacting the bulk package could 
be hidden until a type of object with the ability to move has been selected. 
4.10.2.2Logical Responses and Quality Checks 
Presenting logical responses based on previous responses reduces the time and effort 
it takes to fill out a report and increases data quality.  This can be achieved by making the 
selection of responses accessible using drop-down menus and/or check box or radio button 
graphical user interfaces.  However, where it is possible that not all of the responses have 
been provided, an “Other” field should be available and followed by a field in which text can 
be entered.    
Additionally, whether or not responses are adjusted dynamically, a series of quality 
checks should be conducted upon submission of the report to ensure the responses are 
congruent.   
Those variables influencing responses include:  
 Packaging type, whether a cargo tank or portable tank, influences which 
specifications will populate the responses for the variable “Tank Specification,” 
and whether the number of compartments within the bulk package can to be 
greater than one.   
 General material type, whether aluminum, stainless steel, carbon steel, composite 
materials, combination, or other, causes the responses for head and shell 
materials, and their associated thicknesses, to be populated.   
 Tank specification, itself a subsidiary of “Packaging Type”, should adjust the 
available ranges of working pressure from which the reporter can choose.  
Furthermore, the commodity information for each tank type should be reflected 
in the available responses for the commodity-related variables.   
 Hazard class and division, packaging group and hazardous material identification 
number influence each other.  The ideal form would allow the reporter to 
respond to the variable of their choice and adjust the available responses for the 
remaining variables accordingly.   
 Tank capacity bounds the packaged amount. 
 Packaged amount bounds the amount released. 
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 The damaged component selected limits the damage type and dimensions 
(including damage width, height, and depth).   
 The damage dimensions restrict the dimensions of the breach.   
 If the bulk package was struck by an object, that object must not be stationary.   
4.10.3 Prototype Database Management System 
A prototype database management system was developed using Microsoft Access to 
provide a framework to record accident data.  This basic framework illustrates a 
methodology for storing information collected as part of the pilot study; however, it requires 
further enhancement to enable data collection by the online form to be mapped directly to 
the database management system.    
4.10.3.1Schema for Storing Recorded Data 
The envisioned schema for storing recorded data consists of six tables (Figure 4.11): 
 Administrative variables. 
 General design characteristics. 
 Compartment-specific package design characteristics. 
 Compartment-specific commodity information. 
 Basic accident information. 
 Damage information. 
In this database schema, each cargo tank involved in the accident is assigned a 
separate incident identification number.  Due to the nature of data collected in the 
Administrative Variables, General Design Characteristics, and Basic Accident Information 
tables, one record corresponding to each reported accident is expected.  Should this 
methodology be incorporated into the Form DOT F 5800.1 reporting system, these datasets 
could be combined directly with the existing DOT HMIRS.  
The number of records in the Compartment-Specific Package Design Characteristics 
and Compartment-Specific Commodity Information tables corresponds to the number of 
compartments for each recorded incident.  For error checking and analysis purposes, these 
two datasets should also be linked using the compartment number. 
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Figure 4.11 Prototype Database Management System 
Damage information is proposed to be stored such that there may be multiple 
listings of a particular damage location because multiple components within that area may be 
damaged.  The number of records in this dataset will be the product of the number of 
reported accidents (represented by the number of unique PHMSA Incident IDs), the 
number of areas damaged on the cargo tank and the number of components damaged.  
Basic Accident Information
ID
Administrative Variables Vehicle Speed Prior to Crash
PHMSA Incident ID How Speed was Established
Report Timestamp Event Number
Quality Check Rollover
Impacting Passenger Vehicle Speed Damage Information
Impacting Heavy Vehicle Speed ID
Impacting Other Object Speed PHMSA Incident ID
Impacted Object Damaged Location
Impacted Object (Other) Component Damaged
Impacted Passenger Vehicle Speed Damage Type
Impacted Heavy Vehicle Speed Damage Width
Impacted Other Object Speed
Damage Height
Damage Height UOM
General Design Characteristics Damage Depth
ID Damage Depth UOM
PHMSA Incident ID Release Occurred
Packaging Type Amount Released
General Material Type Amount Released UOM
Tank Specification Breach Height
Specification Other Breach Height UOM
Number of Compartments Breach Width
Mounting Type Breach Width UOM
Compartment-Specific Package Compartment-Specific 
Design Characteristics Commodity Information
ID ID
PHMSA Incident ID PHMSA Incident ID
Compartment Number Compartment Number
Tank Capacity Hazardous Class
Tank Capacity Units of Measure Hazardous Division
Head Material Packaging Group
Shell Material Hazardous Material Identification Number
Front Head Thickness Packaged Amount
Rear Head Thickness Packaged Amount Unit of Measure
Side Shell Thickness
Bottom Shell Thickness
Working Pressure
PHMSA Incident ID
Impacting Object
Top Shell Thickness
Damage Width UOM
Impacting Object (Other)
Jacketed
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Caution should be exercised in the interpretation of the responses stored in this dataset as an 
incident resulting in a release will also contain records of non-release damage.   
4.10.3.2Security Access Controls 
The implementation of this prototype database management system may require, at a 
minimum, three levels of access: administrator access, reporter access, and public access.  
Administrator access would enable database owners to provide access to other users, create 
back-ups of the datasets, implement data quality checks, correct errors, track the number of 
views the dataset generates, and link to datasets generated by other organizations.  By 
necessity, this level of access should have the greatest amount of security.  Reporter access is 
granted to those individuals or companies who will be required to submit a report.  Access 
can be granted on a per-accident basis or to all bulk package transporters.  Distinguishing 
between reporters and the general public ensures that data validity will be maintained.  
Finally, public access is the most general type of access.  Currently, PHMSA allows free 
access to their data via an online form.   
An alternate approach is to provide access through a third party, similar to the 
approach employed by FMCSA.  Prior to the implementation of such a database, there 
should be careful consideration of the level of public accessibility.  The decision whether to 
share raw or processed data with the public should be weighted with possible confidentiality 
concerns.  Additionally, if automatic data checks are not implemented, it may be desirable to 
institute a manual quality check prior to making the data publicly available. 
To ensure that individuals: (1) are allowed to access the system, (2) access the system 
from an appropriate connection, (3) have permission to utilize the data/system in a 
particular manner, and (4) generate an activity log should data security become a concern, 
security access controls should be incorporated. Access to the system is typically ensured 
using a login identification coupled with a password.  This is particularly important for 
administrator access to prevent actions such as deleting or maliciously altering collected data.  
Administrative access may also be restricted to within a company firewall to maintain data 
integrity.  The same requirement is not anticipated to be necessary for reporter or public 
access; however, limiting access to within the United States may be considered.  Granting 
permissions to utilize the data/system in a particular manner is necessary to ensure the 
database is used appropriately.  Therefore, the general public should be restricted to reading 
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database contents and viewing a directory of the database contents.  Reporters should have 
limited authorization to create new reports or update existing reports that they have 
previously submitted.  Another method to ensure the database is used appropriately is to 
generate an activity log.  The activity log should include the time and date of changes to the 
dataset as well as who initiated the changes and what was changed.  Thus, should accidental 
changes occur, they can be undone and progress tracking can be accomplished.   Activity 
logs can also be used to count the number of views or downloads of the accident damage 
data and gather information concerning the individuals accessing the public documents; thus 
enabling administrators to determine how best to present the data. 
4.11 Conclusion 
A number of potential data collection process options were evaluated and the 
feasibility and efficiency of a government-sponsored extension of Form DOT F 5800.1 with 
mandatory participation was considered in more detail.  Technical implementation 
characteristics were also discussed.  
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CHAPTER 5 
BULK PACKAGE ACCIDENT DATA COLLECTION PROGRAM  
PILOT STUDY1 
5.1 Introduction 
The potential collection of this bulk package accident damage data was explored 
using a pilot study.  The purpose of the pilot study was to evaluate the quality of data 
expected from such a data collection system, to identify improvements to the data collection 
system itself, to demonstrate the types of analyses that could be facilitated by the database, 
and to estimate the period of time required to collect incident data sufficient to support 
reasonable statistical analyses.   
To achieve these goals, an online pilot data collection tool was developed.  
Invitations to participate in the pilot study were sent to NTTC members, Dow Chemical 
Company carriers, and individuals who had submitted Form DOT F 5800.1 corresponding 
to highway bulk package accidents.  Each pilot study participant was asked to provide one or 
two reports concerning accidents that may or may not have resulted in the release of 
hazardous materials.  They were informed that recording non-release incidents was equally 
important as recording incidents in which there was a hazardous materials release.  Non-
release accident information enables identification of accident scenarios during which certain 
materials and components do not fail.  On the other hand, the recording of accident 
information for an incident that resulted in a release enables identification of accident 
scenarios during which tank components fail.   
Due to a low level of participation in the pilot study, an alternative method for 
gathering bulk package accident performance information was developed to supplement the 
                                                          
1 This chapter was developed to fulfill the requirements of the Transportation 
Research Board (TRB)’s Hazardous Materials Cooperative Research Program (HMCRP) 
project HM-07 entitled “Accident Performance Data of Bulk Packages Used for Hazardous 
Materials Transportation.”   This chapter appears as parts of Section 3 and Section 4 in HM-
07’s final deliverable which was accepted for publication.   
Philip J. Daum, P.E., Christopher P. L. Barkan, Ph.D., M. Rapik Saat, Ph.D., and 
Laura E. Ghosh, Feasibility Study for Highway Hazardous Materials Bulk Package Accident 
Performance Data. Hazardous Materials Cooperative Research Program (HMCRP) Report, 
Transportation Research Board, 2013. 
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accident reports gathered using the data collection tool.  The pilot study added bulk package 
accident performance information from a manual review of NTSB reports and information 
gathered from multiple sources, including PHMSA HMIRS reports, FMCSA MCMIS 
reports, and news articles.  This process enabled identification of several improvements to 
the pilot data collection tool and generated a total of 50 accident records with varying 
degrees of completeness, particularly regarding bulk package design, the extent of the 
damage, and the dimensions of the breach.   
The data collected as part of the pilot study were also used to estimate the amount of 
time for such a system to yield statistically significant accident performance measures.  This 
was accomplished by comparing population-wide accident and release rates to minimum 
sample size requirements.  The minimum sample size requirements were developed using a 
subset of pilot study accident records corresponding to hazardous materials transported in 
MC 306 or DOT 406 containers.  Two conditions were used to establish minimum sample 
sizes: (1) a sufficient number of accident records to minimize Type I errors (where 
insignificant variables appear not to have an effect on the probability of a release) and (2) at 
least 10 events for each variable included in the regression equations.   
5.2 Pilot Data Collection Tool 
The online data collection tool was developed using a combination of 
Hypertext Markup Language (HTML), Cascading Style Sheets (CSS), PHP, and JavaScript.  
The data collection tool incorporated several dynamic features but was not designed to 
automatically perform quality checks.  Instead, quality checks were conducted manually.  
Should manual quality checks require additional information, participants were encouraged 
to provide contact information with the stipulation that all contact information would 
remain confidential.  Additionally, participants were reassured that contact information 
provided would only be used to verify responses to the pilot study and not for any purpose 
beyond the pilot study.   
The pilot data collection tool was designed to enable bulk package accident damage 
information to be collected accurately and with minimal difficulty for pilot study 
participants.  However, the project team envisions the incorporation of several additional 
features in a fully implemented system.  To identify useful features, participants were also 
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asked to share their ideas on how to improve the collection process through a series of 
comment boxes.   
5.2.1 Pilot Data Collection Tool Launch Site 
All invitations to participate in the pilot study directed the participants to a website 
that introduced the project and provided information about the types of information to be 
requested as part of the pilot study.  (Screenshots of the sections of the pilot study data 
collection tool that are discussed here and below can be seen in Appendix E.)  From the 
website’s home page, participants could access the pilot data collection tool to submit a 
report.  
5.2.2 Pilot Data Collection Tool Instructions 
Upon accessing the pilot data collection tool, participants were instructed to forgo 
using their browser’s “back,” “forward” or “refresh” commands prior to submitting the 
report.  This was necessary because the data collection tool was not sophisticated enough to 
prevent a resetting of the form when the browser refreshed a page thereby causing their 
responses to be erased.   
The participant was then directed to the instruction page for the data collection tool.  
The participant was again reminded not to leave the page or refresh their browser prior to 
submitting their information because doing so would cause the information entered to be 
lost.  They were informed that the submit button could be found on the "Accident 
Information" tab, once the type of bulk package was identified.  To start, the participant was 
asked to identify the type of bulk package.  This resulted in the appearance of additional 
fields that were specific to the type of package selected.  After completing the fields that 
were specific to the package type, the participant was asked to proceed to the "Bulk Package 
Information" tab.   
The instructions also informed participants that if they were unsure what 
information was being requested or would like clarification concerning the available 
responses, they should refer to the tab marked "Pilot Test Supplemental Information."   If 
the information was not there, they were requested to leave a comment so that this 
information could be provided in the future. 
Finally, participants were informed that because this was a pilot study, quality checks 
had not been built into the data collection tool.  Therefore, participants were asked to take 
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measures to ensure that they had responded correctly.  Participants were also asked to 
provide their contact information so that clarification could be obtained should an 
unexpected result be received.  They were once again informed that all contact information 
provided would remain confidential and be removed from the dataset containing the results 
of the pilot study after the information had been corroborated. 
5.2.3 Data Collection Pages 
The pilot data collection tool consisted of the following four sections:  
 Bulk Package Design Information. For cargo tanks, this section recorded 
information that was visually detected or listed on the cargo tank name plate.  To 
clarify what information was requested, an exemplar name plate was included.  
For portable tanks, this section recorded information that was: found visually, 
stamped on the tank's head or a separate placard, or provided as part of the 
container specifications. 
 Basic Commodity Information. This section recorded information found in 
shipping papers associated with the commodity transported at the time of the 
accident. 
 Bulk Container Damage Information. This section recorded information on 
the area(s), components, and type of damage incurred in the accident as well as 
the amount of lading lost.  Several dynamic form features were used, including 
the following:  
– Displaying the appropriate damage location image for a portable tank, a 
trailer-mounted cargo tank or a truck-mounted cargo tank, dependent on the 
package type selected. 
– Not displaying questions associated with undamaged components 
– Not displaying questions associated with damage type and subsequent fields 
until the damage location had been selected. 
– Not displaying damage dimensions and questions concerning a release until 
the damage type had been selected. 
– Not displaying bulk package breach dimension questions until a release had 
been verified. 
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 Basic Accident Information. This section recorded information concerning the 
object impacting the bulk package, speeds of the vehicle(s) involved in the 
accident (when applicable), and whether the bulk package rolled over.  
Note that the pilot data collection tool did not display location-specific components.   
5.2.4 Supplemental Information 
To further clarify what information was being requested, a supplemental information 
page was included in the pilot data collection tool.  The intention was to provide responses 
to questions or comments previous participants had included in the comments fields.  
Initially, however, the only supplemental information provided were the exemplar 
specification plates for a cargo tank or portable tank, corresponding to the type of bulk 
package initially identified (Appendix E).   
5.3 Pilot Study Report Generation 
The pilot study was designed to collect accident damage information that was 
volunteered by bulk package owners; however, despite extensive efforts to reach out to 
multiple individuals, the level of participation was unsatisfactory.  Therefore, the project 
team has employed alternative methodologies to generate pilot study data and populate the 
database.  Accident reports from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) along 
with information gathered from multiple sources including PHMSA HMIRS reports, 
FMCSA MCMIS reports, and news articles were used.    
5.3.1 Pilot Study Reports Using Information from NTSB Investigated Accidents    
Reports from several accidents investigated by NTSB contain some information 
concerning the bulk packages involved.  Specifically, commodity information and basic 
accident information is captured but the reports do not contain release quantity or design 
information.  Detailed damage information, if not included in the report text, was described 
based on a manual review of photographs included in the reports. 
The reports included in the pilot study are:  
 Highway Accident Report, Largo, Maryland – September 6, 1985. 
 Hazardous Materials Accident Brief for Accident No. DCA-09-FZ-001 (2009). 
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 NTSB Report – Collision of Tractor/Cargo Tank Semitrailer and Passenger 
Vehicle and Subsequent Fire, Yonkers, New York – October 9, 1997. 
 Overturn of a Tractor-Semitrailer (Cargo Tank) with the Release of Automotive 
Gasoline and Fire, Carmichael, California – Feb 13, 1991. 
 Rollover of a Truck-Tractor and Cargo Tank Semitrailer Carrying Liquefied 
Petroleum Gas and Subsequent Fire, Indianapolis, Indiana, October 22, 2009. 
 Propane Truck Collision with Bridge Column and Fire, White Plains, New York 
– July 27, 1994. 
5.3.2 Pilot Study Reports Using Information from Multiple Sources 
Information from multiple sources was used to develop reports of sampled accidents 
occurring between March and October 2011.  Selected accidents were reported to PHMSA, 
and photographs of the extent of damage to the bulk packages were collected through news 
articles.   Additionally, FMCSA reports were used to supplement basic accident information.     
Between March and October 2011, a total of 68 accidents reported to PHMSA were 
also found in news articles (links to the news articles are included in Appendix F).  Photos 
and other footage of the bulk package involved in the accident vary with respect to how well 
they illustrate damage to the bulk package.  Therefore, not all damage to the bulk package 
could be determined using the photos and descriptions gathered.  In general, only the most 
severe damage type was identified in descriptions of the accident.  Additionally, in several 
instances, the approximate location of the damage or breach was estimated based on the 
final position of the bulk package.   Some accident reports provided insufficient information 
from which to generate a pilot study report.  In all, 44 reports were generated from a 
combination of PHMSA HMIRS, news articles, and FMCSA MCMIS information.  
However, these reports typically do not contain compartment-specific information with the 
exception of bulk packages that consist of only one compartment.  Therefore, compartment-
specific design and release information was not included in the pilot study report.      
5.3.3 Improvements to the Pilot Data Collection Tool  
Through the collection of accident reports, the following improvements to the pilot 
data collection tool were identified: 
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 Enable use of browser navigational tools such that the data entered by a user is 
“saved” if they accidently use the browser’s “back,” “forward” or “refresh” 
buttons. 
 Include "Quenched and Tempered Steel" as an option in the general material 
type.   
 Adjust thickness ranges to include up to 0.5 inches for all material types. 
 Include a mechanism that automatically fills in responses if the design parameters 
are the same for all compartments within the cargo tank. 
 Enable the commodity fields to be automatically filled in once sufficient 
information is gathered in one field (i.e., if the commodity’s hazardous material 
identification number is filled in, the hazardous class and division number and 
packaging group should automatically populate to the appropriate fields).  
 Dynamically list relevant bulk package components within the area impacted.  
This will simplify reporting and increase the accuracy of the reports. 
 Enable more than one type of damage to be selected for each component. 
 Include fire as a damage type.  Vehicles involved in accidents can also be 
exposed to fire, which may cause the temperature in the immediate vicinity of the 
bulk package to increase beyond the melting point of bulk package components.  
Should a vehicle fire be sufficiently hot, bulk packaging may melt and result in a 
release although it may have escaped damage in the initial accident.    
 Utilize FMCSA’s accident event descriptions together with an event order.  This 
would eliminate the need for indicating whether the bulk package struck or was 
struck by an object and replace the identification of the object 
impacting/impacted by the bulk package. Event ID’s provided in FMCSA 
correspond to the following types of events:  
– Non-collision, ran off road. 
– Non-collision, jackknife. 
– Non-collision, overturn (rollover). 
– Non-collision, downhill runaway. 
– Non-collision, cargo loss or shift. 
– Non-collision, explosion or fire. 
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– Non-collision, separation of units. 
– Non-collision, cross median/centerline. 
– Non-collision, equipment failure (brake failure, blown tires, etc.). 
– Non-collision, other. 
– Non-collision, unknown. 
– Collision involving pedestrian. 
– Collision involving motor vehicle in transport. 
– Collision involving parked motor vehicle. 
– Collision involving train. 
– Collision involving pedalcycle. 
– Collision involving animal. 
– Collision involving fixed object. 
– Collision with work zone maintenance equipment. 
– Collision with other moveable object. 
– Collision with an unknown moveable object. 
– Other. 
 Include the angle of collision if involved in a collision with a moveable object.   
5.4 Statistical Summary of Pilot Test 
The pilot study resulted in a data set consisting of 50 records.  A summary of data in 
Table 5.1 illustrates the range of responses obtained in the pilot test, grouped by hazardous 
material type.  This data set has varying degrees of completeness, particularly regarding bulk 
package design, the extent of the damage, and the dimensions of the breech.  As a result, 
while there are 50 records presented in Table 5.1, the completeness of the dataset is not 
portrayed.  For many variables the actual number of records for which information was 
obtained sum to less than 50.   
Due to the limited data size and varying degrees of completeness, the statistical 
summary of this data is not representative of the entire population of accidents involving 
bulk packages.  As mentioned above, the pilot study data are over-weighted in accidents that 
had a release and underweighted in non-release accidents.  For this reason, the analyses and 
evaluations of the pilot study data presented in this report are for illustrative purposes only  
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and should not be considered reliable estimates of the performance of highway bulk 
packages. Nevertheless, the following discussion details variable response completeness, 
summarizes the collected data, and provides a basic interpretation.     
In the pilot study, the design characteristics, commodity information, and accident 
information is stored such that one record pertains to one accident.  Since one accident may 
result in damage to more than one part of the bulk package and more than one component, 
damage information is stored such that one record pertains to one location-component 
combination.  For example, a rollover accident that resulted in damage to the shell along the 
entire length of the tank would result in a minimum of three location-component 
combinations: one for damage to the shell in each location (i.e., given a rollover onto the 
passenger side of the bulk package, location 18 – top front passenger-side, location 19 – top 
middle passenger-side, and location 20 – top rear passenger-side are likely the three locations 
incurring damage). For the purposes of the following discussion, the terms “case” or 
“damage case” refer to one of these location-component records.  A total of 115 damage 
cases were identified from 46 accident records (four of the 50 accidents did not have 
sufficient damage information).    
5.4.1 Container Types 
The pilot study considered a total of 50 records in which 49 (98 percent of the pilot 
accident records) correspond to cargo tanks and one (2 percent) corresponds to an ISO 
tank.  A total of 33 records correspond to trailer-mounted cargo tanks and 16 correspond to 
truck-mounted cargo tanks.  While specification information was unavailable for 13 of 16 
truck-mounted cargo tanks and 8 of 33 trailer-mounted cargo tanks, container specifications 
are matched to all but two commodities in this pilot study (Table 5.1).    
5.4.2 Number of Compartments 
In general, it was difficult to ascertain the number of compartments a bulk package 
contained from the information provided by PHMSA and/or photos of the bulk package.  
Where this information was not available, the bulk package was assumed to have at least one 
compartment with a capacity corresponding to “Cont1 Package Capacity” listed in PHMSA’s 
HMIRS.  Similarly, for those PHMSA-reported accidents in which two separate kinds of 
hazardous materials were involved, the bulk package was assumed to have at least two 
compartments. As a result, 40 accident records (80 percent) indicate a bulk package with one 
 175 
 
compartment and four records indicate a bulk package with two compartments.  Five 
records correspond to bulk packages with four compartments and one record corresponds 
to a bulk package with five compartments.   
5.4.3 Materials of Construction 
The materials of construction were determined for 34 records (68 percent).  
Aluminum was the material of construction for 28 (56 percent) of the bulk packages.  Two 
(4 percent) were constructed of stainless steel, three (6 percent) were constructed of carbon 
steel, and one (2 percent) was constructed of composite materials. 
5.4.4 Capacity 
Since PHMSA only records the total capacity of a bulk package (by type of 
hazardous material), capacity for individual compartments was incompletely recorded in the 
pilot study.  Should this data collection system be implemented, it is anticipated that this 
information will be more readily available.  To account for bulk package capacity in the 
analysis of pilot test data, the total capacity of the bulk package was recorded when available.  
Capacity information is available for 32 of the 50 records (64 percent).  The total bulk 
package capacities range between 2,500 gallons and 12,500 gallons (Figure 5.1).   
5.4.5 Head/Shell Thicknesses 
Head and shell thickness were recorded for 22 records (44 percent of the pilot accident 
records).  These thicknesses were obtained for eleven DOT 406/MC 306 containers (22 
percent), two DOT 407/MC 307 containers (4 percent), one DOT 412 container (2 
percent), and three MC 331 containers (6 percent).  Four records (8 percent) did not list a 
corresponding specification).  Additionally, one record (2 percent) listed only shell thickness 
information.  Examining the data for the largest homogeneous group, the DOT 406/MC 
306 containers, the head thicknesses range from 0.175 inches to 0.25 inches while shell 
thicknesses range from 0.15 to 0.204 inches. 
5.4.6 Working Pressure 
Tank pressure ratings were recorded for 27 accidents (54 percent).  The pressure 
ratings range from 1 psig to 5 psig for the DOT 406/MC 306.  The majority (17 records or 
34 percent of the pilot accident records) indicate a pressure rating of 3 psi.  Pressure ratings 
of up to 29 psig were recorded for the DOT 407/MC 307 containers.  The DOT 412 
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listed for most of the records in the pilot study dataset (24 of 50 records).  Other 
commodities include:  
 Ammonium nitrate, liquid (UN2426). 
 Diesel fuel/heating oil (UN1202). 
 Diesel fuel/fuel oil/cleaning (NA1993). 
 Alcohols, n.o.s. (UN1987). 
 Petroleum crude oil (UN1267). 
 Hydrochloric acid (UN1789). 
 Acrylic acid, stabilized (UN2218). 
 Propane (UN1978). 
 Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) (UN1075). 
 Flammable liquids, n.o.s. (UN1993). 
 Isopropenylbenzene (UN2303). 
 Hydrogen, refrigerated liquid (UN1966). 
5.4.10 Hazardous Materials Packaged Amount 
Similar to the capacity for individual compartments, the packaged amount for 
individual compartments was also poorly recorded in the records found for the pilot study.  
Should this data collection system be implemented, it is anticipated that this information will 
be readily available.  To account for the packaged amount in the pilot study analysis, the total 
packaged amount was recorded when available.  Packaged amount information was recorded 
for 29 (58%) of the 50 records. These range from 500 gallons to 9,501 gallons (see Figure 
5.2).     
5.4.11 Vehicle Speed 
The speed of the bulk package vehicle prior to incurring damage was estimated for 
48 (96 percent) of the records.  The pilot study grouped speeds in 5 mph bins.  These speeds 
ranged from 0 to 65 miles per hour (Figure 5.3).   
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5.4.12 Damage Location 
The location of damage to the bulk package was determined from photographs 
accompanying newspaper articles and damage descriptions included in PHMSA’s HMIRS 
“Description of Events.”  Since photographs associated with rollovers were typically of the 
bulk package’s final resting position, damage to the side in contact with the ground could 
only be approximated.  Damage was estimated for 47 records (94 percent).  Based on this 
method of approximation, the locations most likely to be damaged are the top front 
passenger-side and the piping and/or undercarriage below the tank (Table 5.2).  These 
damage locations most likely correspond to different types of accidents: damage to the top 
front passenger-side results from rollover accidents while damage to the piping and/or 
undercarriage below the tank results from accidents involving other vehicles.  Note: damage 
corresponding to the ISO container was converted to the location-naming scheme for cargo 
tanks for the purposes of this summary. 
The following observations regarding damage location can be derived from the pilot 
study data (Table 5.3):  
 The passenger side of the bulk package is more likely to be damaged and result in 
a release if involved in an accident.  However, the driver’s side of the bulk 
package may be more prone to release if it is damaged during an accident.   
 The top of the bulk package is equally likely to incur damage and result in a 
release as the bottom of the bulk package; however, if piping and/or the bulk 
package’s undercarriage are excluded, the top of the bulk package is twice as 
likely to be damaged in an accident.   
 Although the top front passenger side is most likely to be damaged, on average 
the front of the bulk package is equally likely to be damaged and involved in a 
release as is the rear. This is likely due to the additional protection afforded to 
the bottom of the bulk package by the tractor and the trailer wheel set.    
 Both the front and rear of the bulk package are more likely to sustain damage 
that results in a release than the middle.   
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Table 5.2 Number of Accidents Resulting in Damage and Releases by Location 
 
Total 
Damaged 
 
Proportion of Releases Per 
Location Releases 
Number 
Damaged 
Total Number 
of Releases 
1 - Front Head Damage Below Centerline 1 1 1.00 0.02 
2 - Front Head Damage on Centerline 3 1 0.33 0.02 
3 - Front Head Damage Above Centerline 6 2 0.33 0.05 
4 - Front Head Destroyed 0 0 0.00 0.00 
5 - Rear Head Damage Below Centerline 3 3 1.00 0.07 
6 - Rear Head Damage on Centerline 0 0 0.00 0.00 
7 - Rear Head Damage Above Centerline 4 3 0.75 0.07 
8 - Rear Head Destroyed 0 0 0.00 0.00 
9 - Bottom Front Driver-Side Damage 3 3 1.00 0.07 
10 - Bottom Middle Driver-Side Damage 3 2 0.67 0.05 
11 - Bottom Rear Driver-Side Damage 5 4 0.80 0.10 
12 - Top Front Driver-Side Damage 5 3 0.60 0.07 
13 - Top Middle Driver-Side Damage 3 3 1.00 0.07 
14 - Top Rear Driver-Side Damage 7 4 0.57 0.10 
15 - Bottom Front Passenger-Side Damage 4 1 0.25 0.02 
16 - Bottom Middle Passenger-Side 
Damage 
3 1 0.33 0.02 
17 - Bottom Rear Passenger-Side Damage 4 1 0.25 0.02 
18 - Top Front Passenger-Side Damage 17 10 0.59 0.24 
19 - Top Middle Passenger-Side Damage 7 4 0.57 0.10 
20 - Top Rear Passenger-Side Damage 8 5 0.63 0.12 
21 - Damage to Piping and/or 
Undercarriage Below the Tank 
12 10 0.83 0.24 
Note: These locations are identified in Figures 21 through 23. 
  
Table 5.3 Comparison of Damage and Release Locations 
   
Proportion of Releases Per 
Location 
Total 
Damaged Releases 
Number 
Damaged 
Total Number 
of Releases 
Driver Side 14 11 0.79 0.26 
Passenger Side 26 17 0.65 0.40 
Top 30 22 0.73 0.52 
Bottom (including piping) 26 21 0.81 0.50 
Bottom (excluding piping) 16 11 0.69 0.26 
Front 27 19 0.70 0.45 
Middle 15 10 0.67 0.24 
Rear 26 19 0.73 0.45 
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5.4.13 Damaged Components 
Similar to the damage location, the bulk package components damaged in the 
accident were identified using photographs accompanying newspaper articles and damage 
descriptions included in PHMSA’s HMIRS “Description of Events” and “What Failed 
Description.”   Detailed information regarding the identification of the type of valve 
damaged in the accident is limited; therefore, for the purposes of this analysis, the following 
valve components were grouped together:  
 106 – Bottom Outlet Valve 
 107 – Check Valve 
 115 – Discharge Valve or Coupling 
 116 – Excess Flow Valve 
 127 – Inlet (Loading) Valve 
 134 – Liquid Valve 
 144 – Pressure Relief Valve or Device 
 154 – Valve Body 
 156 – Valve Spring 
 157 – Valve Stem 
 158 – Vapor Valve 
Similarly, “Loading or Unloading Lines (135)” were grouped with “Piping or Fittings 
(141).”   
Because damage to various components was identified using PHMSA’s “What Failed 
Description,” the pilot study estimates of component performance are expected to indicate a 
higher failure rate given that the component has sustained damage.  A possible exception is 
the performance of the tank shell because the pilot study generally assumed shell damage on 
the ground-side of rolled bulk packages.   
Damaged components were identified for 46 accident records (92 percent).  The 
component most likely to be damaged is the tank shell (Table 5.4).  This is not surprising as 
it is the largest component of the bulk package.  Nevertheless, the pilot study also indicated 
that the tank shell was the least likely to result in a release if damaged.    
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Table 5.4 Number of Accidents Resulting in Damage and Releases  
by Component Type 
 
  
Proportion of Releases Per 
Component Type 
Total 
Damaged Releases 
Number 
Damaged 
Total Number 
of Releases 
Valves 7 7 1.00 0.17 
Loading/Unloading Lines, 
Piping or Fittings 
12 9 0.75 0.21 
Manway/Dome Cover 8 8 1.00 0.19 
Tank Head 11 7 0.64 0.17 
Tank Shell 28 17 0.61 0.40 
Valve Seat 1 1 1.00 0.02 
Weld or Seam 5 5 1.00 0.12 
The pilot study demonstrated the collection of damage information to determine 
whether component performance varied by damage location.  Due to the number of damage 
locations (refer to Figures 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10), determining whether component performance 
varied by location requires a much greater number of records; therefore, only the tank shell 
is explored in further detail (Table 5.5).  This analysis indicates that tank shell damage 
probably does vary by location.  Additionally, by considering damage cases, analysis of the 
pilot data indicates that, in general, additional protection for the top front passenger side 
(19% of all releases) and bottom rear driver’s side of the tank (10% of all releases) might be a 
good idea.    
5.4.14 Damage Type 
Damage type was identified for all 115 damage cases (Table 5.6).  The pilot study 
data suggests that there are differences in the probabilities of release depending on the type 
of damage received. For example, the most prevalent type of damage resulting in a release is 
the ripping or tearing of the tank head, shell, or appurtenances.  A total of 15 releases can be 
attributed to ripping or tearing although the frequency of this type of damage is low (only 16 
cases).  This differs from the most prevalent type of damage, crushing damage, which 
accounts for 39 damage cases of which 12 result in the release of hazardous materials.   
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Table 5.5 Number of Accidents Resulting in  
Tank Shell Damage and Releases by Location 
   
Proportion of Releases Per 
Location 
Total 
Damaged Releases 
Number 
Damaged 
Total Number 
of Releases 
 9 - Bottom Front Driver-Side Damage 3 3 1.00 0.07 
 10 - Bottom Middle Driver-Side Damage 3 2 0.67 0.05 
 11 - Bottom Rear Driver-Side Damage 4 4 1.00 0.10 
 12 - Top Front Driver-Side Damage 4 2 0.50 0.05 
 13 - Top Middle Driver-Side Damage 3 1 0.33 0.02 
 14 - Top Rear Driver-Side Damage 7 2 0.29 0.05 
 15 - Bottom Front Passenger-Side Damage 4 0 0.00 0.00 
 16 - Bottom Middle Passenger-Side Damage 3 1 0.33 0.02 
 17 - Bottom Rear Passenger-Side Damage 4 0 0.00 0.00 
 18 - Top Front Passenger-Side Damage 16 8 0.50 0.19 
 19 - Top Middle Passenger-Side Damage 5 2 0.40 0.05 
 20 - Top Rear Passenger-Side Damage 6 3 0.50 0.07 
Table 5.6 Number of Cases Corresponding to Each Damage Type  
by Component Category 
 
Valves 
Lines, 
Piping or 
Fittings 
Manways/
Dome 
Covers Tank Head Tank Shell Valve Seat 
Weld or 
Seam 
Damage Type D R D R D R D R D R D R D R 
Abraded         5 0     
Bent 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 2 1     
Burst or 
Ruptured 
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1       
Cracked         2 2   5 4 
Crushed   1 1   6 2 32 9     
Failed to Operate 1 1             
Gouged or Cut 1 1     1 1 5 4     
Leaked 2 2 1 1 5 5         
Punctured       1 1 9 6     
Ripped or Torn 1 1 7 6 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Structural 1 1             
Torn off or 
Damaged 
  1 1     6 4     
Vented               
Note:  D represents the number of cases in which the component was damaged.  
 R represents the number of cases in which damage to that component resulted in a release. 
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5.4.15 Damage Dimensions 
Damage dimensions were difficult to ascertain from many of the photos and damage 
descriptions.  Therefore only 11 cases listed damage dimensions.  However, with the full 
implementation of such a program, it is anticipated that sufficient data will be collected to 
evaluate the extent and severity of the damage.      
5.4.16 Release Indicator 
The pilot data included an indication as to whether a release occurred due to damage 
to a particular component in the specified cargo tank location.  This variable is used as the 
dependent variable when evaluating and modeling conditional probability of release.  In the 
pilot study, this variable was coded “0” if no release occurred and “1” if a release occurred.  
Of the 46 tanks with damaged components in the pilot study, 42 (93%) tanks were damaged 
to the extent that a release occurred. Recall that the data is heavily weighted with accident 
records for which a release occurred and is underweighted in records for non-release 
accidents.  Each of the 46 cargo tanks with damaged components had at least one, and 
usually multiple, location-component combinations that sustained damage during the 
accident.  In total, the data set included 115 location-component damage records for the 46 
cargo tanks.  While there were often multiple location-component combinations on a single 
tank that were damaged in a single accident, not all of the location-component combinations 
contributed to a release.  Of the 115 location-component records, 67 (58 percent) resulted in 
a release of lading.  This translates to a 58 percent probability of release per instance of 
damage.    
5.4.17  Amount Released 
The amount released was recorded for 40 (80 percent) of the 50 accidents and 62 (54 
percent) of the 115 damage cases.  This quantity reflects an estimate of the difference 
between the amount packaged and the amount recovered.  Therefore, if the accident 
involved the combustion of hazardous material following its initial release, there was no 
distinction between hazardous materials spilled versus hazardous materials consumed in the 
fire/explosion.  Additionally, since the amount released was obtained from PHMSA 
HMIRS, if leaks occurred from two different locations on the bulk package, or as a result of 
the failure of two different components in the same location, the total amount released was 
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assigned to both cases.  The amount released ranged between a residual amount and 9,500 
LGA (Figure 5.4) with a mean of 2,470 gallons.     
 
Figure 5.4 Cumulative Proportion of Pilot Study Release Amounts 
5.4.18 Breach Dimensions 
The dimensions of the breach were very difficult to ascertain from the photos and 
were therefore recorded for only four cases.  As with damage dimension information, with 
the full implementation of such a program, it is anticipated that sufficient data will be 
collected.  The breach dimensions along with the amount released can be used to estimate 
the rate of release and/or the amount of time until the release was mitigated.  For example, 
large releases combined with small breach dimensions may indicate longer response times.  
5.4.19 Roadway Collision Indicator 
An incident involving the collision of the bulk package vehicle with another vehicle 
was coded as “1”, otherwise, it was coded as “0”.  The dataset generated by the pilot test 
contains 21 records (42 percent of the pilot accident records) in which the bulk package was 
involved in a collision with another vehicle.   
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000
C
u
m
u
la
ti
ve
 P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 
Amount Released (Gallons) 
 186 
 
5.4.20 Passenger Vehicle Collision Indicator 
There are two ways in which a passenger vehicle may be involved in a collision with 
a bulk package.  The first, coded as “-1” in the pilot test dataset, corresponds to a passenger 
vehicle striking the bulk package.  There were 15 instances of a passenger vehicle colliding 
with the bulk package (30 percent of the pilot accident records).  The second, coded as “1”, 
corresponds to the bulk package vehicle striking a passenger vehicle.  There were two 
instances of this type of collision (4 percent of the pilot accident records).   
5.4.21 Heavy Vehicle Collision Indicator 
Collisions involving a second heavy vehicle were coded in a similar manner to the 
passenger vehicle collisions.  The pilot dataset includes two records (4 percent) in which a 
heavy vehicle struck the bulk package and two records (4 percent) in which the bulk package 
struck another heavy vehicle.     
5.4.22 Speed of Other Vehicle Involved in Collision 
The speed of the vehicle involved was recorded in 5-mph bins.  Since vehicle speed 
was not provided in PHSMA’s HMIRS, it was estimated based upon the accident description 
and the speed of the bulk package vehicle. These speeds ranged from 0 to 65 mph (Figure 
5.5).   
5.4.23 Jackknife Indicator 
A jackknife occurring as part of the accident was recorded as a “1”, otherwise, a “0” 
was recorded.  Of the 50 records in the pilot study, only one jackknife accident was 
recorded.     
5.4.24 Cross Median/Centerline Indicator 
Of the 50 records in the pilot dataset, nine (18 percent) involve the bulk package 
traveling across the median or centerline of the roadway.  These types of accidents 
correspond to an average release size of approximately 3,360 gallons of hazardous materials, 
while accidents in which the bulk package did not cross the median or centerline of the 
roadway resulted in an average release amount of approximately 1,550 gallons.  
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Figure 5.5 Estimated speed of Other Vehicle Involved in Accident 
5.4.25 Ran Off Road Indicator 
Of the 50 records in the pilot dataset, 32 (64 percent) involve the bulk package 
vehicle being driven out of the lane(s) of travel.  Of these 32 records, seven indicate collision 
with another vehicle.  Of the 18 records where the bulk package vehicle was not driven out 
of the lane(s) of travel, 14 indicate collision with another vehicle.  An average of 2,350 
gallons was released for accidents in which the bulk package was driven off the road 
compared to approximately 1,140 gallons when the bulk package vehicle was kept on the 
roadway.  
5.4.26 Rollover Indicator 
Thirty-five accidents (70 percent of the pilot accident records) involved the bulk 
package rolling over.  Nine (18 percent) correspond to a roadway collision, eight (16 percent) 
correspond to accidents in which the bulk package was driven across the median or 
centerline of the roadway, and thirty (60 percent) correspond to “ran-off-road” accidents.  
Of the records that did not indicate a rollover, 12 (24 percent) correspond to a roadway 
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collision, one (2 percent) involved crossing the median or centerline of the roadway and two 
(4 percent) involved running off the road.  Rollovers resulted in an average release of 2,378 
gallons compared to an average of 806 gallons when the package remained upright.   
5.4.27 Explosion or Fire Indicator 
A fire or explosion alters how much hazardous material is recovered.  Material that is 
consumed in a fire or explosion is included in estimates of how much material was released 
in an accident.  The accident data in the pilot study included a variable to indicate whether 
that record corresponded to a fire or explosion.  Overall, 15 of the 50 records (30 percent) 
indicate that an explosion or fire accompanied the accident.  These accidents resulted in an 
average release of 3,800 gallons compared to the mean release of 1,131 gallons for those 
accidents in which no fire or explosion occurred.   
5.4.28 Listing of Objects Struck By the Bulk Package 
Following the classification of the type of accident (collision, jackknife, cross 
median/centerline, ran-off-road, rollover, and fire/explosion), the bulk package may have 
struck several objects on or near the roadway.  The involvement of these objects was 
recorded with a “1”, otherwise if the bulk package did not strike the object, a “0” was 
recorded.  Overall, the greatest number of releases involved the bulk package striking both 
the roadway and the ground (Table 5.7).  This is largely attributed to rollover accidents. 
5.5 Expected Implementation Time 
The data collected as part of the pilot study were also used to estimate the amount of 
time for such a system to yield statistically significant accident performance measures.  This 
was accomplished by comparing population-wide accident and release rates to minimum 
sample size requirements.  The minimum sample size requirements were developed using a 
subset of pilot study accident records corresponding to hazardous materials transported in 
MC 306 or DOT 406 containers.  Two conditions were used to establish minimum sample 
sizes: (1) a sufficient number of accident records to minimize Type I errors (where 
insignificant variables appear not to have an effect on the probability of a release) and (2) at 
least 10 events for each variable included in the regression equations. 
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Table 5.7 Objects Struck by the Bulk Package and Corresponding Release Sizes 
Roadway Ground 
Concrete 
Barrier 
Guard 
Rail 
Lighting/ 
Power 
Line Pole 
Bride 
Column Number 
Average Release 
Volume (LGA)* 
✔      2 32 
 ✔     9 1,444 
✔ ✔     12 2,730 
✔  ✔    2 1,240 
✔   ✔   3 700 
 ✔  ✔   5 1,510 
✔ ✔  ✔   1 452 
✔ ✔  ✔  ✔ 2 9,200 
    ✔  1 736 
Object not identified 13 1,637  
Average Release Volume (LGA)* 
2,315 2,303 1,240 2,674 736 9,200   
Note: * denotes an average of the available release volumes. 
 
5.5.1 Population-Wide Accident and Release Rates 
The amount of time to yield accident performance measures is important when 
considering the implementation of such a system.  The following analysis estimates the rate 
at which reports would be generated given current highway bulk package accident rates 
observed in the pilot study.  This was achieved by compiling a dataset consisting of PHMSA 
HMIRS reports, FMCSA MCMIS reports, and news articles over a seven-month period, 
estimating the total number of accidents per month, and calculating the average rate at which 
accidents occur.   
5.5.2 Accident Rate Dataset 
To estimate the rate at which reports would be generated given current highway bulk 
package accident rates, a dataset consisting of PHMSA HMIRS reports, FMCSA MCMIS 
reports and news articles between March and September, 2011was compiled.  The combined 
dataset consisted of 924 accidents (Figure 4.2) of which 236 resulted in a release of 
hazardous materials (Figure 4.3).  The majority of these accidents were only reported by one 
source and only 5 records were captured in all three datasets.  News articles and FMCSA 
records shared a total of 11 records.   
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PHMSA HMIRS reports used in this analysis consisted of in-transit highway 
accidents involving cargo tank motor vehicles or portable tanks in which a crash occurred.  
These records correspond to the reportable incidents as defined by 49 CFR 171.15 and 49 
CFR 171.16.  For highway transportation, these include any incident in which one or more 
of the following apply:  
 “as a direct result of a hazardous material: a person is killed, a person receives an 
injury requiring admittance to a hospital, the general public is evacuated for one 
hour or more, a major transportation artery or facility is closed or shut down for 
one hour or more” (49 CFR 171.15 7.b.1), 
 “a situation exists of such a nature that, in the judgment of the person in 
possession of the hazardous material, it should be reported to the [National 
Response Center] even though it does not meet other requirements” (49 CFR 
171.15 7.b.5), 
 “there is an unintentional release of a hazardous material or the discharge of any 
quantity of hazardous waste” (49 CFR 171.16 a.2), or 
 “a specification cargo tank with a capacity of 1,000 gallons or greater containing 
any hazardous material suffers structural damage to the lading retention system 
or damage that requires repair to a system intended to protect the lading 
retention systems, even if there is no release of hazardous material” (49 CFR 
171.16 a.3). 
In reality, the accidents in which the bulk package was damaged but did not result in 
a release are underrepresented in this database.  Therefore, we can expect that the rate of 
accidents will be greater than the rate derived solely from considering this dataset.  
Regardless, with these parameters, 123 accidents were reported to PHMSA HMIRS within 
the seven-month period.  Of these 123 accidents, 98 resulted in a release.   
FMCSA MCMIS reports consist of accidents involving a cargo tank or intermodal 
truck that has been placarded for hazardous materials transportation.  These parameters 
yielded 754 accidents between March and September, 2011.  Some of the discrepancy in the 
number of accidents from PHMSA’s HMIRS results from the inclusion of accidents in 
which the bulk package was not damaged (e.g., an accident in which a vehicle was rear-ended 
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by the hazmat vehicle); however, the discrepancy cannot be entirely discounted because the 
MCMIS dataset also contains 70 releases that are not included in the HMIRS (Figure 4.3).    
The third dataset used in this analysis was derived from news articles found during 
the same period.  These news articles consisted of accidents that resulted in damage to the 
bulk package.  During the seven-month period, 127 accidents were recorded of which 103 
result in the release of hazardous materials.  Although the number of records in the news 
article dataset was of a similar magnitude to the HMIRS, they only share approximately 30 
percent (37 records were found in both datasets).  Similarly, news articles share 6 records 
with FMCSA MCMIS records.  Like the PHMSA HMIRS dataset, a dataset comprised of 
news articles tends to underestimate accidents in which the bulk package was damaged but 
no release occurred.  Therefore, an accident rate derived solely from considering the number 
of accidents reported in news articles is expected to be less than the actual accident rate.    
5.5.3 Accident and Release Rates 
The accidents in the combined dataset were grouped by month to estimate the rate 
at which accidents occur (Figure 5.6).  If all the FMCSA MCMIS, PHMSA HMIRS, and 
news report accidents are considered, 132 ± 20 accidents can be expected per month (with 
95% confidence).  Furthermore, from these accidents, approximately 34 ± 7 releases will 
occur per month (with 95% confidence) (Figure 5.7).    Therefore, approximately 26% of 
accidents involving hazardous materials bulk packages result in a release.  In contrast, Brown 
et al (2000) shows that the release rates from Harwood et al. (1990) for highway bulk 
packages transporting gases and liquids at 8% and 19% respectively.   
As mentioned above, the pilot test data are over-weighted in accidents that had a 
release and under-weighted in non-release accidents.  Furthermore, only a subset of data 
relating to MC 306 and DOT 406 cargo tanks have been used in the sample size analyses 
that follow.  For these reasons, the analyses and evaluations of the pilot data presented in 
this report are for illustrative purposes and should not be considered reliable estimates of the 
performance of highway bulk packages.  Such analyses will require a much more extensive 
dataset, development of which is the subject of this report. 
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Figure 5.6 Highway Hazmat Accidents from March to September 2011 
 
Figure 5.7 Hazardous Materials Releases Resulting from Highway Accidents from 
March to September 2011 
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5.5.4 Minimum Number of Records 
The requisite sample sizes were estimated to determine when sufficient data will be 
obtained to conduct statistical analyses with acceptable confidence intervals.  These sample 
sizes must satisfy two conditions: 
1. The first condition requires that there be sufficient accident records to minimize 
type I errors (where insignificant variables appear to have a significant effect) and 
type II errors (where significant variables appear to not have an effect on the 
probability of a release) when testing hypotheses with the model.   While 
determining acceptable levels of type I and type II errors are not necessary for 
developing a model, sample size estimate approaches used in hypothesis testing 
may provide a rough estimate of the required sample size for developing a 
regression equation.    
2. The second condition requires that there are at least 10 events per variable 
included in the model (Peduzzi et al. 1996). This is typically checked once the 
accident data have been collected.  For each variable considered, there should be 
accident records pertaining to at least 10 release events and 10 non-release 
events. 
To satisfy the first condition, the general multiple logistic regression form, given by 
Equation 4, with a single independent variable, was considered.  The requisite sample size 
for each variable was determined by using a subset of data corresponding to hazardous 
materials typically shipped in MC 306 or DOT 406 containers.  The probability of a damage 
case release was estimated using this subset of data and the percentage of accidents resulting 
in a release (26%).  The parameters describing the distribution of each variable were 
calculated and the odds ratio of each variable was determined.  Using this information the 
number of accident records needed to achieve specified significance and power levels was 
determined. 
5.5.4.1 Sample Size Dataset  
The pilot study dataset was refined to contain records corresponding to hazardous 
materials typically shipped in MC 306 or DOT 406 containers.  This subset consisted of 35 
accident records that corresponded to 77 component-specific damage cases in which a 
component of the bulk package was damaged.  On average, there were approximately 2.3 
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component-specific damage cases per accident. The dataset was modified to contain the 
following variables:  
 Thickness of the head or shell at the location where the bulk package was 
damaged.  
 Total capacity of the bulk package.  
 Packaged amount.  
 Speed of the bulk package prior to impact.  
 Speed of the other vehicle involved in the accident.  
 Damage location.  
 Component damaged within that location. 
 Damage type.  
 Whether a personal vehicle was involved.  
 Whether a heavy vehicle was involved.  
 Whether the bulk package crossed the centerline or median.  
 Whether it ran off the road.  
 Whether it rolled over. 
 Whether it exploded or caught fire.  
 Whether the units separated in the crash (if the tractor-trailer was also towing a 
pup trailer). 
 Whether the bulk package struck the roadway. 
 Whether it struck the ground. 
 Whether it struck a concrete barrier. 
 Whether it struck a guardrail. 
Since the general logistic regression program used for the analysis did not allow 
categorical data, the damaged component, its location, and the type of damage were 
converted to a series of binomial variables. 
5.5.4.2 Probability of a Release 
Of the 77 component-specific damage cases included in the MC 306/DOT 406 data 
subset, 74 indicated whether a release occurred as the result of an accident.  Of these, 48 
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damage cases contributed to a release of hazardous materials.  Since the records generated 
during the pilot study correspond to accidents in which a release occurred, the conditional 
probability that damage to a particular component-location combination (damage case) 
contributed to a release, given that a release occurred, was 65 percent (48 of 74 records).  
Using the probability that an accident results in a release, the probability that a particular 
component-specific damage contributed to a release is found by: 
 (                                  )
  (                                          )
  (                         ) 
Eq. 7 
Assuming an accident rate of 26 percent (34 releases per 134 accidents per month, as 
developed in Section 3), the probability of release related to component-specific damage is 
16.7 percent.  This means that, in an accident, the bulk package components are able to 
withstand the incurred damage 83.3 percent of the time.   
5.5.4.3 Odds Ratios  
In order to estimate the required sample size for a logistic regression analysis, an 
initial estimate of the odds ratio is required (refer to Equation 4).  As a measure of the ratio 
of probability of an event per unit change of a variable, the odds ratio depends upon an 
estimate of the mean and standard deviation of the variables used in the logistic regression 
equation.  The following odds ratios estimates are based on data collected during the pilot 
test. 
Scalar Variables. A normal distribution was assumed in order to estimate the mean 
and standard deviation of the scalar variables.  This assumption yields favorable estimates of 
the minimum number of records required.  It is likely that, given non-normal distributions, 
larger sample sizes will be required.  Therefore, once sufficient data has been collected, the 
assumption of normality should be re-examined. 
The following variables were standardized by dividing each value by its standard 
deviation (Table 5.8): 
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Table 5.8 Distribution Parameters of Scalar Variables  
and Corresponding Odds Ratios 
Variable Mean Deviation 
Adjusted 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Odds 
Ratio 
Thickness 0.19 0.01 13.04 1 0.653 
Capacity 4160 4525 0.92 1 1.389 
Packaged Amount 6506 2621 2.48 1 1.166 
Speed 44 20 2.20 1 0.682 
Other Vehicle Speed 14 22 0.60 1 1.509 
 
 Thickness of the head or shell at the location where the bulk package was 
damaged. 
 Total capacity of the bulk package.  
 Packaged amount.  
 Speed of the bulk package prior to impact.  
 Speed of the other vehicle involved in the accident. 
To get a reasonable value for the odds ratio, logistic regression analyses were 
performed using the standardized variables.   
Binomial Variables. The distribution for binomial variables is described by the 
probability of a damage case release and the number of damage cases considered.  The 
probability of a damage case release is determined by dividing the mean by the number of 
records considered in the initial odds ratio estimates (Table 5.9).  Logistic regression analyses 
were performed using the original variables to obtain the odds ratios used in the subsequent 
sample size analysis. 
5.5.4.4 Analysis Parameters 
In statistical analysis, there are generally two types of errors.  In the case of 
estimating release probabilities, type I error, denoted by α, occurs when the variable is 
found to have a significant effect on the probability of release when it actually does not.  The 
type I error is controlled in experimental analysis by specifying the significance level, or the 
amount of type I error allowed in the experiment.  In most experiments where type I error is 
the primary concern, the significance level corresponds to α = 0.05.  On the other hand, 
type II error, denoted by θ, occurs when a variable is not found to have a significant effect   
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Table 5.9 Distribution Parameters of Binomial Variables  
and Corresponding Odds Ratios 
Variable n Mean p 
Odds 
Ratio 
Damaged Valve 74 0.068 0.09% 2.273 
Damaged Lines, Pipes and/or Fittings 74 0.108 0.15% 4.266 
Damaged Manway 74 0.108 0.15% >999 
Damaged Head 74 0.054 0.07% 0.163 
Damaged Shell 74 0.622 0.84% 0.259 
Damaged Weld and/or Seam 74 0.041 0.05% >999 
Abraded 74 0.027 0.04% 0 
Bent 74 0.095 0.13% 0.183 
Burst or Ruptured 74 0.041 0.05% 1.087 
Crushed 74 0.392 0.53% 0.176 
Cracked 74 0.068 0.09% >999 
Gouged or Cut 74 0.068 0.09% 2.273 
Leaked 74 0.081 0.11% >999 
Punctured 74 0.054 0.07% >999 
Ripped or Torn 74 0.108 0.15% >999 
Torn Off or Damaged 74 0.068 0.09% >999 
Front Head Damage on Centerline 75 0.027 0.04% 1.000 
Front Head Damage above Centerline 75 0.053 0.07% 0.163 
Rear Head Damage Below Centerline 75 0.040 0.05% 0.255 
Rear Head Damage Above Centerline 75 0.013 0.02% >999 
Bottom Front Driver-Side Damage 75 0.053 0.07% 1.666 
Bottom Middle Driver-Side Damage 75 0.040 0.05% 1.087 
Bottom Rear Driver-Side Damage 75 0.067 0.09% >999 
Top Front Driver-Side Damage 75 0.053 0.07% 1.087 
Top Middle Driver-Side Damage 75 0.027 0.04% 0.532 
Top Rear Driver-Side Damage 75 0.080 0.11% 0.511 
Bottom Front Passenger-Side Damage 75 0.040 0.05% 0.255 
Bottom Middle Passenger-Side Damage 75 0.053 0.07% 0.163 
Top Front Passenger-Side Damage 75 0.187 0.25% 0.969 
Top Middle Driver-Side Damage 75 0.053 0.07% 1.666 
Top Rear Passenger-Side Damage 75 0.080 0.11% 1.091 
Damage to Piping and/or Undercarriage  
Below the Tank 
75 0.133 0.18% >999 
Passenger Vehicle Involved 77 0.273 0.35% 1.729 
Heavy Vehicle Involved 77 0.065 0.08% 2.273 
Crossed Centerline 77 0.221 0.29% 0.384 
Ran Off Road 77 0.675 0.88% 0.500 
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Table 5.9 (cont.) 
Variable n Mean p 
Odds 
Ratio 
Rolled Over 77 0.818 1.06% 0.439 
Units Separated 77 0.195 0.25% 0.384 
Struck Roadway 77 0.468 0.61% 0.778 
Struck Ground 77 0.688 0.89% 0.397 
Struck Concrete Barrier 77 0.065 0.08% 0.334 
Struck Guardrail 77 0.130 0.17% 0.891 
Struck Tree 77 0.013 0.02% 1.000 
Involved Explosion or Fire 77 0.182 0.24% 8.333 
 
when it actually does.  The type II error is controlled by designing experiments that have 
large values of power (and small values of θ).  This is usually accomplished by increasing 
the number of samples considered in the experiment.   
Since the minimum sample size required to determine whether a variable has a 
significant effect on the probability of release are to be identified, the type I and type II error 
should be balanced.  For example, more type I error may be initially accepted into the 
experiment until sufficient sample sizes have been gathered to control the type II error.  For 
this reason, sample sizes were determined for two significance levels (0.05 and 0.1) and six 
levels of power (0.70, 0.75, 0.80, 0.85, 0.90, and 0.95).   
5.5.4.5 Sample Size Estimates 
The required number of accident records was estimated using the POWER 
procedure in SAS 9.2.   Once the number of cases required to obtain a significant result with 
adequate probability had been determined, the number of accidents was calculated.  Table 
5.10 shows the sample sizes needed to obtain the corresponding power for testing, at the 
specified significance level, the effect of the thickness of the head or shell at the location 
where the bulk package was damaged.  For example, using a significance level of 0.1, in 
order to achieve 90 percent power, 166 accident records are needed.   
For those variables containing sufficient information and variance, the number of 
accident records needed to determine their effect was calculated in a similar manner.  These 
sample sizes indicated that there are three tiers of variables. Tier I variables required sample  
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Table 5.10 Sample Size Required for the Variable ‘Thickness’ 
Significance Level Nominal Power Number of Cases Number of Accidents 
0.05 0.70 274 120 
0.05 0.75 308 134 
0.05 0.80 348 152 
0.05 0.85 398 174 
0.05 0.90 466 203 
0.05 0.95 576 251 
0.10 0.70 209 91 
0.10 0.75 239 104 
0.10 0.80 275 120 
0.10 0.85 319 139 
0.10 0.90 380 166 
0.10 0.95 480 209 
 
sizes of less than 800 accident records (Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9).  Of these, damage to the 
shell or crushing damage require the least number of records. 
The sample sizes required for Tier II variables at a significance level of 0.1 and 90 
percent power ranged between 858 and 1,286 accident records (Table 5.11). In comparison 
to Tier I variables, these required twice as many accident records.   
Table 5.11 Required Number of Accident Records for Variables 
Significance 
Level 
Nominal 
Power 
Packaged 
Amount 
Driver-Side 
Bottom Front 
Driver-Side 
Top Rear 
Passenger-Side 
Top Middle 
Struck 
Roadway 
0.05 0.70 927 661 618 661 737 
0.05 0.75 1,042 744 695 744 829 
0.05 0.80 1,178 841 786 841 937 
0.05 0.85 1,348 962 899 962 1,072 
0.05 0.90 1,577 1,125 1,052 1,125 1,255 
0.05 0.95 1,950 1,392 1,301 1,392 1,552 
0.10 0.70 707 504 472 504 562 
0.10 0.75 808 577 539 577 643 
0.10 0.80 928 663 620 663 739 
0.10 0.85 1,079 770 720 770 859 
0.10 0.90 1,286 917 858 917 1,023 
0.10 0.95 1,624 1,159 1,084 1,159 1,293 
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Those variables requiring sample sizes above 5,000 are classified as Tier III variables: 
 Bulk package design pressure. 
 Burst or ruptured damage. 
 Damage to the rear head below the centerline. 
 Damage to the bottom middle driver-side. 
 Damage to the top front driver-side.  
 Damage to the top middle driver-side.  
 Damage to the bottom front passenger-side.  
 Damage to the top front passenger-side.  
 Damage to the top rear passenger-side.  
 Striking the guardrail. 
These large sample size requirements may be attributed to a low correlation between 
these variables and the probability of a damage case release, or limitations in the estimating 
procedure.  Therefore, the required sample sizes should be re-evaluated after the collection 
of accident data has begun.   
5.5.4.6 Multivariate Logistic Regression Sample Sizes 
In multivariate logistic regression the minimum sample size must also meet the 
conditions of minimum number of records (condition 1) and minimum number of events 
per variable (condition 2).  To determine the minimum number of records, the interaction of 
the variables included in the logistic regression model must be considered.  An example can 
be drawn from tank car performance analyses using the RSI-AAR TCAD (Treichel et al. 
2006).  In these analyses, the characteristics in the model were assumed to be independent of 
each other; therefore, for example, given a curve that represents the relationship between the 
probability of release and tank shell thickness (Figure 5.10), the addition of a standard (non-
varying) thickness jacket adjusts the curve towards lower probability of release values by the 
same amount.  Note that in Figure 5.10, the slopes of the lines differentiating the presence 
of a jacket are equal.   
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Figure 5.10 No Correlation Effects 
The minimum sample sizes for models in which variables are not correlated is 
approximately equal to the largest sample size requirement of the variables included in the 
model.  For example, using the MC 306/DOT 406 pilot data subset, 277 accident records 
are needed for modeling the probability of a release as a function of thickness, capacity, and 
speed at a significance level of 0.1 with 90 percent power.   
However, if the variables are correlated, as is typically the case for empirical data, the 
probability of a damage case release will be different from the sum of the probabilities of 
release from each variable.  Referring to the RSI-AAR TCAD example, if the presence of a 
jacket and the thickness of the shell material were, in fact, correlated, the slopes of the lines 
would be different (Figure 5.11).  Here, given a curve that represents the relationship 
between the probability of release and tank shell thickness, the addition of a standard (non-
varying) thickness jacket adjusts the curve towards lower probability of release values by 
increasingly greater amounts.  In Figure 5.11, the hypothetical decrease in probability of a 
release due to the interaction effects of a jacket and shell thickness is represented by the grey 
area. 
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Figure 5.11 Effect of Correlation Between Variables 
The required minimum sample size for models in which the variables are correlated 
will be larger than that required for models with uncorrelated variables.  This is because 
additional records are needed to evaluate the interaction effects of the variables included in 
the model.  The pilot study dataset suggests correlations exist between the following 
variables:  
 Damage to the shell, crushing type damage, and rollover accidents, running off 
the road, “struck roadway” and “struck ground.” 
 Which component was damaged and the damage location (if not nested). 
 Damage to fittings and accidents involving passenger vehicles (i.e., damage to 
Location 3: front head above centerline, and damage to the head itself). 
 Speed of the bulk package and speed of the other vehicle involved (this most 
likely resulted from the method employed to estimate the other vehicle’s speed in 
the context of the pilot study, but correlation is nevertheless expected). 
 Capacity and packaged amount. 
Since the correlation between variables cannot be estimated due to the limited size of 
the pilot study dataset, the increase in sample size cannot currently be determined. 
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5.5.5 Minimum Number of Events 
Peduzzi et al. (1996) defines the number of outcome events as “the smaller number 
of binary outcomes (e.g. alive versus dead)” and provides the example that “a particular 
study may have many subjects, but too few deaths for a valid analysis”.  In applying 
Peduzzi’s results to the question of bulk package performance, each record represents a 
particular set of independent variables and an outcome (release or no release).  Records in 
the dataset are therefore equivalent to the subjects to which Peduzzi et al. (1996) refers. 
Similarly, since the percentage of accidents resulting in a release is less than the percentage of 
non-release accidents, release events are equivalent to Peduzzi’s events.   
It is also possible that, since the probability of an accident resulting in a release is 
approximately 26 percent, the accident dataset may have many records but too few release 
events for a valid analysis.  According to Peduzzi et al. (1996), at least 10 events per variable 
included in the model are desirable to maintain the validity of the model:  
      
 
 
 Eq. 8 
where: 
 l = the number of independent variables in the regression model, and  
p = the lesser of the percentage of release events or non-release events. 
Given that 26 percent of accidents result in a release, if a model consisted of 10 
variables, the minimum number of accident records required is 385 (Table 5.12).    
5.5.6 Expected Implementation Time  
The amount of time for the bulk package accident data collection system to yield 
statistically significant accident performance measures was determined by comparing the 
required sample sizes to the rate of data acquisition (Table 5.13).   
If the implemented dataset were able to obtain records for all accidents that occur 
(132 per month), the dataset would yield significant results for some variables within one 
month of implementation; and within one year, there would be sufficient accident records to 
analyze each of the Tier I and Tier II variables.   
Since reporting rates may be significantly lower than the expected accident rate, the 
number of months needed to generate sufficient sample sizes was determined for a range of   
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Table 5.12 Minimum Number of Records Needed to Satisfy Condition 2. 
Number of Variables 
Included in the Model Number of Records 
1 39 
2 77 
3 116 
4 154 
5 193 
6 231 
7 270 
8 308 
9 347 
10 385 
11 424 
12 462 
13 500 
14 539 
15 577 
Table 5.13 Number of Months Required for Sufficient Sample Sizes for Testing 
Significance at α = 0.10 and power = 0.90 
Variables 
Required 
Sample Size  
Reporting Rate (%) 
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 
Number of Months 
Tier I Min 45 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 
Max 625 4 5 5 6 7 8 10 13 19 37 
Tier II Min 1,084 7 8 9 10 11 13 17 22 33 65 
Max 1,624 10 11 12 14 16 20 24 32 48 96 
Tier III Min 11,030 83 92 103 118 138 165 206 275 412 824 
 
reporting rates [recall Battelle (2009) estimated an HMIRS reporting rate of 26.9 percent and 
the underreporting analysis conducted in Chapter 4 estimated a reporting rate between 13 
and 44 percent].  This assumes that the ratio of non-release accidents to accidents in which a 
release occurs is maintained.  As shown in Table 5.13, if complete records for only 20 
percent of accidents are obtained, the dataset would need nearly two years of data 
accumulation before each of the Tier I variables could be tested.  By the fourth year of data 
collection, the significance of each of the Tier II variables could be tested.  
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5.6 Conclusion 
The feasibility and efficiency of an accident damage data collection system was 
explored through the development and implementation of a pilot study.  The main purposes 
of the pilot study were to evaluate the quality of data expected from such a data collection 
process, and identify improvements to the data collection system itself.   
The data collected by the pilot test was summarized and the interpretation of this 
data was discussed.  Additionally, minimum sample sizes required to test the effect of the 
variables on the probability of a release were generated using those pilot test records 
pertaining to hazardous materials typically transported in MC 306 and/or DOT 406 
containers.  These minimum sample sizes were compared to the expected number of 
accidents and releases involving hazardous materials to provide an estimate when the 
implemented bulk package data collection system is expected to yield results.  With a 20 
percent reporting rate, the system is expected to contain a sufficient number of records to 
test the significance of most variables within four years of its implementation. 
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CHAPTER 6 
INSTITUTIONAL BARRIER IDENTIFICATION1  
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter identifies potential institutional barriers to the development of a 
database, and approaches to overcoming them.  Since the database (created by an addendum 
to Form DOT F 5800.1) would be a government managed activity, the associated 
institutional issues must be considered.  These include cost, confidentiality, data quality, and 
regulatory hurdles of implementation.  There are also institutional barriers associated with 
the parties that would report the accident data.  These stem from the perception that there is 
little benefit from reporting and even some potential negative consequences.   These include 
the cost to complete reports and the potential that the information provided could be used 
in litigation against the provider.  Additionally, it may be difficult for individuals reporting 
the accident to obtain damage information.  This may be due to accident scene safety 
measures (i.e., evacuating the scene and clearing the roadway), and the disposition of the 
bulk package following an accident (i.e., being placed in an impound yard).  These challenges 
will need to be overcome in order to achieve a successful data collection process.     
6.2 Industry Opinion 
A successful accident damage database will require collection of relevant information 
at minimal cost and with full cooperation or participation from the key industry 
stakeholders.  Industry concerns with gathering additional accident damage information need 
to be understood and overcome.  To gauge the potential level of participation from the 
                                                          
1 This chapter was developed to fulfill the requirements of the Transportation 
Research Board (TRB)’s Hazardous Materials Cooperative Research Program (HMCRP) 
project HM-07 entitled “Accident Performance Data of Bulk Packages Used for Hazardous 
Materials Transportation.”   This section appears as Chapter 5 in HM-07’s final deliverable 
which was published in 2013.   
Philip J. Daum, P.E., Christopher P. L. Barkan, Ph.D., M. Rapik Saat, Ph.D., and Laura E. 
Ghosh, 2013.  Feasibility Study for Highway Hazardous Materials Bulk Package Accident 
Performance Data Collection. Hazardous Materials Cooperative Research Program 
(HMCRP) Report 10, Transportation Research Board. Washington, DC. 
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industry and understand these concerns, an extensive interview and survey process was 
conducted with the following industry organizations:   
 Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association (TTMA). 
 International Tank Container Organization (ITCO). 
 National Tank Truck Carriers Inc. (NTTC). 
 American Chemistry Council (ACC). 
 American Petroleum Institute (API). 
 Compressed Gas Association (CGA). 
 American Trucking Associations (ATA). 
 American Transportation Research Institute (ATRI). 
6.2.1 Concerns Raised by Industry Associations 
Several of the industry associations expressed concerns with such a database; 
therefore, a series of conversations ensued to gain insights from key industry members.   The 
following subsections summarize the principal concerns.  Several stakeholder group 
representatives have little confidence that a voluntary database could be successfully 
established due to the 200 to 300 stakeholders involved in the trucking industry compared to 
the one dozen or so companies involved in the rail industry tank car accident database (See 
Appendix C for a discussion of this and other institutional differences affecting the 
development of a database).   
6.2.1.1 Influence on Modal Competition 
Some industry associations expressed concern that a shipper’s use of the database 
and resulting analyses could lead them to shift traffic away from truck to rail.  Ironically, the 
hazardous material shippers interviewed believed the opposite, stating that if there were 
adequate data to reliably assess highway transport safety and risk, motor carriers would 
obtain a larger share of business.  Shippers believe that the highway mode has lower risk 
than is currently perceived, but they must discount risk estimates because of the lack of the 
subject database needed to objectively assess risk.  Shippers would prefer a level of quality in 
the highway bulk package performance data that is equivalent to what they have for rail in 
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the RSI-AAR Tank Car Accident Database (TCAD).  This suggests that development of a 
highway bulk package database could lead to more favorable consideration of highway 
transport, rather than less. 
6.2.1.2 Effect of Ranking One Type of Cargo Tank Better Than Another 
Another concern of some stakeholders is that an accident damage database may 
show that some types of cargo tanks are better than others.  The database probably will 
demonstrate differences among specifications; however, there is already qualitative 
understanding of this.  An accident damage database would enable quantification of accident 
performance differences, and better understanding of how specific design elements perform.  
Hazardous materials shippers and risk managers could use the resultant statistics to better 
inform their decision-making regarding cargo-tank purchase and leasing decisions for 
products with different hazard levels.  Data might also be able to be used to support a 
reduction in carriers’ insurance premiums because of better understanding of the risk.  An 
accident damage database would also provide a factual basis for discussions with regulators 
about whether proposed changes are justified and if they are cost-effective.  In general, it will 
support a more accurate and refined approach to ongoing improvements in cargo tank 
design. 
6.2.1.3 Litigation Concerns 
The accident damage database stakeholders have also expressed concern that an 
accident damage database may be used in litigation against them.  This concern may be at the 
root of the substantial underreporting of accidents and incomplete reporting of accident 
information in PHMSA’s HMIRS.  Several stakeholder representatives suggested that certain 
information provided in Form 5800.1 or a possible accident damage database should be 
protected against disclosure under Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests and/or be 
restricted from use in liability cases.  In general, equipment manufacturers, shippers and 
carriers comply with federal regulatory requirements. Under these circumstances federal pre-
emption can be used to defend challenges to cargo tank specifications and design.  The 40-
year experience of the TCAD indicates that the accident data, analyses, and the resulting 
actions taken based on industry consensus, tend to provide reasonable means to effectively 
manage liability risks. 
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6.2.2 Survey Feedback 
The industry organizations were asked to distribute a survey to their members 
regarding several aspects of a database enabling bulk package accident performance.  
Specifically, survey respondents identified several concerns that discourage participation and 
other challenges to collecting requested information. 
6.2.2.1 Concerns Discouraging Participation 
Manufacturers, repair facilities, carriers, and shippers were asked to identify concerns 
that may limit participation in such a data collection process.   The principal concerns for all 
industry groups are confidentiality, liability concerns, and increases in the amount of 
paperwork required (Table 6.1).  Since the number of responses is considered a small sample 
size (less than 30), generalization of responses may include biases that cannot be detected. 
Table 6.1. Main Concerns with Providing Bulk Package Accident Performance Data 
Main Concerns 
Stakeholders 
Manufacturers 
Repair 
Facilities Carriers Shippers 
Confidentiality ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Liability Concerns ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Paperwork ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Cost  ✔ ✔  
Other Companies Not Participating   ✔  
Data Accuracy   ✔  
Time Requirements   ✔  
 
Recommended Measures to Increase Participation.  Survey responders also 
suggested approaches to increase the likelihood that crash and tank damage information 
would be reported.  These include:  
 Ensure the data are confidential or guarantee anonymity, at least from outside 
groups. 
 Review, redefine, and simplify existing reporting requirements (this may include 
having law enforcement or emergency response officials communicate that the 
accident meets reporting criteria).  
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 Make reporting straightforward. 
 Automate the reporting system to accommodate wireless transmission of data.   
 Link multiple reporting systems to reduce redundant collection. 
 Create an incentive program such as linking reporting of accidents into a 
company’s safety rating; ensuring incident report records are up-to-date prior to 
issuing permits or creating a tax incentive for compliance.  
 Mandatory participation and greater consequences for non-compliance (e.g., a 
$5,000 fine with no mediation).   
 Review/audit by independent inspectors or assessors. 
 Campaign to highlight the benefits of equipment improvements thatwill reduce 
the damage caused by crashes. 
 Provide useful feedback in a way that is easy for the drivers, mechanics and 
others to understand (similar to the FMCSA cargo tank driver rollover 
prevention video).   
 Increased training of police officers to have them note damage on accident 
reports. 
 Involve repair facilities in reporting. 
 Clearer identification of who was responsible for the crash. 
6.2.2.2 Challenges of Data Collection 
Manufacturers.  One manufacturer indicated that they collect accident data on 
crashes involving their bulk packages; however, the collection of these data is dependent 
upon whether they are aware of the incident and the incident type.  This manufacturer also 
indicated that there is no set amount of information they collect; rather, information was 
only collected if deemed relevant.  The other two manufacturers that responded do not 
collect data regarding crashes involving their bulk packages. 
Repair Facilities.  Repair facilities were asked a series of questions concerning the 
amount of training needed to ensure the collection of accurate information, the degree of 
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difficulty anticipated in collecting various kinds of bulk package design information and 
accident damage information, and a rough estimate of the amount of time needed to collect 
this information.  Of the seven repair facilities that responded to the survey, six indicated 
that some certification was necessary to ensure data quality.  Three respondents indicated 
that the highest level of certification (Authorized Inspectors) was required.   
The damage information that was identified as most difficult to collect is whether the 
damage occurred near a previous repair and whether that repair influenced the structural 
integrity of the tank.  Following the information concerning a previous repair, the 
information identified as moderately difficult to collect includes:  
 Cause(s) of lading loss (i.e., shell puncture, bottom fitting damage, rupture 
resulting from exposure to fire). 
 Location of the crack, gouge, puncture, or rupture where the most hazardous 
material spilled. 
 Dimensions of the crack, gouge, puncture, or rupture where the most hazardous 
material spilled. 
 Location of damage resulting in the loss of hazardous materials. 
 Shell or head thickness at damage locations resulting in the loss of hazardous 
materials. 
 Dimensions of damage at non-spill locations. 
 Shell or head thickness at non-spill locations. 
 Whether the crack or tear occurred because of damage to the fitting or 
appurtenance. 
 The type of wet line construction. 
The majority of the bulk package repair facilities indicated that the following 
information would be easy to collect:  
 Location of initial point of impact. 
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 Dimensions of dent, crack, gouge, puncture, or rupture at an initial point of 
impact. 
 Shell or head thickness at an initial point of impact. 
 Shell or head thickness at the location where the most hazardous material was 
spilled. 
 Dimensions of crack, gouge, puncture, or rupture where the most hazardous 
material spilled. 
 Location of damage that does not result in a spill. 
 Location of damaged fitting. 
 Type of fitting damage. 
 Whether the cargo tank was repaired to specification, repaired to non-
specification, or scrapped. 
 Tank shape. 
 Tank wall thickness. 
 Baffle and bulkhead location. 
 Type(s) of accident protection devices. 
 Type(s) of roll stability devices.  
 Presence of wet lines. 
In addition to the above information, some repair facilities also gather the following 
damage information: 
 Age of fittings. 
 Tank dimensions (out of round). 
 Frame, suspension, axle, and bumper damage. 
 Attachment damage. 
 Lighting damage. 
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 Records of previous repairs and testing. 
 History of products hauled. 
The repair facilities were asked to estimate how long it would take to gather the 
above information.  Four of the repair facilities estimated that it would require between one 
and five hours, while one company estimated that it would take two to three days.  Another 
company indicated that estimating damage repairs “varies from tank to tank depending on 
whether the tank is ASME coded or not.”  Furthermore, the estimated time for the 
collection of design information ranged from 15 minutes to two hours while one repair 
facility estimated that two to three days would be required to collect the design data. 
Carriers.  In addition to variables recorded by various existing databases, as 
discussed in section 2, several carriers also report collecting: 
 Location information including GPS records and the number of miles from the 
home terminal. 
 Driver information including driver age, length of employment and years of 
experience.  
 Bulk package data including vehicle maintenance records.  
 Collision events data including electronic control module (ECM) or other 
onboard recorder information, photos of the accident scene and damage, root 
cause of crash, contributing factors, and accident reconstruction. 
 Package damage information including damage location, type, size, depth, wall 
thickness of damaged cargo tank, repair orders, adjuster investigation, and 
additional damage caused by righting equipment (in the case of a rollover).  
Since these data are being collected already, the additional burden of recording the 
data in a national database is minimal. However, the carriers also reported several challenges 
regarding the collection of crash and damage data.  Working with local law enforcement at 
the accident scene and obtaining police reports in a timely manner was the challenge 
reported by the largest number of carriers.  Other challenges to data collection include lack 
of software to collect specific data, lack of access to equipment due to impounding, 
increased response or remediation time due to inexperienced or insufficiently trained 
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emergency response teams, driver inability to take photos of accident (due to safety or law 
enforcement guidance), difficulty in preservation of incident scene, and lag time in getting a 
trained accident investigation engineer to the site.  Some obstacles that need to be overcome 
in order for carriers to populate an accident damage database include the inability to describe 
and/or determine the condition of the vehicle if it is severely damaged, ability to collect the 
data in a timely fashion, and the threat of legal liability.   
Shippers.  In general, shippers tend to collect similar information as carriers 
regarding hazardous material accidents.  Where hazardous materials are shipped using 
carrier-owned vehicles, one shipper reported that they require the carrier to submit a full 
incident investigation report including a root cause analysis.  Therefore, in addition to 
variables recorded by various databases, as discussed in Section 3, several shippers also 
report collecting: 
 On-board event recorder information (including speed and whether brakes were 
applied prior to the crash). 
 On-board drive camera (recording front and back of the vehicle before and 
immediately after the crash, including view of driver behavior at the time of the 
incident). 
 Pictures and witness information and interviews. 
 Information to determine whether an incident report should be filed (leakage 
amount, citation information, closing of public roadways, injuries, and 
environmental impact). 
Shippers also report several challenges in collecting accident information.  These 
include:  
 Difficulty with gathering information from a carrier or carrier’s subcontractor. 
 Conflicting opinions with the police report regarding what caused the accident. 
 Inability of driver to correctly recall events. 
 Lack of information concerning the events in the accident because not all 
vehicles/trailers are equipped with event recording devices. 
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6.3 Institutional Barriers Identification and Possible Solutions 
The success of an accident damage data collection system depends upon overcoming 
several institutional challenges.  Based on the industry feedback discussed above, several of 
these institutional challenges were identified and are further considered in the following 
discussion.  Possible solutions are also suggested. 
6.3.1 Institutional Barriers Associated with System Implementation and Operation 
6.3.1.1 Cost Barriers 
During fiscal year 2011, the Hazmat Information System (HMIS) cost approximately 
$2,255,000 ($1,945,000 annualized CR + $310,000 adjustments) and the research and 
analysis conducted by PHMSA cost approximately $435,000 ($423,000 annualized CR + 
$2,000 adjustments) (PHMSA 2011).  These expenses would increase with the 
implementation of an addendum to Form 5800.1 and increased enforcement of 
participation.  To justify this increase, the database must provide a return on investment.  
Since the addendum to Form 5800.1, to record highway bulk package accident damage, is 
expected to accrue accident information at a relatively slow rate, this program may require 
several years of operation before the data can be used to assess accident performance and 
identify components or locations that would benefit from enhancements.  Thus, a cost-
effectiveness analysis should take this into account.   
Possible Solution.  A possible method for justifying the expense of the addendum 
is to communicate the positive net return on investment for the RSI-AAR TCAD project.  
Since 1970, that database has been used to provide the sponsors with a scientific and 
statistical basis for evaluating the effectiveness and costs of new proposed rules and 
regulations.  This approach has earned the respect of the regulatory agencies and has resulted 
in more pragmatic, effective, and fact-based regulatory proposals.  This database has been 
periodically evaluated for its effectiveness in aiding the industry to achieve various 
improvements in the safety of hazardous materials transportation by rail.  Evaluations of the 
TCAD have consistently shown industry savings that were over 11 times the costs of 
implementing the database (Treichel 2011).  The effort has led to safer, more secure, more 
competitive, and more profitable businesses.   
Another possible method to justify the database is to conduct a pilot study with 
effective incentives for participation.  The pilot study would enable realistic estimates of the 
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additional cost of implementing an addendum to Form 5800.1.  Additionally, the pilot study 
would provide further information regarding data accrual rates and lead to preliminary 
package performance estimates.  These could be used to more accurately estimate the 
benefits of an accident database. 
6.3.1.2 Regulatory Barriers 
Modifying the current Form 5800.1 to include the proposed fields would require a 
change to the current regulations governing compliance.  Whatever changes were proposed 
must conform to the procedures outlined in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  
Therefore, this option would probably take several years and could encounter opposition 
from the regulated community.  The previous amendment to Form 5800.1 required several 
years and revisions before being adopted.   
Possible Solution.  To streamline the process of modifying the current Form 
5800.1 or adopting an addendum database into regulation, a coordinated effort could be 
undertaken.  This effort should focus on developing consensus among stakeholders 
regarding how to modify the form.  Engaging stakeholder participation in developing an 
addendum to the highway bulk package 5800.1 would help mitigate issues that might 
otherwise hinder its adoption.  However, developing consensus among the industry may be 
difficult because it will involve a diverse group of carriers and associations representing those 
carriers.  A sufficient number of carriers must be convinced that such a database would be in 
their best interest.  To achieve this critical mass, the individuals coordinating the revision 
effort should focus their initial effort on carriers already committed to risk-based approaches 
to safety. 
6.3.2 Barriers to Reporting Accident Data 
Several institutional barriers currently discourage individuals from reporting 
accidents to PHMSA.  These include the involvement of drivers to fill out paperwork 
without compensation, the possibility that legal repercussions may arise from the 
information provided to PHMSA, and the possibility that the individual required to report 
the incident is for some reason incapacitated due to the accident and thus unable to do so.  
These challenges need to be overcome if the accident reporting system discussed in this 
report is to succeed in gathering accurate information for a sufficient number of accidents to 
conduct useful analyses. 
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6.3.2.1 Reporting Responsibility Placed on Driver 
PHMSA estimates that completion of the Form 5800.1 by the individual reporting 
the accident would take 1.6 hours to: review the instructions, search existing data sources for 
information, gather the required data and complete and review the report.  The individual 
reporting the accident is a representative of the company in possession of a hazardous 
material during transportation.  In the case of in-transit accidents, the driver of the bulk 
package is involved with the reporting.  Drivers are typically paid according to the number of 
hours or number of miles he/she has been driving and paperwork is completed on personal 
time.  Therefore, they may not be compensated for the time required to fill out a report.  
Any lack of compensation is a disincentive to the reporting individual and represents an 
institutional barrier to completing these reports.   
Possible Solution.  When the driver involved in the investigation is compensated 
for their time, this aspect of the institutional barrier is reduced or eliminated. 
6.3.2.2 Reporting Responsibility of Carriers 
Not only do companies lack incentive to report the incident, there is a disincentive 
because of the possible legal repercussions resulting from the information provided in the 
accident report. 
Possible Solution.  Increased enforcement of existing requirements would motivate 
companies to ensure accidents are reported.  Additional motivation may be achieved by 
designing the system to rate a company’s participation in the program according to how 
consistently and comprehensively they report accidents, and tying these participation ratings 
into FMCSA’s safety rating system.  However, if participation in the program is to be tied to 
the company’s safety rating, the accident rate for the carrier should not be generated from 
PHMSA reported accidents.  Rather, the accident rate for carriers should be generated from 
an external source such as FMCSA’s database or a dataset created from newspaper articles 
and later matched to the carrier.  For this incentive to be most meaningful and valuable, 
non-release accidents must also be reported. 
6.3.2.3 Privacy of Information/Legal Repercussions 
Since the addendum would be an extension of Form 5800.1, similar to the 
information in the HMIRS, the additional data would be subjected to the current Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA) and, therefore, not protected.  However, there is concern that 
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the public availability of the stored data, under Option B, would have negative repercussions 
on the individuals and companies responsible for reporting.  The availability of these data 
for public use may either discourage individuals from reporting an accident or affect the 
accuracy and completeness of data actually reported. 
Possible Solution.  A possible solution would be the implementation of a “no-
fault” provision such that information reported using the Form 5800.1 addendum cannot be 
used in liability cases.  One way to implement a “no-fault” provision is to store information 
collected via the Form 5800.1 addendum separately from the Form 5800.1 information such 
that the damage data cannot be traced to the carrier, shipper or other identifiable 
information.  Individuals responsible for reporting would then be provided with a unique 
receipt number as proof of compliance during company inspections and audits.  In this way, 
the general public would be unable to correlate a bulk container damage report with a 
particular accident or bulk carrier.  It is important to note that access to accident damage 
data is already available as part of the litigation process; therefore, collecting factual data 
through an addendum to Form 5800.1 will do no additional harm. 
6.3.3 Barriers to Obtaining Damage Information 
There are also several barriers to obtaining accurate damage information.  These 
include challenges to recording crash and damage information at the crash scene and 
restricted access to the vehicle(s) and bulk package following the accident. 
6.3.3.1 Crash Scene Data Collection Challenges 
The need to collect accident damage information often conflicts with the primary 
goal of emergency responders at the scene, which is to contain or prevent spill and ensure 
the safety of individuals at the site.  The presence of individuals at the crash site increases the 
risk of someone being injured.  Furthermore, a goal of local law enforcement, to regain the 
use of the transportation route, conflicts with data collection because the incident scene may 
often be cleared prior to the information being recorded.   
Carriers reported several additional challenges that would result from trying to gather 
data while emergency responders and local law enforcement try to fulfill their responsibilities 
at the accident scene.  Working with local law enforcement and obtaining police reports in a 
timely manner was the challenge most frequently reported by carriers.  Other challenges to 
data collection include drivers’ inability to take photos of accident (due to safety or law 
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enforcement guidance), difficulty in preservation of the scene and lag time in getting a 
trained accident investigation engineer to the site. 
Possible Solution.  Prior to the removal of the bulk package and other vehicles 
from the accident scene, photos of the following should be taken of the:  
 bulk package specification plate(s). 
 hazmat placard. 
 object(s) that damaged the bulk package in the accident. 
 bulk package and any damage to the bulk package (these may be taken after the 
bulk package has been moved from its “resting” position).   
These images may be taken by law enforcement personnel if a representative of the 
company is not present or otherwise unable to perform these tasks.  These images would be 
used to ascertain accident damage and other parameters if the bulk package was later 
unavailable.   
Additionally, an effort should be made to streamline the process of transferring 
photos and other information from local law enforcement to the carriers so that the 
information can be reported.  This may be accomplished by creating an industry website that 
has instructions and links to law enforcement request forms.   
6.3.3.2 Restricted Access to the Vehicle(s) and Bulk Package Involved in an Accident 
Carriers also reported two challenges to collecting information after the truck and 
bulk package have been removed from the accident scene: the lack of software to collect 
specific data and the lack of access to equipment due to impounding.  These two challenges 
are typically overcome by estimating damage and accident conditions (i.e., the location and 
extent of damage and how fast the bulk package was traveling, respectively) thereby reducing 
the quality of data initially reported as part of the addendum.   
Possible Solution.  The reporting system should allow for initial estimates to be 
revised once access to the vehicle(s) and bulk package has been granted. 
6.4 Conclusion 
The success of an accident damage data collection system depends upon overcoming 
several institutional challenges including: 
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 Cost barriers – Possible methods for overcoming these barriers include 
communicating the positive net return on investment for similar projects (such 
as the RSI-AAR TCAD) or conducting a pilot study with effective incentives for 
participation.   
 Regulatory barriers – Possible methods for overcoming these barriers include 
undertaking a coordinated effort that focuses on developing consensus among 
stakeholders regarding how to incorporate the accident damage data collection 
process. The initial attempt to gain support for such a regulatory revision should 
focus on carriers already committed to risk-based approaches to safety. 
 Reporting responsibility – Possible methods for overcoming these barriers 
include ensuring drivers are compensated for the time spent filing accident 
reports and increased enforcement to motivate companies to ensure accidents 
are reported. 
 Privacy of information/legal repercussions – Possible methods for overcoming 
these barriers include the implementation of a “no-fault” provision such that 
collected information cannot be traced to information currently collected by 
Form 5800.1.  In such a scenario, carriers would be required to provide proof of 
compliance during company inspections and audits.   
 Crash scene data collection challenges – A possible method for overcoming this 
barrier is to ensure photos of the damage and accident scene are taken prior to 
removal of the bulk package from the accident scene. 
 Restricted access to the vehicle(s) and bulk package involved in an accident – A 
possible method for overcoming this barrier is to allow for initial estimates to be 
revised once access to the vehicles has been granted. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION  
 
The ability to assess a hazardous material bulk package’s conditional probability of 
release (CPR) enables private and public sector organizations to better inform their risk 
management efforts including choice of package design, hazardous material routing 
decisions, and general understanding of the risk associated with various business activities.   
The rail sector has found it useful to have detailed databases for both accident and tank car 
design information.   Using these databases, numerous fact-based decisions have been made 
regarding safety, regulatory and business decisions.  The ability of the highway sector to 
similarly quantify bulk package performance is constrained because not all of the necessary 
information is currently collected.   
This thesis presents an analysis and possible methodologies to develop and 
implement an accident reporting system to collect sufficient information to evaluate U.S. 
DOT-specified hazardous materials bulk package accident performance.   Improved bulk 
package performance was identified as a risk mitigation strategy that reduces both the CPR 
and the quantity of hazardous materials released in an accident.  Thus, the principal objective 
of developing such an accident damage database is to provide a robust source of empirical 
accident information on bulk package performance in a wide range of accident scenarios.   
In particular, estimating CPR requires collection of detailed information from accidents 
resulting in damage to the bulk package regardless of whether a release occurs.  
Furthermore, in addition to the information currently being collected by DOT Form 5800.1, 
the following information is needed:  
 Presence and type of accident damage protection for bottom fittings 
 Presence and type of rollover accident damage protection 
 Presence of jacket   
 Type of jacket material 
 Damage location on the bulk package 
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 Whether the damage sustained by the component resulted in a release 
 Vehicle speed prior to crash 
 Type of impacted object 
The preferred method for such a data collection system is an industry-sponsored 
extension of PHMSA’s HMIRS; however, a government-sponsored extension of this 
program is thought to be more feasible.    A pilot study implementation of such a program 
illustrated the benefits of dynamically adjusting questions according to logic and previous 
responses.  Furthermore, there is a need for logical quality checks upon report submission.   
Results from the pilot study illustrated the expected range of responses.  Due to the limited 
number of responses and varying degrees of completeness, the statistical summary of this 
data is not representative of the entire population of accidents involving bulk packages and 
therefore should not be considered reliable estimates of the performance of highway bulk 
packages.   Instead data collected as part of the pilot study were used to determine that it will 
take approximately two years for such a system to begin to yield statistically significant 
accident performance measures.   
Finally, potential institutional barriers to the development of a database were 
identified and approaches to overcoming them were suggested.   Main concerns identified by 
industry associations are the potential impacts of bulk package performance quantification 
on modal competition and the continued ability to use existing equipment particularly under 
the threat of litigation.   Individuals in the industry also identified confidentiality, liability 
concerns, increased paperwork and increased administrative time required to file reports, as 
barriers to participation in such a program.   Furthermore, obtaining some of the required 
information may prove to be challenging due to restricted access to the vehicle(s) and bulk 
package(s) involved and a limited ability to either observe the scene of the crash immediately 
after the accident or obtain a copy of a detailed police report in a timely manner.  
Institutional barriers include the cost of such a program and numerous regulatory hurdles 
that must be addressed prior to implementation.    The success of an accident damage data 
collection system requires overcoming all of these challenges. 
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7.1 Introduction 
In addition to presenting a methodology to develop and implement an accident 
reporting system, this thesis identifies several areas for future work regarding bulk package 
safety performance.  Should a data collection program be implemented, future work would 
include addressing questions developed in Chapter 3 regarding bulk package accident 
performance.  Some of these questions include:  
 Do different cross-section shapes affect accident performance in general?  If so, 
in what manner? 
 Does compartment capacity influence component-specific conditional 
probability of release? 
 Does a lower center of gravity affect bulk package accident performance? 
 How does jacket presence and thickness affect bulk package accident 
performance? 
 What are the relationships between head thickness and material and CPR? 
 What are the relationships between shell design thickness and material and bulk 
package performance? 
 Which locations on the bulk package are more susceptible to damage and/or 
release? 
 Are there location-specific effects in terms of component design damage 
resistance? 
There are also several questions that will remain unable to be answered upon the 
implementation of the data collection program.  These questions are associated with a higher 
degree of data collection and could alternatively be addressed by developing simulations or 
component-specific laboratory tests.  They include:  
 How does round manhole performance compare to oval? 
 How does the performance of baffles or baffle attachment rings compare in 
accident scenarios? 
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 Is package performance affected by the presence and/or location of past repairs? 
 What is the nature of the relationship between package motion and the CPR?  
For example, if a package is both rolling and sliding along the ground, is it more 
susceptible to lading loss than if it were only rolling or only sliding? 
 Is there a particular way a cargo tank deforms that is more susceptible to lading 
loss? 
Furthermore, the results of the pilot study, although not considered reliable estimates 
of the performance of highway bulk packages, nonetheless indicate that certain locations and 
components on the bulk package may have a propensity for damage.  Without the 
implementation of the accident data collection program, simulations of a bulk package 
overturning or being involved in a collision due to different loading scenarios and driving 
characteristics could confirm these observations, and evaluate possible damage protection 
strategies.  However, with the implementation of a data collection program, the effect on 
overall bulk package performance could be quantified and their necessity evaluated.   
Future research may also investigate extraneous factors, such as roadside design 
features, affecting the impact type and severity.  Instead of affecting the bulk package’s 
ability to withstand damage, risk reduction strategies could be developed that reduce the 
forces expected in an accident.  In lieu of an accident damage database, such work could be 
conducted by assembling and analyzing existing GIS roadway design information.   
The results of this future work will enable more accurate estimates of conditional 
probabilities of release and quantities of release.  Incorporating these estimates into the 
generalized risk equation would enable the selection of suitable cargo tanks for the type of 
commodity being transported and facilitate route selection analyses in addition to many 
other transportation risk management and mitigation strategies. 
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APPENDIX A 
SURVEY DEVELOPMENT AND QUESTIONS 
 
Due to the potential differences in the use of bulk package accident performance 
data, five surveys, targeting package manufacturers, carriers, shippers, repair facilities and 
researchers, were developed.  The purpose of the surveys was to gain insight on what 
information different stakeholders believe would be most useful in an accident damage 
database. Additionally, the survey was intended to provide information on what constraints 
might exist among stakeholders as well as various preferences they might have regarding the 
database.  Questions were tailored to each survey group to maximize collecting information 
best known by those industry sectors.    
Demographic Questions 
To determine the population of stakeholders that each survey respondent 
represented, several “demographic” questions were asked.   
Manufacturer demographic questions included:  
 Approximately how many bulk tanks does your company manufacture in a year?  
For each type of bulk package, manufacturers were asked to select one of the 
following ranges: 
– 0  
– 1 – 9  
– 10 – 99  
– 100 - 1,000  
– Over 1,000 
 The ranges are based on a logarithmic scale and were chosen to accommodate the 
variability expected for various sizes of operation. 
 Are the tanks trailer-mounted or truck-mounted? Please select the best 
description of your company from the following list:  
– Single Stage Manufacturer (i.e. manufacture the tank and mount it),  
– Incomplete Vehicle Manufacturer (i.e. you manufacture the cargo tank and 
sell it to another company that assembles the tank to an underframe),  
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– Intermediate Vehicle Manufacturer (i.e. you buy an existing, incomplete tank, 
modify it and sell it to another manufacturer) ,  
– Final Stage Manufacturer (i.e. you mount the tank and perform the final 
inspections) 
 
Repair Facilities were asked the following set of demographic questions:  
 In a typical year, approximately how many bulk tanks does your facility repair? 
For each type of bulk package, manufacturers were asked to select one of the 
following ranges: 
– 0  
– 1 - 199  
– 200 - 499  
– 500 - 1,000  
– Over 1,000 
 Of the tanks repaired in a year, approximately what percentage were crash-related 
repairs? Please report the approximate number of the following cargo tanks you 
repair because they’ve been involved in a crash. 
– 0 %  
– 1 % - 24% 
– 25% - 49%  
– 50% - 74%  
– 75% - 100% 
 These questions were asked to determine the average number of crash-related repairs 
your facility makes per year; however, conversations with repair facilities and survey 
reviewers indicated that it was easier for repair facilities to answer the question in parts. 
 Are the bulk tanks trailer-mounted or truck-mounted? 
Carriers were asked the following two demographic questions to enable responses to 
be compared to manufacturer and repair facility responses: 
 What types of bulk tanks does your company own or lease? Carriers were asked 
to select various types of bulk tanks from a list similar to the one used in the 
manufacturer and repair facility surveys. 
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 Approximately what percentage of your highway shipments are made using the 
following kinds of fleets?  Carriers were asked to identify what percentage of 
tanks were owned by a lessor, a shipper, or the carrier from the following range 
of percentages: 
– 0% - 19% 
– 20% - 39% 
– 40% - 59% 
– 60% - 79% 
– 80% - 99% 
– 100% 
Additionally, carriers were asked the following two demographic questions to enable 
comparisons to shipper responses to be further refined: 
 Approximately how many bulk tank deliveries of hazardous materials does your 
company make in North America, per year? 
– 1 - 99 deliveries per year 
– 100 - 999 deliveries per year 
– 1,000 - 9,999 deliveries per year 
– 10,000 - 50,000 deliveries per year 
– Over 50,000 deliveries per year 
 The scale used in this question is also a logarithmic scale but was calibrated to 
separate companies whose main business is not the transportation of hazardous 
materials (such as a gas station that owns a bulk container and refills their pumps once a 
week) from mid-size and large carrier businesses who specialized in transporting 
hazardous materials.   
 What type(s) of hazardous materials do you transport in bulk by highway?  
Responses consisted of classes and divisions of hazardous materials. 
Similarly, shippers were asked the above questions in a revised order: 
 What type(s) of hazardous materials do you ship in bulk by highway?  Again, 
responses consisted of classes and divisions of hazardous materials. 
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 Approximately how many highway shipments of hazardous materials using bulk 
tanks in North America does your company make in a year? 
– 1 - 99 shipments per year 
– 100 - 999 shipments per year 
– 1,000 - 9,999 shipments per year 
– 10,000 - 50,000 shipments per year 
– Over 50,000 shipments per year 
 It was recognized that the range of the logarithmic scale of annual shipments may be 
low with regard to shipments of petroleum products; however, the scale was thought to 
provide a sufficient differentiation for companies shipping chemical (non-petroleum) 
products. 
 What types of bulk tanks do you typically use for highway shipments? Shippers 
were asked to select various types of bulk tanks from a list similar to the one 
used in the manufacturer and repair facility surveys. 
 Approximately what percentage of your highway shipments are made using the 
following kinds of fleets? Shippers were asked to identify what percentage of 
tanks were owned by a lessor, the shipper, or a carrier from the following range 
of percentages: 
– 0% - 19% 
– 20% - 39% 
– 40% - 59% 
– 60% - 79% 
– 80% - 99% 
– 100% 
Finally, researcher demographic questions included:  
 What is the primary focus of your research? 
 How many years of research experience do you have?  
 With which types of bulk tanks are you most interested? Researchers were asked 
to select various types of bulk tanks from a list similar to the one used in the 
manufacturer and repair facility surveys. 
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Existing Use of Accident Damage Protection and Accident Prevention Measures 
The use of accident damage protection devices and accident prevention measures 
can potentially alter the conditional probability of release and the probability of an accident, 
respectively.  Therefore, the inclusion of accident damage protection devices and accident 
prevention measures, in addition to those specified by CFR 49, can potentially reduce the 
overall transportation risk by some unknown amount.  In order to estimate the effectiveness 
of such devices/measures, their presence and whether they were involved in the accident 
should be recorded.  Although the inclusion of accident prevention measures may seem to 
be outside the scope of a database designed for calculating the conditional probability of 
release (CPR), by not including fields to record their presence in the proposed database, the 
variation in the effectiveness of accident damage protection devices would be unacceptably 
large.  Also, some types of tank damage may be associated with certain types of accident (i.e. 
rollovers); therefore, knowing the presence or absence of these is pertinent to calculating 
CPR.  Furthermore, since the presence of accident prevention measures is currently not 
recorded by other accident databases, a gap exists in relating estimates of the conditional 
probability of release to the overall risk of transporting hazardous materials in bulk packages 
by highway.  The following questions were therefore asked to determine which fields would 
be most useful for inclusion in the proposed database.    
Bulk tank manufacturers were asked: 
 How often does your company install any of the following systems/devices? 
Carriers and shippers were asked:  
 Do you specify additional design features above and beyond the minimum 
federal requirements for bulk tanks used to transport hazardous materials? 
If yes, do you require the vehicles/cargo tanks used for your 
[deliveries/shipments] to have any of the following: (Differences in the survey 
questions are bracketed and appear in the following format [carriers/shippers]). 
Possible responses for all respondents included:  
 Accident Damage Protection Measures:  
– Fitting Protection Beyond Federal Standards 
– Additional Shell Protection 
– Increased Tank Wall Thickness 
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– Other 
 Accident Prevention Measures: 
– Lowered Center of Gravity 
– Wider Wheel Track 
– Electronic Stability Control (ESC) / Trailer-Mounted Roll Stability Control 
(RSC) 
– Braking Technology (including disc and hybrid drum-disc brake 
configurations) 
– Tire Pressure Monitors 
– Truck Conspicuity & Enhanced Lighting/Signaling, beyond that which is 
required by regulation 
– None 
– Other 
Additionally, for the carrier, shipper and repair facility surveys, electronic stability 
control (ESC) was delineated from trailer-mounted roll stability control (RSC) and the 
following accident prevention measures were options: 
 Truck-mounted roll stability control (RSC)  
 Electronic Data Recorders (EDRs)  
 Automated Transmissions  
 Speed Limiters  
 Truck-Specific Navigation (including Global Position System (GPS) navigation 
aids)  
Since it is unknown how many containers have been equipped with accident damage 
protection devices, the modal risk associated with transporting hazardous materials in bulk 
packages by highway cannot be determined.  
Best Ways to Reduce the Conditional Probability of Release 
Recognizing that industry professionals are most able to identify bulk package safety 
performance improvement strategies, several questions were designed to identify accident 
damage reduction measures that a possible database could evaluate.  Therefore, 
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manufacturers, repair facilities, carriers and shippers were asked: “From your experience, 
what are the best ways to reduce the risk of a spill and/or the volume of lading released in a 
crash?”  Researchers were asked: “Based on your knowledge and research, what are the best 
ways to reduce the probability of a spill or the volume of lading released assuming a crash 
has occurred?”.  Furthermore, manufacturers, carriers, shippers and researchers were asked: 
“From your experience, what are the most effective means to improve accident damage 
protection?” while repair facilities were asked: “Based on your experience, please identify the 
top five (5) most effective accident prevention measures:  
 Lowered Center of Gravity,  
 Wider Wheel-Base,  
 Electronic Stability Control (ESC),  
 Truck-mounted Roll Stability Control (RSC),  
 Improved Brakes (Including disc and hybrid drum-disc brake configurations),  
 Electronic Data Recorders (EDRs),  
 Tire Pressure Monitors,  
 Automated Transmissions,  
 Speed Limiters,  
 Truck Specific Navigation Aids for Risk Avoidance (including Global Position 
System (GPS) Navigation Aids),  
 Truck Conspicuity & Enhanced Lighting/Signaling, beyond that which is 
required by regulation, and  
 Other” 
Identifying Bulk Tank Design Components to Evaluate with an Accident Damage 
Database 
The goals of a hazardous materials bulk-package, accident-damage database are to (a) 
determine which components are vulnerable to damage and at risk for releasing hazardous 
materials, and (b) to evaluate the effectiveness of existing conditional probability of release 
reduction strategies.  To best achieve these goals, the bulk package accident damage database 
should include fields for tank parts and appurtenances that are most likely to be damaged in 
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the event of an accident.   Survey respondents were asked to consider the following three 
accident scenarios in which:  
 the cargo tank experiences a rollover 
 there are one or more additional vehicles involved in a crash 
 the vehicle transporting hazardous materials is the only vehicle involved and it 
does not rollover 
Bulk tank manufacturers, repair facilities, carriers, shippers and researchers were 
asked to include parts that are typically damaged, whether or not they result in lading loss 
when answering: “From your experience, what parts of the tank are most likely to be 
damaged in the following accident scenarios?”  Additionally, the manufacturer, repair facility, 
carrier, shipper and researcher surveys asked: “From your experience, what components of 
the tank are most likely to be involved in the release of lading if the part is damaged?” 
Scope of a Possible Accident Database 
In addition to achieving the goals of the accident damage database, in order for it to 
be successful, it should gather information that is useful for the databases’ users.  Therefore, 
the manufacturers, carriers, shippers and researchers were asked to indicate how useful the 
following accident information is for their business: 
 Crash Root Cause (i.e. driver condition, location constraints) 
 Crash Description (i.e. time of crash, number of vehicles) 
 Package Design Information (i.e. head thickness, cross-section shape and 
dimensions) 
 Package Damage/Rupture Information (i.e. damage location, damage type, size 
and depth of damage, wall thickness of damaged cargo tank) 
 Injury/Fatality Information (i.e. Number of fatalities due to released lading) 
 Accident Costs (i.e. repair costs, clean-up costs) 
 Other 
Additionally, researchers were asked: 
 In your opinion, what are other aspects related to accident performance that a 
proposed cargo tank performance database could easily accommodate? 
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 In addition to cargo tank performance, what additional fields would be required 
for the aspects listed above? 
Data Collection Effort and Challenges 
Consideration was also given to minimize additional burden on stakeholders.  One 
of the ways to ensure this is to limit the collection of data to that which is already recorded 
by key stakeholders.  Therefore, manufacturers, carriers, and shippers were asked:  
 What accident data do you currently collect regarding crashes involving the cargo 
tanks you [manufacture/use]? 
To gauge the difficulty in collecting such data, and accounting for differences 
between manufacturers, carriers and shippers, these stakeholders were asked: 
 What challenges do you have in collecting data regarding crashes involving the 
cargo tanks you [manufacture/use]? 
Additionally, repair facilities were asked the following series of questions regarding 
the effort, time, and expertise needed to record damage and cargo tank design information: 
 Please rate how easily the following damage information can be recorded for 
inclusion in a bulk tank accident performance database. 
– Location of initial point of impact 
– Dimensions of dent, crack, gouge, puncture, or rupture at initial point of 
impact 
– Shell or head thickness at initial point of impact 
– Cause(s) of lading loss (i.e. shell puncture, bottom fitting damage, rupture 
due to fire) 
– Location of crack, gouge, puncture, or rupture where the most hazardous 
material spilled 
– Dimensions of crack, gouge, puncture, or rupture where the most hazardous 
material spilled 
– Shell or head thickness at location where the most hazardous material was 
spilled 
– Location of damage resulting in hazardous materials spill 
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–  Dimensions of crack, gouge, puncture, or rupture where the most hazardous 
material spilled 
– Shell or head thickness at damage locations resulting in a hazardous materials 
spill 
– Location of damage that does not result in a spill 
– Dimensions of damage at non-spill locations 
– Shell or head thickness at non-spill damage locations 
– Whether the damage occurred near a previous repair 
– Whether the previous repair influenced the structural integrity of the tank 
– Whether the crack or tear occurred because of damage to the fitting or 
appurtenance 
– Location of damaged fitting 
– Type of fitting damage 
– Whether the cargo tank was repaired to specification, repaired to non-
specification, or scrapped 
– Approximately how much time would it take to provide all of the above 
accident damage information while evaluating the damage to a cargo tank 
that had been involved in a crash? 
– In addition to the damage information listed, what other damage information 
does your company record? Please also provide an estimate of the time 
needed to determine the additional damage information 
– How difficult would it be to provide the following bulk tank design 
information? 
– Tank shape 
– Tank wall thickness 
– Baffle and bulkhead location 
– Valve design and location 
– Type(s) of accident protection devices 
– Type(s) of roll stability devices 
– Presence of wet lines 
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– Type of wet line construction 
– Approximately how much time would it take to provide all of the above 
cargo tank design information? 
– In order to ensure accurate damage and design information is provided, what 
level of certification would be needed? 
– Authorized Inspectors (AIs),  
– Qualified Inspectors (QIs),  
– Certified Individuals (CIs), or 
– No certification needed. 
Effectiveness of Existing Databases in Addressing Industry Issues 
One of the approaches for establishing a bulk-package, accident-damage database is 
to build off of an existing database.  To identify the best accident damage database from 
which to start, the manufacturers, repair facilities, carriers, and shippers were asked the 
following questions:  
 With which of the following databases is your company familiar? 
– Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS),  
– Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting System (HMIRS),  
– Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS),  
– Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA),  
– Large Truck Crash Causation Study (LTCCS), and 
– Other. 
 Of the databases you selected, how useful are they in addressing industry issues? 
Likewise, researchers were asked similar questions as follows:  
 Does your organization use any of the following accident databases to evaluate 
cargo tank performance? 
– Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS),  
– Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting System (HMIRS),  
– Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS),  
– Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA),  
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– Large Truck Crash Causation Study (LTCCS), and 
– Other. 
 Of the databases you selected in question 7, how effective are they in addressing 
industry issues? 
Database Structure Preferences 
In addition to building off of an existing database, there are several approaches for 
structuring a future accident damage database.  These approaches can be delineated into the 
following choices:  
 Mandatory or voluntary 
 Industry sponsored or government sponsored 
 A new process / database or build on existing programs 
To increase the likelihood of a successful database, the stakeholder’s preferred 
structure should be considered.  Therefore, all of the stakeholder groups (manufacturers, 
repair facilities, carriers, shippers and researchers) were asked: “If a cargo tank accident 
performance database is established, what approach would you prefer?” and “Why?” 
Gauging Participation in a Voluntary Program 
Since the success of a voluntary program relies on the willingness of stakeholders to 
participate, the manufacturer, repair facility, carrier and shipper survey respondents were 
asked “Would your company be willing to provide data to populate a voluntary program?”  
Recognizing that stakeholders who respond to the survey are probably more likely to 
participate in a voluntary program than those stakeholders who do not respond, the 
stakeholders were also asked: “In your opinion, what percentage of highway, bulk-tank, 
hazmat accidents would go unreported if a voluntary, industry-based data collection strategy 
was adopted?”  Similarly, researchers were asked “In your opinion, what percentage of 
accidents would go unreported if a voluntary, industry-based data collection strategy was 
adopted?”   
To identify which concerns would likely reduce participation, the manufacturer, 
repair facility, carrier and shipper survey respondents were also asked: “What is your biggest 
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concern with participating in a voluntary program?”  Data collection strategies to reduce 
these concerns would likely yield the greatest success rate. 
Recommended Measures to Increase Participation 
To identify possible incentive programs for participating in such an effort, all survey 
respondents were asked “What measures would you recommend to increase the probability 
that crash and tank damage information is reported?”   
  
 246 
HM-07 Manufacturer Survey 
 
Please provide your contact information. This will allow us to contact you in case we 
need to better understand the answers you provide.  
Required fields are denoted with an *. Note: Your responses will remain confidential. 
Your contact information will not be used for any purpose beyond this survey. Only 
aggregate information, which cannot be tied back to an individual or a company, will be 
reported.  
 
Check this box if you would like to receive a copy of the survey results 
 
Organization Name *  
 
Prefix [Mr., Mrs., Ms., Dr., etc] *  
 
Contact Name *  
 
Email *  
 
Phone Number *  
 
Street Address  
 
City  
 
State  
 
Zip  
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Question 1: Approximately how many bulk tanks does your company manufacture 
in a year? 
  
0 1 - 9 10 - 99 
100 - 
1,000 
Over 
1,000  
Atmospheric Pressure Cargo 
Tank (MC 306 or DOT 406)        
Low Pressure Cargo Tank  
(MC 307 or DOT 407)        
Corrosive Cargo Tank  
(MC 312 or DOT 412)        
High Pressure Gas Cargo 
Tank (MC 331)        
Cryogenic Liquid Cargo 
Tank (MC 338)        
Asphalt Cargo Tank 
       
Compressed Gas Tube 
Trailer        
Non-Pressurized UN 
Portable Tank        
Pressurized UN Portable 
Tank        
Cryogenic UN Portable Tank 
       
Non-Specification Tank For 
Combustible Materials        
Other - 1 (Rate here and 
specify below)        
Other - 2 (Rate here and 
specify below)        
Other - 3 (Rate here and 
specify below)        
Other - 1:  
Other - 2:  
Other - 3:  
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Question 2: Are the tanks trailer-mounted or truck-mounted? 
MC 306 / DOT 406  
Not Applicable 
Mostly trailer-mounted 
Mostly truck-mounted 
 
MC 307 / DOT 407  
Not Applicable 
Mostly trailer-mounted 
Mostly truck-mounted 
 
MC 312 / DOT 412  
Not Applicable 
Mostly trailer-mounted 
Mostly truck-mounted 
 
MC 331  
Not Applicable 
Mostly trailer-mounted 
Mostly truck-mounted 
 
MC 338  
Not Applicable 
Mostly trailer-mounted 
Mostly truck-mounted 
 
Asphalt Tanks  
Not Applicable 
Mostly trailer-mounted 
Mostly truck-mounted 
 
Tube Trailers  
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Not Applicable 
Mostly trailer-mounted 
Mostly truck-mounted 
 
Non-Specification Tanks For Combustible Materials  
Not Applicable 
Mostly trailer-mounted 
Mostly truck-mounted 
 
Other Please identify type of tank in box below then identify how it is mounted using the 
check boxes below.  
 
Not Applicable 
Mostly trailer-mounted 
Mostly truck-mounted 
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Question 3: Please select the best description of your company from the following 
list. 
Please check one of the following. Note: If you are a single-stage manufacturer, you do 
not need to also check "final stage manufacturer". 
 
Single Stage Manufacturer (i.e. manufacture the tank and mount it) 
Incomplete Vehicle Manufacturer (i.e. you manufacture the cargo tank and sell it 
to another manufacturer)  
Intermediate Vehicle Manufacturer (i.e. you buy an existing, incoplete tank, 
modify it and sell it to another manufacturer) 
Final Stage Manufacturer (i.e. you mount the tank and perform the final 
inspections) 
Other:  
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Question 4: How often does your company install any of the following 
systems/devices? 
Accident Damage Protection Measures: In addition to those specified in 49 CFR.  
  
Never 
Occasionally - 
Only at the request 
of our customers 
Usually - A standard 
feature on our bulk 
tanks 
 
Fitting Protection Beyond 
Federal Standards      
Additional Shell Protection 
     
Increased Tank Wall Thickness 
     
Other - 1 (Please rate here and 
specify below)      
Other - 2 (Please rate here and 
specify below)      
Other - 3 (Please rate here and 
specify below)      
Other - 1:  
Other - 2:  
Other - 3:  
 
Accident Prevention Measures: Please check all that apply.  
  
Never 
Occasionally - 
Only at the 
request of our 
customers 
Usually - A 
standard feature 
on our bulk 
tanks 
 
Lowered Center of Gravity 
     
Wider Wheel Track 
     
Electronic Stability Control 
(ESC) / Trailer-Mounted Roll 
Stability Control (RSC) 
     
Braking Technology (including 
disc and hybrid drum-disc 
brake configurations) 
     
Tire Pressure Monitors 
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Never 
Occasionally - 
Only at the 
request of our 
customers 
Usually - A 
standard feature 
on our bulk 
tanks 
 
Truck Conspicuity & 
Enhanced Lighting/Signaling, 
beyond that which is required 
by regulation 
     
Other - 1 (Please rate here and 
specify below)      
Other - 2 (Please rate here and 
specify below)      
Other - 3 (Please rate here and 
specify below)      
Other - 1:  
Other - 2:  
Other - 3:  
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Question 5: From your experience, what are the best ways to reduce the risk of a 
spill and/or the volume of lading released in a crash? 
 
 
Question 6: From your experience, what are the most effective means to improve 
accident damage protection? 
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Question 7: From your experience, what parts of the tank are most likely to be 
damaged in the following accident scenarios? 
Include parts that are typically damaged, whether or not they result in lading loss 
 
In an incident in which the cargo tank experiences a rollover: 
 
 
In an incident in which there are one or more additional vehicles involved in a crash: 
 
 
In an incident in which the vehicle transporting hazardous materials is the only vehicle 
involved and it does not rollover:  
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Question 8: From your experience, what components of the tank are most likely to 
be involved in the release of lading if the part is damaged? 
In an incident in which the cargo tank experiences a rollover: 
 
 
In an incident in which there are one or more additional vehicles involved in a crash: 
 
 
In an incident in which the vehicle transporting hazardous materials is the only vehicle 
involved and it does not rollover: 
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Question 9: The proposed database is intended to evaluate the following items in 
terms of their contribution to a reduction in the probability and severity of a 
hazardous material spill resulting from a crash involving a bulk tank. Please 
identify: 
a) The item your company is MOST interested in having evaluated:  
Select one.  
Roll Stability Devices (i.e. electronic stability control or roll stability control 
devices) 
 254 
Accident Prevention Devices (i.e. improved brakes, increased night-time 
visibility devices) 
Accident Protection Devices (i.e. rollover damage protection device, rear-end 
tank protection, stop-valves and shear sections) 
Valve Design and Location 
Tank Shape 
Tank Wall Thickness and Material Strength/Toughness 
Baffle and Bulkhead Location 
Other (Please indicate here and specify below) 
Other: Please specify here.  
 
b) The items for which your company would also find evaluations useful:  
Select as many as apply.  
Roll Stability Devices (i.e. electronic stability control or roll stability control 
devices) 
Accident Prevention Devices (i.e. improved brakes, increased nighttime visibility 
devices) 
Accident Protection Devices (i.e. rollover damage protection device, rear-end 
tank protection, stop-valves and shear sections) 
Valve Design and Location 
Tank Shape 
Tank Wall Thickness and Material Strength/Toughness 
Baffle and Bulkhead Location 
Other -1 (Please indicate here and specify below) 
Other -2 (Please indicate here and specify below) 
Other -3 (Please indicate here and specify below) 
Other -1: Please specify here.  
Other-2: Please specify here.  
Other-3: Please specify here.  
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Question 10: How useful is the following accident data information for your 
business? 
  
Not Useful 
Somewhat 
Useful 
Useful 
Very 
Useful  
Crash Root Cause (i.e. driver 
condition, location constraints)       
Crash Description (i.e. time of 
crash, number of vehicles)       
Package Design Information 
(i.e. head thickness, cross-
section shape and dimensions) 
      
Package Damage/Rupture 
Information (i.e. damage 
location, damage type, size 
and depth of damage, wall 
thickness of damaged cargo 
tank) 
      
Injury/Fatality Information 
(i.e. Number of fatalities due 
to released lading) 
      
Accident Costs (i.e. repair 
costs, clean-up costs)       
Other - 1 (Please rate here and 
specify below):       
Other -2 (Please rate here and 
specify below):       
Other -3 (Please rate here and 
specify below):       
Other -1: Please specify here.  
Other -2: Please specify here.  
Other -3: Please specify here.  
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Question 11: What accident data do you currently collect regarding crashes 
involving the cargo tanks you manufacture? 
 
 
Question 12: What challenges do you have in collecting data regarding crashes 
involving the cargo tanks you manufacture? 
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Question 13: With which of the following databases is your company familiar? 
Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS) 
Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting System (HMIRS) 
Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA) 
Large Truck Crash Causation Study (LTCCS) 
Other:  
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Question 14: Of the databases you selected in question 13, how useful are they in 
addressing industry issues? 
  
Not 
Applicable  
Not Very 
Useful 
Somewhat 
Useful 
Useful 
Very 
Useful  
Motor Carrier 
Management 
Information System 
(MCMIS): 
       
Hazardous Materials 
Incident Reporting 
System (HMIRS): 
       
Fatality Analysis 
Reporting System 
(FARS) 
       
Trucks Involved in 
Fatal Accidents 
(TIFA) 
       
Large Truck Crash 
Causation Study 
(LTCCS) 
       
Other (as specified 
above)        
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Question 15: If a cargo tank accident performance database is established, what 
approach does your company prefer? 
a)  
 Voluntary 
 Mandatory 
 
Why? 
 258 
  
 
b)  
Industry sponsored 
Government sponsored 
 
Why? 
  
 
c)  
A new process / database 
Build on existing programs (i.e. add fields to Form 5800.1 and increase reporting 
compliance) 
 
Why? 
  
 
d) Other (optional) Describe any alternative you have in mind.  
Also list the pros and cons for this option  
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Question 16: Would your company be willing to provide data to populate a 
voluntary program? 
Yes 
Most likely 
Probably not 
No 
Question 17: What is your biggest concern with participating in a voluntary 
program? 
Confidentiality 
Paperwork 
Liability Considerations 
Cost 
Other:  
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Question 18: In your opinion, what percentage of highway, bulk-tank, hazmat 
accidents would go unreported if a voluntary, industry-based data collection 
strategy was adopted? 
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Question 19: What measures would you recommend to increase the probability that 
crash and tank damage information is reported? 
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HM-07 Repair Facility Survey 
 
Please provide your contact information. This will allow us to contact you in case we 
need to better understand the answers you provide. 
Required fields are denoted with an *. Note: Your responses will remain confidential. Your contact 
information will not be used for any purpose beyond this survey. Only aggregate information, which cannot 
be tied back to an individual or a company, will be reported. 
 
Check this box if you would like to receive a copy of the survey results 
 
Organization Name: *  
 
Prefix [Mr., Mrs., Ms., Dr., etc.]: *  
 
Contact Name: *  
 
Contact Email: *  
 
Contact Phone Number: *  
 
Street Address:  
 
City:  
 
State:  
 
Zip:  
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Question 1: In a typical year, approximately how many bulk tanks does your facility 
repair?  
 
  
0 1 - 199 200 - 499 500 - 1,000 Over 1,000 
 
Atmospheric Pressure 
Cargo Tank (MC 306 or 
DOT 406) 
       
Low Pressure Cargo 
Tank (MC 307 or DOT 
407) 
       
Corrosive Cargo Tank 
(MC 312 or DOT 412)        
High Pressure Gas Cargo 
Tank (MC 331)        
Cryogenic Liquid Cargo 
Tank (MC 338)        
Asphalt Cargo Tank 
       
Compressed Gas Tube 
Trailer        
Non-Pressurized UN 
Portable Tank        
Pressurized UN Portable 
Tank        
Cryogenic UN Portable 
Tank        
Non-Specification Tank 
For Combustible 
Materials 
       
Other - 1 (Please rate 
here and specify below)        
Other - 2 (Please rate 
here and specify below)        
Other - 3 (Please rate 
here and specify below)        
 
Other - 1:  
Other - 2:  
Other - 3:  
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Question 2: Of the tanks repaired in a year, approximately what percentage were 
crash-related repairs? 
Please report the approximate number of the following cargo tanks you repair because they’ve been 
involved in a crash:  
 
  
0 % 1 % - 24% 25% - 49% 50% - 74% 
75% - 
100%  
Atmospheric Pressure 
Cargo Tank (MC 306 or 
DOT 406) 
       
Low Pressure Cargo 
Tank (MC 307 or DOT 
407) 
       
Corrosive Cargo Tank 
(MC 312 or DOT 412)        
High Pressure Gas Cargo 
Tank (MC 331)        
Cryogenic Liquid Cargo 
Tank (MC 338)        
Asphalt Cargo Tank 
       
Compressed Gas Tube 
Trailer        
Non-Pressurized UN 
Portable Tank        
Pressurized UN Portable 
Tank        
Cryogenic UN Portable 
Tank        
Non-Specification Tank 
For Combustible 
Materials 
       
Other - 1 (Please rate 
here and specify below)        
Other - 2 (Please rate 
here and specify below)        
Other - 3 (Please rate 
here and specify below)        
Other - 1:  
Other - 2:  
Other - 3:  
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Question 3: Are the bulk tanks trailer-mounted or truck-mounted? 
 
MC 306 / DOT 406  
Not Applicable 
Mostly trailer-mounted 
Mostly truck-mounted 
 
MC 307 / DOT 407  
Not Applicable 
Mostly trailer-mounted 
Mostly truck-mounted 
 
MC 312 / DOT 412  
Not Applicable 
Mostly trailer-mounted 
Mostly truck-mounted 
 
MC 331  
Not Applicable 
Mostly trailer-mounted 
Mostly truck-mounted 
 
MC 338  
Not Applicable 
Mostly trailer-mounted 
Mostly truck-mounted 
 
Asphalt Tanks  
Not Applicable 
Mostly trailer-mounted 
Mostly truck-mounted 
 
Tube Trailers  
Not Applicable 
Mostly trailer-mounted 
Mostly truck-mounted 
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Non-Specification Tank For Combustible Materials  
Not Applicable 
Mostly trailer-mounted 
Mostly truck-mounted 
 
Other  
Please identify type of tank in the box below then identify how it is mounted using the check boxes below. 
 
 
Not Applicable 
Mostly trailer-mounted 
Mostly truck-mounted 
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Question 4: Please rate how easily the following damage information can be 
recorded for inclusion in a bulk tank accident performance database. 
  
Very Easy Easy Difficult 
Very 
Difficult  
Location of initial point of impact 
      
Dimensions of dent, crack, gouge, puncture, or 
rupture at initial point of impact       
Shell or head thickness at initial point of impact 
      
Cause(s) of lading loss (i.e. shell puncture, 
bottom fitting damage, rupture due to fire)       
Location of crack, gouge, puncture, or rupture 
where the most hazardous material spilled       
Dimensions of crack, gouge, puncture, or rupture 
where the most hazardous material spilled       
Shell or head thickness at location where the 
most hazardous material was spilled       
Location of damage resulting in hazardous 
materials spill       
Dimensions of of crack, gouge, puncture, or 
rupture where the most hazardous material 
spilled 
      
Shell or head thickness at damage locations 
resulting in a hazardous materials spill       
Location of damage that does not result in a spill 
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Very Easy Easy Difficult 
Very 
Difficult  
Dimensions of damage at non-spill locations 
      
Shell or head thickness at non-spill damage 
locations       
Whether the damage occurred near a previous 
repair        
Whether the previous repair influenced the 
structural integrity of the tank        
Whether the crack or tear occurred because of 
damage to the fitting or appurtenance       
Location of damaged fitting 
      
Type of fitting damage 
      
Whether the cargo tank was repaired to 
specification, repaired to non-specification, or 
scrapped 
      
 
Question 5: Approximately how much time would it take to provide all of the above 
accident damage information while evaluating the damage to a cargo tank that had 
been involved in a crash? 
 
 
 
Question 6: In addition to the damage information listed in Question 4, what other 
damage information does your company record? 
Please also provide an estimate of the time needed to determine the additional damage information 
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Question 7: How difficult would it be to provide the following bulk tank design 
information? 
 
  
Very Easy Easy Difficult 
Very 
Difficult   
Tank shape 
      
Tank wall thickness 
      
Baffle and bulkhead location 
      
Valve design and location  
      
Type(s) of accident 
protection devices       
Type(s) of roll stability 
devices       
Presence of wet lines 
      
Type of wet line construction 
      
 
Question 8: Approximately how much time would it take to provide all of the above 
cargo tank design information? 
 
 
 
Question 9: From your experience what other design features should be evaluated 
for accident damage performance? 
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Question 10: In order to ensure accurate damage and design information is 
provided, what level of certification would be needed? 
 
Authorized Inspectors (AIs) 
Qualified Inspectors (QIs) 
Certified Individuals (CIs) 
No certification needed 
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Question 11: What parts of the tank are most likely to be damaged in the following 
accident scenarios? 
Include parts that are typically damaged, whether or not they result in lading loss 
 
In an incident in which the cargo tank experiences a rollover: 
 
 
In an incident in which there are one or more additional vehicles involved in a crash: 
 
 
In an incident in which the vehicle transporting hazardous materials is the only vehicle involved and it does 
not rollover: 
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Question 12: What components of the tank are most likely to be involved in the 
release of lading if the part is damaged? 
 
In an incident in which the cargo tank experiences a rollover: 
 
 
In an incident in which there are one or more additional vehicles involved in a crash: 
 
 
In an incident in which the vehicle transporting hazardous materials is the only vehicle involved and it does 
not rollover: 
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Question 13: From your experience, what are the most effective means to improve 
accident damage protection?  
 
 
 
Question 14: Based on your experience, please identify the top five (5) most effective 
accident prevention measures: 
 
Lowered Center of Gravity 
Wider Wheel-Base 
Electronic Stability Control (ESC) 
Truck-mounted Roll Stability Control (RSC) 
Improved Brakes (Including disc and hybrid drum-disc brake configurations) 
Electronic Data Recorders (EDRs) 
Tire Pressure Monitors 
Automated Transmissions 
Speed Limiters 
Truck Specific Navigation Aids for Risk Avoidance (including Global Position System (GPS) 
Navagation Aids) 
Truck Conspicuity & Enhanced Lighting/Signalling, beyond that which is required by regulation 
Other:  
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Question 15: With which of the following databases is your company familiar? 
 
Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS) 
Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting System (HMIRS) 
Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA) 
Large Truck Crash Causation Study (LTCCS) 
Other:  
 
Question 16: Of the databases you selected in question 15, how useful are they in 
addressing industry issues? 
 
  
Not 
Applicable 
Not 
Useful 
Somewhat 
Useful 
Useful 
Very 
Useful  
Motor Carrier Management Information 
System (MCMIS):        
Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting 
System (HMIRS):        
Fatality Analysis Reporting System 
(FARS)        
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA) 
       
Large Truck Crash Causation Study 
(LTCCS)        
Other (as specified above) 
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Question 17: If a cargo tank accident performance database is established, what 
approach does your company prefer? 
 
a)  
Voluntary 
Mandatory 
Why? 
  
 
b)  
Industry sponsored 
Government sponsored 
Why? 
  
 
c)  
A new process / database 
Build on existing programs (i.e. add fields to Form 5800.1 and increase reporting compliance) 
Why? 
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d) Other (optional)  
Describe any alternative you have in mind. Also list the pros and cons for this option 
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Question 18: Would your company be willing to provide data to populate a 
voluntary program? 
Yes 
Most likely 
Probably not 
No 
 
Question 19: What is your biggest concern with participating in a voluntary 
program? 
Confidentiality 
Paperwork 
Liability Considerations 
Cost 
Other:  
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Question 20: In your opinion, what percentage of accidents would go unreported if a 
voluntary, industry-based data collection strategy was adopted? 
 
 
 
Question 21: What measures would you recommend to increase the probability that 
crash and tank damage information is reported? 
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HM-07 Carrier Survey 
 
Please provide your contact information. This will allow us to contact you in case we 
need to better understand the answers you provide. 
Required fields are denoted with an *. Note: Your responses will remain confidential. 
Your contact information not be used for any purpose beyond this survey. Only aggregate 
information, which cannot be tied back to an individual or a company, will be reported. 
Check this box if you would like to receive a copy of the survey results 
 
Organization Name *  
 
Prefix [Mr., Mrs., Ms., Dr., etc] *  
 
Contact Name *  
 
Email *  
 
Phone Number *  
 
Street Address:  
 
City:  
 
State:  
 
Zip:  
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Question 1: What types of bulk tanks does your company own or lease?  
Please check all that apply:  
Atmospheric Pressure Cargo Tank (MC 306 or DOT 406) 
Low Pressure Cargo Tank (MC 307 or DOT 407) 
Corrosive Cargo Tank (MC 312 or DOT 412) 
High Pressure Gas Cargo Tank (MC 331) 
Cryogenic Liquid Cargo Tank (MC 338) 
Asphalt Cargo Tank 
Compressed Gas Tube Trailer 
Non-Pressurized UN Portable Tank 
Pressurized UN Portable Tank 
Cryogenic UN Portable Tank 
Non-Specification Tank For Combustible Materials 
Other:  
 
Question 2: Approximately what percentage of your highway shipments are 
made using the following kinds of fleets: 
  
Tanks 
owned by 
a lessor 
Tanks 
owned by 
a shipper 
Tanks 
owned by 
the carrier 
Other 
(Please 
rate here 
and specify 
below) 
 
0% - 19% 
      
20% - 39% 
      
40% - 59% 
      
60% - 79% 
      
80% - 99% 
      
100% 
      
Other:  
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Question 3: Approximately how many bulk tank deliveries of hazardous 
materials does your company make in North America, per year? 
1 - 99 deliveries per year 
100 - 999 deliveries per year 
1,000 - 9,999 deliveries per year 
10,000 - 50,000 deliveries per year 
Over 50,000 deliveries per year 
 
Question 4: What type(s) of hazardous materials do you transport in bulk by 
highway? 
Class 2:  
Division 2.1 - Flammable gases 
Division 2.2 - Non-flammable, non-toxic gases 
Division 2.3 - Toxic gases 
 
Class 3:  
Class 3 - Flammable liquids (and Combustible liquids) 
 
Class 4:  
Division 4.1 - Flammable solids 
Division 4.2 - Spontaneously combustible materials 
Division 4.3 - Water-reactive substances / Dangerous when wet materials 
 
Class 5:  
Division 5.1 - Oxidizing substances 
Division 5.2 - Organic peroxides 
 
Class 6:  
Division 6.1 - Toxic substances 
Division 6.2 - Infectious substances 
 
Class 8:  
Class 8 - Corrosive substances 
 
Class 9:  
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Class 9 - Miscellaneous hazardous materials / products, substances, or organisms 
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Question 5: Do you specify additional design features above and beyond the 
minimum federal requirements for bulk tanks used to transport hazardous 
materials? 
Yes - We have a company policy that identifies additional requirements 
Yes - We consider additional design features offered 
No 
Other:  
Question 6: If yes, do you require the vehicles/cargo tanks used for your 
deliveries to have any of the following: 
Please check all that apply 
Accident Damage Protection Measures: In addition to those specified in 49 CFR.  
Fittings Protection Beyond Federal Standards 
Additional Shell Protection 
Increased Tank Wall Thickness 
Other:  
 
Accident Prevention Measures: Please check all that apply.  
Lowered center of gravity 
Wider wheel-base 
Electronic stability control 
Truck-mounted roll stability control (RSC) 
Trailer-mounted roll stability control (RSC) 
Improved Brakes (including disc and hybrid drum-disc brake configurations) 
Electronic Data Recorders (EDRs) 
Tire Pressure Monitors 
Automated Transmissions 
Speed Limiters 
Truck-Specific Navigation (including Global Position System (GPS) navigation aids) 
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Truck Conspicuity (devices that make the truck more visible) & Enhanced 
Lighting/Signalling beyond that which is required by regulations 
None 
Other:  
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Question 7: From your experience, what are the best ways to reduce the risk of 
a spill and/or the volume of lading released in a crash? 
 
Question 8: From your experience, what are the most effective means to 
improve accident damage protection? 
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Question 9: From your experience, what parts of the tank are most likely to be 
damaged in the following accident scenarios? 
Include parts that are typically damaged, whether or not they result in lading loss 
 
In an incident in which the bulk tank experiences a rollover: 
 
In an incident in which there are one or more additional vehicles involved in a crash: 
 
In an incident in which the vehicle transporting hazardous materials is the only vehicle 
involved and it does not rollover: 
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Question 10: From your experience, what components of the tank are most 
likely to be involved in the release of lading if the part is damaged? 
In an incident in which the cargo tank experiences a rollover: 
 
In an incident in which there are one or more additional vehicles involved in a crash: 
 
In an incident in which the vehicle transporting hazardous materials is the only vehicle 
involved and it does not rollover: 
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Question 11: Please rate your company’s interest in being able to evaluate the 
effect each of the following items have on managing risks in hazardous 
materials transportation: 
  
Not 
Intereste
d 
Somewha
t 
Interested 
Intereste
d 
Very 
Intereste
d 
 
Roll Stability Devices (i.e. electronic 
stability control or roll stability control 
devices) 
      
Accident Prevention Devices (i.e. improved 
brakes, side object detection system, 
increased night-time visibility devices) 
      
Accident Protection Devices (i.e. rollover 
damage protection device, rear-end tank 
protection, stop-valves and shear sections) 
      
Wet Lines 
      
Valve Design and Location  
      
Tank Shape 
      
Tank Wall Thickness and Material 
Strength/Toughness       
Baffle and Bulkhead Location 
      
Other - 1 (Please rate here and specify 
below)       
Other - 2 (Please rate here and specify 
below)       
Other - 3 (Please rate here and specify 
below)       
 
Other - 1: Please specify here.  
Other - 2: Please specify here.  
Other - 3: Please specify here.  
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Question 12: How useful is the following accident data information for your 
business? 
  
Not 
Useful 
Somewhat 
Useful Useful 
Very 
Useful  
Crash Root Cause (i.e. driver condition, 
location constraints)       
Crash Description (i.e. time of crash, number 
of vehicles)       
Package Design Information (i.e. head 
thickness, cross-section shape and 
dimensions) 
      
Package Damage/Rupture Information (i.e. 
damage location, damage type, size and 
depth of damage, wall thickness of damaged 
cargo tank) 
      
Injury/Fatality Information (i.e. Number and 
severity of injuries due to released lading)       
Accident Costs (i.e. repair costs, clean-up 
costs)       
Other - 1 (Please rate here and specify 
below):       
Other - 2 (Please rate here and specify 
below):       
Other - 3 (Please rate here and specify 
below):       
 
Other - 1: Please specify here.  
Other - 2: Please specify here.  
Other - 3: Please specify here.  
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Question 13: What accident data do you currently collect regarding crashes 
involving the cargo tanks you use? 
 
 
Question 14: What challenges do you have in collecting data regarding crashes 
involving the cargo tanks you use? 
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Question 15: With which of the following databases is your company familiar? 
Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS) 
Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting System (HMIRS) 
Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA) 
Large Truck Crash Causation Study (LTCCS) 
Other:  
  
 285 
Question 16: Of the databases you selected in question 15, how useful are they 
in addressing industry issues? 
  
Not 
Applicable 
Not Very 
Useful 
Somewhat 
Useful 
Useful 
Very 
Useful  
Motor Carrier Management 
Information System (MCMIS):        
Hazardous Materials Incident 
Reporting System (HMIRS):        
Fatality Analysis Reporting 
System (FARS)        
Trucks Involved in Fatal 
Accidents (TIFA)        
Large Truck Crash Causation 
Study (LTCCS)        
Other (as specified above) 
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Question 17: If an accident database is established, what approach does your 
company prefer? 
a)  
Voluntary 
Mandatory 
 
Why? 
  
b)  
Industry sponsored 
Government sponsored 
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Why?  
 
c)  
A new process / database 
Build on existing programs (i.e. add fields to Form 5800.1 and increase reporting 
compliance) 
 
Why? 
  
d) Other (optional)  
Describe any alternative you have in mind. Also list the pros and cons for this option 
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Question 18: Would your company be willing to provide data to populate a 
voluntary program? 
Yes 
Most likely 
Probably not 
No 
Question 19: What is your biggest concern with participating in a voluntary 
program? 
 
Confidentiality 
Paperwork 
Liability Concerns 
Cost 
Other:  
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Question 20: In your opinion, what percentage of highway, bulk-tank, hazmat 
accidents would go unreported if a voluntary, industry-based data collection 
strategy was adopted? 
 
Question 21: What measures would you recommend to increase the 
probability that crash and tank damage information is reported? 
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HM-07 Shipper Survey 
 
Please provide your contact information. This will allow us to contact you in case we 
need to better understand the answers you provide. 
Required fields are denoted with an *. Note: Your responses will remain confidential. 
Your contact information will not be used for any purpose beyond this survey. Only 
aggregate information, which cannot be tied back to an individual or a company, will be 
reported.  
 
Check this box if you would like to receive a copy of the survey results 
 
Organization Name *  
 
Prefix [Mr., Mrs., Ms., Dr., etc] *  
 
Contact Name *  
 
Email *  
 
Phone Number *  
 
Street Address:  
 
City:  
 
State:  
 
Zip:  
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Question 1: What type(s) of hazardous materials do you ship in bulk by highway? 
Class 2:  
Division 2.1 - Flammable gases 
Division 2.2 - Non-flammable, non-toxic gases 
Division 2.3 - Toxic gases 
Class 3:  
Class 3 - Flammable liquids (and Combustible liquids) 
Class 4:  
Division 4.1 - Flammable solids 
Division 4.2 - Spontaneously combustible materials 
Division 4.3 - Water-reactive substances / Dangerous when wet materials 
Class 5:  
Division 5.1 - Oxidizing substances 
Division 5.2 - Organic peroxides 
Class 6:  
Division 6.1 - Toxic substances 
Division 6.2 - Infectious Substances 
 
Class 8:  
Class 8 - Corrosive substances 
Class 9:  
Class 9 - Miscellaneous hazardous materials / products, substances or organisms 
Question 2: Approximately how many highway shipments of hazardous materials 
using bulk tanks in North America does your company make in a year? 
Please select the category representing your best estimate:  
1 - 99 shipments per year 
100 - 999 shipments per year 
1,000 - 9,999 shipments per year 
10,000 - 50,000 shipments per year 
Over 50,000 shipments per year 
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Question 3: What types of bulk tanks do you typically use for highway shipments? 
Please check all that apply:  
 
Atmospheric Pressure Cargo Tank (MC 306 or DOT 406) 
Low Pressure Cargo Tank (MC 307 or DOT 407) 
Corrosive Cargo Tank (MC 312 or DOT 412) 
High Pressure Gas Cargo Tank (MC 331) 
Cryogenic Liquid Cargo Tank (MC 338) 
Asphalt Cargo Tank 
Compressed Gas Tube Trailer 
Non-Pressurized UN Portable Tank 
Pressurized UN Portable Tank 
Cryogenic UN Portable Tank 
Non-Specification Tank For Combustible Materials 
Other:  
Question 4: Approximately what percentage of your highway shipments are made 
using the following kinds of fleets: 
  
Tanks 
owned by 
a lessor 
Tanks 
owned by 
the shipper 
Tanks 
owned by 
a carrier 
Other 
(Please 
rate here 
and specify 
below)  
 
0% - 19% 
      
20% - 39% 
      
40% - 59% 
      
60% - 79% 
      
80% - 99% 
      
100% 
      
Other:  
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Question 5: Do you specify additional design features above and beyond the 
minimum federal requirements for bulk tanks used to transport hazardous 
materials? 
Yes - We have a company policy that identifies additional requirements 
Yes - We consider additional design features offered 
No 
Other:  
Question 6: If yes, do you require the vehicles/cargo tanks used for your shipments 
to have any of the following: 
Please check all that apply 
 
Accident Damage Protection Measures: In addition to those specified in 49 CFR.  
Fitting Protection Beyond Federal Standards 
Additional Shell Protection 
Increased Tank Wall Thickness 
Other:  
Accident Prevention Measures:  
Lowered center of gravity 
Wider wheel-base 
Electronic stability control (ESC) 
Truck-mounted roll stability control (RSC) 
Trailer-mounted roll stability control (RSC) 
Improved Brakes (including disc and hybrid drum-disc brake configurations) 
Electronic Data Recorders (EDRs) 
Tire Pressure Monitors 
Automated Transmissions 
Speed Limiters 
Truck-Specific Navigation Aids for Risk Avoidance (including Global Position 
System (GPS) navigation aids) 
Truck Conspicuity & Enhanced Lighting/Signalling, beyond that which is 
required by regulation 
None 
Other:  
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Question 7: From your experience, what are the best ways to reduce the risk of a 
spill and/or the volume of lading released in a crash? 
 
 
Question 8: From your experience, what are the most effective means to improve 
accident damage protection? 
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Question 9: From your experience, what parts of the tank are most likely to be 
damaged in the following accident scenarios? 
Include parts that are typically damaged, whether or not they result in lading loss 
 
In an incident in which the bulk tank experiences a rollover: 
 
 
In an incident in which there are one or more additional vehicles involved in a crash: 
 
 
In an incident in which the vehicle transporting hazardous materials is the only vehicle 
involved and it does not rollover:  
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Question 10: From your experience, what components of the tank are most likely to 
be involved in the release of lading if the part is damaged? 
In an incident in which the bulk tank experiences a rollover: 
 
 
In an incident in which there are one or more additional vehicles involved in a crash: 
 
 
In an incident in which the vehicle transporting hazardous materials is the only vehicle 
involved and it does not rollover: 
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Question 11: Please rate your company’s interest in being able to evaluate the effect 
each of the following items have on managing risks in hazardous materials 
transportation: 
  
Not 
Interested 
Somewhat 
Interested 
Interested 
Very 
Interested  
Roll Stability Devices (i.e. 
electronic stability control 
or roll stability control 
devices) 
      
Accident Prevention 
Devices (i.e. improved 
brakes, side object 
detection system, 
increased night-time 
visibility devices) 
      
Accident Protection 
Devices (i.e. rollover 
damage protection device, 
rear-end tank protection, 
stop-valves and shear 
sections) 
      
Wet Lines 
      
Valve Design and 
Location        
Tank Shape 
      
Tank Wall Thickness and 
material 
strength/toughness 
      
Baffle and Bulkhead 
Location       
Other -1 (Please rate here 
and specify below)       
Other -2 (Please rate here 
and specify below)       
Other -3 (Please rate here 
and specify below)       
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Other - 1: Please specify here.  
Other - 2: Please specify here.  
Other - 3: Please specify here.  
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Question 12: How useful is the following accident data information for your 
business? 
 
  
Not Useful 
Somewhat 
Useful 
Useful 
Very 
Useful  
Crash Root Cause (i.e. 
driver condition, location 
constraints)  
      
Crash Description (i.e. time 
of crash, number of 
vehicles) 
      
Package Design 
Information (i.e. head 
thickness, cross-section 
shape and dimensions) 
      
Package Damage/Rupture 
Information (i.e. damage 
location, damage type, size 
and depth of damage, wall 
thickness of damaged 
cargo tank) 
      
Injury/Fatality Information 
(i.e. Number of fatalities 
due to released lading) 
      
Accident Costs (i.e. repair 
costs, clean-up costs)       
Other -1 (Please rate here 
and specify below)       
Other - 2 (Please rate here 
and specify below)       
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Not Useful 
Somewhat 
Useful 
Useful 
Very 
Useful  
Other - 3 (Please rate here 
and specify below)       
 
Other - 1: Please specify here.  
 
Other - 2: Please specify here.  
 
Other - 3: Please specify here.  
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Question 13: What accident data do you currently collect regarding crashes 
involving the cargo tanks you use? 
 
 
Question 14: What challenges do you have in collecting data regarding crashes 
involving the cargo tanks you use? 
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Question 15: With which of the following databases is your company familiar? 
Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS) 
Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting System (HMIRS) 
Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA) 
Large Truck Crash Causation Study (LTCCS) 
Other:  
 
Question 16: Of the databases you selected in question 15, how useful are they in 
addressing industry issues? 
  
Not 
Applicable 
Not Very 
Useful 
Somewhat 
Useful 
Useful 
Very 
Useful  
Motor Carrier 
Management 
Information System 
(MCMIS): 
       
Hazardous Materials 
Incident Reporting 
System (HMIRS): 
       
Fatality Analysis 
Reporting System 
(FARS) 
       
Trucks Involved in 
Fatal Accidents 
(TIFA) 
       
Large Truck Crash 
Causation Study 
(LTCCS) 
       
Other (as specified 
above)        
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Question 17: If a cargo tank accident performance database is established, what 
approach does your company prefer? 
a)  
Voluntary 
Mandatory 
Why? 
  
 
b)  
Industry sponsored 
Government sponsored 
Why? 
  
 
c)  
A new process / database 
Build on existing programs (i.e. add fields to Form 5800.1 and increase reporting 
compliance) 
Why?  
 
 
d) Other (optional)  
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Describe any alternative you have in mind. Also list the pros and cons for this option 
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Question 18: Would your company be willing to provide data to populate a 
voluntary program? 
Yes 
Most likely 
Probably not 
No 
 
Question 19: What is your biggest concern with participating in a voluntary 
program? 
Confidentiality 
Paperwork 
Liability Concerns 
Cost 
Other:  
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Question 20: In your opinion, what percentage of highway, bulk-tank, hazmat 
accidents would go unreported if a voluntary, industry-based data collection 
strategy was adopted? 
 
 
 
Question 21: What measures would you recommend to increase the probability that 
crash and tank damage information is reported? 
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HM-07 Researcher Survey 
 
Please provide your contact information. This will allow us to contact you in case we 
need to better understand the answers you provide.  
Required fields are denoted with an *. Note: Your responses will remain confidential. 
Your contact information will not be used for any purpose beyond this survey. Only 
aggregate information, which cannot be tied back to an individual or a company, will be 
reported. 
 
Check this box if you would like to receive a copy of the survey results 
 
Organization Name: *  
 
Prefix [Mr., Mrs., Ms., Dr., etc.]: *  
 
Contact Name: *  
 
Email: *  
 
Phone Number: *  
 
Street Address:  
 
City:  
 
State:  
 
Zip:  
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Question 1: What is the primary focus of your research? 
 
 
Question 2: How many years of research experience do you have?  
 
 
Question 3: With which types of bulk tanks are you most interested? 
MC 306 / DOT 406 
MC 307 / DOT 407 
MC 312 / DOT 412 
MC 331 
MC 338 
Asphalt Tanks 
Tube Trailers 
Intermodal Containers 
Non-Specification Tanks For Combustible Materials 
Other:  
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Question 4: Does your organization maintain any data regarding cargo tank 
accident performance measures? 
Yes 
No 
 
Question 5: If yes, what accident performance measures do you record? 
If easier, please include a link to variable descriptions in the space below or email 
variable descriptions to survey@trbhazmatresearch.org 
 
 
Question 6: What aspects of cargo tank accident performance does your research 
focus on? 
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Question 7: Does your organization use any of the following accident databases to 
evaluate cargo tank performance? 
Please check the ones that your company uses: 
Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS) 
Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting System (HMIRS) 
Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA) 
Large Truck Crash Causation Study (LTCCS) 
Other:  
 
Question 8: Of the databases you selected in question 7, how effective are they in 
addressing industry issues? 
  
Not 
Applicable 
Not 
Effective 
Somewhat 
Effective 
Effective 
Very 
Effective  
Motor Carrier 
Management 
Information System 
(MCMIS): 
       
Hazardous Materials 
Incident Reporting 
System (HMIRS): 
       
Fatality Analysis 
Reporting System 
(FARS) 
       
Trucks Involved in 
Fatal Accidents 
(TIFA) 
       
Large Truck Crash 
Causation Study 
(LTCCS) 
       
Other (as specified 
above)        
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Question 9: What accident data information would be most useful for your 
research? 
Please rate the following kinds of accident data: 
  
Not 
Interested 
Somewhat 
Interested 
Interested 
Very 
Interested  
Crash Root Cause (i.e. 
driver condition, 
location constraints) 
      
Crash Description (i.e. 
time of crash, number 
of vehicles) 
      
Package Design 
Information (i.e. head 
thickness, cross-section 
shape and dimensions) 
      
Package 
Damage/Rupture 
Information (i.e. 
damage location, 
damage type, size and 
depth of damage, wall 
thickness of damaged 
cargo tank) 
      
Injury/Fatality 
Information (i.e. 
Number of fatalities due 
to released lading)  
      
Accident Costs (i.e. 
repair costs, clean-up 
costs) 
      
Other - 1 (Please rate 
here and specify below)       
Other - 2 (Please rate 
here and specify below)       
Other - 3 (please rate 
here and specify below)       
Other -1: Please specify here.  
Other -2: Please specify here.  
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Other -3: Please specify here.  
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Question 10: Please rate the following Package Damage / Rupture Information 
fields that might be useful for your research: 
  
Not 
Relevant 
Somewhat 
Relevant 
Relevant 
Very 
Relevant  
Location of initial point of impact 
      
Dimensions of dent, crack, gouge, 
puncture, or rupture at initial point of 
impact 
      
Shell or head thickness at initial point of 
impact       
Cause(s) of lading loss (i.e. shell 
puncture, bottom fitting damage, rupture 
due to fire) 
      
Location of crack, gouge, puncture, or 
rupture where the most hazardous 
material spilled 
      
Dimensions of crack, gouge, puncture, 
or rupture where the most hazardous 
material spilled 
      
Shell or head thickness at location 
where the most hazardous material was 
spilled 
      
Location of damage resulting in 
hazardous materials spill       
Dimensions of of crack, gouge, 
puncture, or rupture where the most 
hazardous material spilled 
      
Shell or head thickness at damage 
locations resulting in a hazardous 
materials spill 
      
Location of damage that did not result 
in a spill       
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Not 
Relevant 
Somewhat 
Relevant 
Relevant 
Very 
Relevant  
Dimensions of damage at non-spill 
locations       
Shell or head thickness at non-spill 
damage locations       
Whether the damage occurred near a 
previous repair        
Whether the previous repair influenced 
the structural integrity of the tank        
Whether the crack or tear occurred 
because of damage to the fitting or 
appurtenance 
      
Location of damaged fitting 
      
Type of fitting damage 
      
Whether the cargo tank was repaired to 
specification, repaired to non-
specification, or scrapped 
      
Other - 1 (Please rate here and specify 
below):       
Other -2 (Please rate here and specify 
below):       
Other -3 (Please rate here and specify 
below):       
 
Other -1: Please specify here.  
Other-2: Please specify here.  
Other-3: Please specify here.  
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Question 11: Please rate the following package design information that might be 
useful for your research: 
  
Not 
Relevant 
Somewhat 
Relevant 
Relevant 
Very 
Relevant  
Type(s) of roll stability 
devices       
Type(s) of accident 
protection devices       
Presence of wet lines 
      
Type of wet line 
construction       
Valve design and 
location        
Tank shape 
      
Tank wall thickness 
      
Baffle and bulkhead 
location       
Other -1 (Please rate 
here and specify below)       
Other -2 (Please rate 
here and specify below)       
Other -3 (Please rate 
here and specify below)       
Other -1: Please specify here.  
Other -2: Please specify here.  
Other -3: Please specify here.  
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Question 12: In your opinion, what are other aspects related to accident 
performance that a proposed cargo tank performance database could easily 
accommodate? 
 
 
Question 13: In addition to cargo tank performance, what additional fields would be 
required for the aspects listed above? 
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Question 14: Based on your knowledge and research, what are the best ways to 
reduce the probability of a spill or the volume of lading released assuming a crash 
has occurred? 
 
 
Question 15: From your experience, what are the most effective means to improve 
accident damage performance? 
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Question 16: What parts of the tank are most likely to be damaged in the following 
accident scenarios? 
Include parts that are typically damaged, whether or not they result in lading loss. 
 
In an incident in which the cargo tank experiences a rollover: 
 
 
In an incident in which there are one or more additional vehicles involved in a crash: 
 
 
In an incident in which the vehicle transporting hazardous materials is the only vehicle 
involved and it does not rollover:  
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Question 17: What part(s) of the tank are most likely to be involved in the release of 
lading if the part is damaged? 
In an incident in which the cargo tank experiences a rollover: 
 
 
In an incident in which there are one or more additional vehicles involved in a crash: 
 
 
In an incident in which the vehicle transporting hazardous materials is the only vehicle 
involved and it does not rollover: 
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Question 18: If a cargo tank accident performance database is established, what 
approach would you prefer? 
a)  
Voluntary 
Mandatory 
Why? 
  
 
b)  
Industry sponsored 
Government sponsored 
Why?  
 
 
c)  
A new process / database 
Build on existing programs (i.e. add fields to Form 5800.1 and increase reporting 
compliance 
Why? 
  
 
d) Other (optional)  
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Describe any alternative you have in mind. Also list the pros and cons for this option. 
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Question 19: In your opinion, what percentage of accidents would go unreported if a 
voluntary, industry-based data collection strategy was adopted? 
 
 
Question 20: What measures would you recommend to increase the probability that 
crash and tank damage information is reported? 
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APPENDIX B 
LEVELS OF DATA REFINEMENT 
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APPENDIX C 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HIGHWAY AND RAIL HAZARDOUS MATERIAL 
TRANSPORTATION AFFECTING DEVELOPMENT OF A BULK PACKAGE 
ACCIDENT PERFORMANCE DATABASE 
In several places in this report, the industry-sponsored Railway Supply Institute (RSI) 
- Association of American Railroads (AAR) Railroad Tank Car Safety Research and Test 
Project, Tank Car Accident Database (TCAD) has been referred to as an approach that 
could be adapted to achieve similar database objectives for highway, hazardous material, 
bulk packages.  Although much can be learned from the approach used for TCAD, there are 
also numerous differences between rail and highway transport that should be understood 
when trying to develop a comparable database for highway bulk packages.  These differences 
are technical, operational and institutional in nature with the result that implementation of 
such a data-collection program for highway is considerably more complex than simply 
adapting the TCAD and using its procedures.  These differences are considered in this 
Appendix and include: 
1. Industry structure;  
2. Trade associations; 
3. Regulatory agencies;  
4. Existing databases; 
5. Accident rates; and 
6. Litigation and regulation. 
Industry Structure 
Number of Companies 
When the number of companies in an industry is small, the ability to achieve 
consensus on cooperative action is likely to be easier, especially if the interests of all the 
companies are similar.  For example, within the AAR, there are seven Class I freight 
railroads that collectively handle 90% of the hazardous materials transported by rail, and six 
RSI tank car suppliers.  This means that only 13 companies need to negotiate the terms of 
participation in an accident performance data collection program.  On the other hand, the 
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highway hazardous materials transportation industry consists of approximately 150 of the 
200 National Tank Truck Carriers (NTTC) association members that handle approximately 
80% of the hazardous material shipped in bulk tanks on highways in North America. These 
carriers are supplied by 12 cargo-tank suppliers represented by Truck Trailer Manufacturers 
Association (TTMA), and numerous ISO tank builders overseas.  This means that over 170 
companies, some of them international, would need to cooperate to develop a database. 
Although more partners means that costs will be shared over a larger base thereby reducing 
the cost to each individual company, there are diminishing returns to these savings as the 
number increases, and this may be more than offset by the increased diversity of viewpoints 
and correspondingly greater difficulty in achieving consensus on decisions.   
Size of Companies 
Class I railroads are large, complex organizations that are geographically dispersed 
but centrally controlled.  Larger companies in general can cost-justify more specialization in 
personnel and resources and there may be other economies of scale as well.  Because of the 
complexity of their operations and their extensive interchange of freight traffic, railroads 
were early users of centralized computer systems for data management and have developed 
large, corporate information technology (IT) systems to manage and support these activities.  
Among these are dedicated systems for compliance with DOT Form 5800.1 reporting 
requirements.  Data from around the system are locally entered and then received and 
consolidated at headquarters for submittal to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration (PHMSA).  Built into these processes are data checking routines that help 
ensure the integrity, accuracy and consistency of the data submitted.  By contrast, most 
highway carriers are often much smaller companies that may be unable to cost-justify 
investment in such systems.  Consequently more manual procedures are used involving 
personnel who may have a number of other responsibilities and are less experienced with 
PHMSA reporting requirements and the data submittal process. 
Infrastructure Ownership and Interchange 
The railroads own the infrastructure on which hazardous materials are transported 
with different railroads owning and operating different portions of the North American rail 
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network.  Commodities are often shipped from an origination point located on one railroad, 
to a destination point on another.  A requisite for such a system of interchange is consistent 
mechanical standards for rolling stock operating over this network.  The AAR has developed 
and maintains an extensive set of mechanical design interchange standards so that rolling 
stock, including tank cars, are compatible with the infrastructure and other rolling stock, 
throughout the entire network.  Conformance with these standards is required for all rolling 
stock operating in unrestricted interchange service in North America.  Within this context, 
tank car standards are maintained by a technical committee involving railroads, car-builders, 
shippers and regulators.  This committee is continually evaluating the performance of 
various tank car specifications and frequently poses questions to the RSI-AAR Project that 
are addressed using analyses of TCAD.  As a consequence all the major stakeholders in 
TCAD understand its value to the industry.   
By contrast, highway carriers use public infrastructure to transport bulk hazardous 
materials packages.  There is no particular requirement for interchange, so a single carrier 
can transport a package from origin to destination without involving other carriers. The 
design of the bulk packages must comply with US DOT regulations but there is little need or 
incentive to collaborate with other carriers on package design practices.  As a result, the 
highway industry has developed less of an institutional culture of collaboration with other 
carriers that would encourage participation in a voluntary program of data collection. 
Trade Associations 
There are two partner associations involved in the railroad tank car accident 
database: the AAR and the RSI.  AAR is a multi-facetted industry association but two of its 
key functions are of direct relevance to its support of TCAD. The first is that it “facilitates 
the operations, safety, security, and research initiatives” supporting the freight railroad 
industry.  The second, as referenced above, is that the AAR serves as the principal standard 
setting organization for North American railroad rolling stock. 
With regard to the first, the AAR has had a long-standing cooperative research 
program, whose principal objective is to improve rail safety, efficiency and reliability.  In this 
context the AAR's participation in the RSI-AAR tank car safety research project is 
considered a logical element of this larger effort.  Regarding the second function mentioned, 
the AAR maintains an extensive set of mechanical design and condition standards for all 
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freight cars in interchange service, including tank cars.  Furthermore, because of the 
extensive transactions involved with daily interchange of the approximately 1.5 million 
railcars operating in North America, the rail industry has developed the Universal Machine 
Language Equipment Register (UMLER), which is a comprehensive database containing 
detailed information on numerous design parameters of railcars.  Within UMLER, tank cars 
are one of several car-type groups with a dedicated set of data parameters and more than 90 
variables pertinent to tank cars are recorded therein.  Although UMLER was not specifically 
created to provide safety design data for TCAD, RSI and AAR have long recognized its 
value as a consolidated source of such information and have added or modified variables to 
UMLER to facilitate ongoing monitoring and analysis of tank car safety design features.  
RSI is an industry organization that, among other things, supports development of 
industry standards through committees and funded research projects, and advocates on 
behalf of its members during the regulatory and legislative process.  Its members include 
companies of all sizes that supply materials, including tank cars, to the rail industry.  The 
tank car industry has been working with the rail industry developing and maintaining tank 
car design standards for over a century, well before the federal government had a role.  Tank 
car companies are important members of RSI.  Due to the particular significance of 
hazardous material transportation safety in their businesses, they have long recognized the 
importance of having accurate, reliable information about the safety performance of their 
assets, hence their support of the RSI-AAR TCAD.  RSI, along with AAR, also makes 
frequent use of TCAD to support comments on proposed legislation of regulations. 
The highway transport industry is more diffuse.  It is served by several different 
associations, including the: TTMA, International Tank Container Organization (ITCO), 
NTTC, American Trucking Associations (ATA), and numerous state-specific trucking 
associations.  Companies involved in the transportation of hazardous materials by highway 
may have membership in one or more of these organizations; however, there is no single 
organization that encompasses the entire industry.    
 TTMA is an association whose 51 members consist of firms that manufacture 
large truck or tractor pulled trailers, intermodal containers, or cargo tanks.  The 
association disseminates information pertaining to truck trailers, cargo tanks and 
intermodal containers to its members, undertakes projects that further the 
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interests of their member companies and the industry, and advocate on behalf of 
them.    
 ITCO is an international association focused on promoting the use of intermodal 
containers, and addressing safety, regulatory, technical and environmental issues 
regarding them.  ITCO is comprised of 120 members including tank container 
operators, leasing companies, manufacturers, service providers and inspectors.   
 NTTC is a North American trade association whose approximately 200 members 
include carriers specializing in bulk transportation of commodities.  NTTC’s 
main goals are to disseminate legislative, regulatory, and operational 
developments in the tank truck industry, advocate on behalf of its members 
during the regulatory and legislative process, act as a representative of the 
industry to the public, and provide training seminars and other networking 
events that promote the development of healthy business practices. 
 ATA is a national trade association that advocates on behalf of its 37,000 
member motor carriers during the regulatory and legislative process, and 
provides expert services regarding regulatory policy, economic and statistical 
data, hazardous materials and environmental regulations, taxes and registration, 
among others.  The ATA Safety Management Council focuses on advancing risk 
management strategies and other policies related to safety.  The ATA American 
Transportation Research Institute conducts research in the following areas:  
– Commercial drivers 
– Congestion and mobility 
– Economic analysis 
– Environment 
– Safety 
– Security 
– Technology 
– Transportation Infrastructure 
– Trucking Industry Operations 
 State-specific trucking associations exist in all 50 states to promote and protect 
the interests of the trucking industry at the state level.   
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Like railroads, highway carriers are strongly committed to safe transportation of 
hazardous materials, but the larger number of companies, associations, standard setting 
organizations and other parties involved, means that achieving consensus is likely to be more 
challenging.  In part the greater number of entities involved will require greater 
organizational effort, but there are also likely to be more diverse viewpoints and objectives 
among the different stakeholders, meaning that reaching agreement on key decisions will be 
more difficult.  
Regulatory Agencies 
Rail transportation of hazardous materials is primarily regulated by two U.S. 
Department of Transportation Administrations: the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) 
and PHMSA.  These two agencies maintain databases on train accidents and hazardous 
materials releases, respectively and they coordinate their activities regarding tank cars and rail 
transport of hazardous materials.  Compliance with the reporting requirements for each is 
believed to be good. 
The transportation of hazardous materials by highway, in contrast, is regulated by 
state-specific administrations, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), 
PHMSA, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).   Coordination 
between these agencies regarding individual companies is somewhat limited, consequently 
there are overlapping reporting requirements.  This increases the burden on companies with 
an already limited capacity to absorb the corresponding costs.   
Existing Databases 
The railroad industry has several well-established databases from which electronic 
information can be obtained in the event of an accident.  TRAIN II waybills, the AAR’s 
Railinc railcar movement database, contains commodity and other types of shipping 
information. UMLER, the rail industry’s equipment inventory database, has already been 
described and contains extensive design information for tank cars.  Both of these data sets 
are available for assembling accident data along with the FRA’s accident database which 
records information on accident circumstances.  Although exact statistics are not available, it 
is believed that this data collection program has a high rate of compliance.  It is publicly 
accessible on-line making it relatively simple to use as input for development of TCAD 
records.   Due to the existence of these data sources, the principal additional information the 
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TCAD must collect concerns descriptions of the damage incurred by the tank car, which are 
primarily received from the car owners.  The majority of these records come from RSI 
members who are participants in TCAD.   
With regard to highway bulk package transportation, information regarding 
commodities transported, and the type of bulk package used do not exist in an easily 
accessible format.  Although accident information is collected through police records, in a 
recent 7-month period, there were a surprisingly large number of accidents (170 or 
approximately 18%) that were not included in MCMIS.  Furthermore, compliance with 
PHMSA’s Form 5800.1 remains poor (this study estimated that approximately 66 to 87 
percent of accidents in which a bulk package was damaged were not reported to PHMSA).  
Therefore, if an accident damage database were to be established, much more information 
would need to be developed from various sources, rather than simply accessing and 
organizing information from existing databases.  Furthermore, compliance with Form 5800.1 
reporting requirements would almost certainly need to be improved in order to develop a 
statistically representative database. 
Source of Damage Information 
Information for the TCAD is assembled from damage reports developed by a 
relatively limited number of tank car repair shops.  These shops employ specialized 
personnel and are either owned by or have contractual relationships with one or more of the 
tank car companies that sponsor TCAD.  For their part, railroads have specialized personnel 
and internal processes for evaluating accident causes and consequences, and reporting them 
to the FRA, akin to their reporting of PHMSA form 5800.1. 
Motor vehicle damage repair infrastructure and processes are more dispersed and 
diffuse and consequently so would be the opportunities to collect damage information.  
Furthermore, information on many incidents may not be available from repair facilities due 
to cargo tanks that are scrapped on account of economics before reaching a repair facility.  
For the highway mode, it may be more important to record information in the field at or 
near the site of the accident. 
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Accident Rate 
An examination of PHMSA’s HMIRS over the five-year period, 2006 through 2011, 
found that 1,345 highway accidents involving hazardous materials bulk packages had been 
reported with an average release of 2,253 gallons.  During the same time period, 181 rail 
accidents involving hazardous materials occurred, resulted in an average release of 12,566 
gallons.  Compared to rail accidents, highway accidents involving bulk packages are more 
frequent, but, on average result in smaller releases.  Although the higher frequency of 
highway accident-caused releases means that a database could become populated at a more 
rapid rate than the rail database, it also means that the compliance burden will be greater.   
Litigation and Regulation 
The tank car accident database has been supported and developed by the railroad 
industry for over 40 years.  During that time, only one request for data related to litigation 
has been received.  That request came from one of the project sponsors and the data were 
used in its defense.  As discussed elsewhere in this report, the RSI-AAR Tank Car Safety 
Project conducts statistical analyses using TCAD and publishes reports based on the results.  
These reports are subject to critical, technical review prior to publication and are used by 
industry to inform their decision-making regarding tank car safety improvements.  In 
addition to the industry's use, these reports are often used by regulatory agencies in federal 
rule-makings, further enhancing their credibility.  This combination of pro-active use by 
industry, combined with government agency review and acceptance helps support industry 
positions in litigation proceedings. 
Despite this historical experience in the rail industry, companies involved in highway 
transport of hazardous materials and the trade associations representing them have 
expressed concern that the data collected to evaluate highway bulk package performance in 
accidents might be used against them in litigation.  A related concern is that the data would 
be used to the disadvantage of highway carriers in regulatory proposal development. 
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APPENDIX D 
OPTION EVALUATION TOOL 
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APPENDIX E 
PILOT STUDY DATA COLLECTION TOOL 
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APPENDIX F 
LINKS TO NEWSPAPER ARTICLES 
PHMSA ID: E-2011030511 
Vapor Valve Vented 
SP Truck stopped at railroad crossing due to DOT requirements  
when ov rear-ended him. Shut-Off Valve must have been impacted 
as vapor escaped but driver shut it off and vapor dissipated by the 
wind. Road was closed for 40 minutes by police as a precaution. 
http://www.lebanon-express.com/news/local/article_983a213a-4514-11e0-80aa-
001cc4c03286.html 
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xhbt9g_car-rear-ends-propane-tanker_news 
PHMSA ID: E-2011030262 
Piping or Fittings Torn Off or Damaged 
Bulk petroleum transport truck was involved in 
an accident.  No other vehicles involved.  Truck 
went thru the guard rail and down an 
embankment.  No product was realeased from 
the cargo tanks but the saddle tank on the truck 
was damaged and realeased approximatly 80 
gallons of clear diesel.  This was cleaned up with 
spill pads and an excavation of about 2 yards of 
contaimanated soil. 
http://www.columbian.com/news/2011/mar/05/vancouver-trucker-escapes-injury-fuel-
tanker-crash/ 
http://www.columbian.com/news/2011/mar/05/vancouver-trucker-escapes-injury-fuel-
tanker-crash/ 
http://www.hoodrivernews.com/archives/Story.aspx/6977/photo-of-the-day-for-march-4-
2011-truck-crash-closes-right-lane-of-i-84-at-exit-63?loc=top 
PHMSA ID: I-2011040169 
Tank Shell Crushed 
(INSURANCE 1ST REPORT INCLUDED)  1 - DRIVER 
PULLING A TRUCK AND TRAILER COME INTO A TURN 
ABOUT APPROACHING CITY TO FAST - WITH HIS SPEED 
AND HITTING A CURB  IT OVERTURNED THE TRAILER 
WHICH CAME UNHOOKED FROM TRUCK. DRIVER 
CALLED 911  THEN DISPATCH - DISPATCH CONTACTED 
ME AND I CALLED OUR INSURANCE COMPANY  E.P.A. 
ARIZONA  NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER.  2 - TANK ON 
TRAILER CRACKED ALONG FRONT & REAR SEAMS - 
RELEASING A LITTLE PRODUCT FROM EACH 
COMPARTMENT - IT WAS ON IT'S SIDE FOR ABOUT 4 
HOURS. (PHOTO'S INCLUDED)  3 - 4 HRS -  4 - FIRE DEPT. 
PLUGGED CRACKES THE BEST THEY COULD  UNTIL WE 
COULD GET TRAILED PUMPED OUT & TURNED BACK 
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UPRIGHT. 
http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/03/05/20110305arizona-tanker-spill-closes-
road-brk.html#ixzz1gXXqprWO 
http://www.dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1086&ArticleID=91324 
http://www.abc15.com/dpp/news/region_northern_az/other/tanker-causes-gas-spill-after-
arizona-89-rollover#ixzz1gXYuamZG 
PHMSA ID: I-2011040459 
Pressure Relief 
Valve or Device 
- Reclosing Vented 
UNSECURED RAIN-DRAIN (HOSE) FLAPPING IN HIS RIGHT 
REAR-VIEW MIRROR. 
 CARGO ESCAPING FROM THE PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE 
LOCATED IN THE DOME-LID OF THE TRAILER.  
ACCORDING TO PLANT SCALES  - 16 000 LBS OF CARGO (1 
3000 GALLONS) WAS NOT RECOVERED.  
THE DAMAGED TRACTOR AND TRAILER WERE 
DELIVERED BY WRECKER SOMETIME PRIOR TO THAT.    IT 
SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE CORPORATE EHS 
MANAGER ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT CHEMTREC THREE 
TIMES WHILE EN ROUTE TO THE ACCIDENT AT 12:45  12:50  
AND 13:18. ON ALL THREE OCCASIONS A RECORDED 
MESSAGE SAID  ALL AGENTS ARE BUSY  PLEASE HOLD FOR 
THE NEXT AVAILABLE AGENT  AFTER WHICH RECORDED 
MUSIC BEGAN PLAYING. DUE TO INCOMING TELEPHONE 
TRAFFIC AND NEAR VEHICULAR TRAFFIC  CONTACT WITH 
AN  AGENT  WAS NOT ESTABLISHED. 
http://ftstage.sx.atl.publicus.com/article/20110308/NEWS/110309843?Title=Chemical-
tanker-truck-overturns 
http://ftstage.sx.atl.publicus.com/apps/pbcs.dll/gallery?Site=FT&Date=20110307&Catego
ry=PHOTOS&ArtNo=307009998&Ref=PH&Params=Itemnr=2 
PHMSA ID: I-2011050057 
THE DRIVER WAS CONDUCTING ROUTINE RESIDENTIAL 
FILLS WITH #2 HEATING OIL IN THE TOWN OF 
VASSALBORO. DURING CONDITIONS BECAME SUDDENLY 
ICY WITH FREEZING RAIN. ALTHOUGH PROCEEDING AT 
THE SPEED LIMIT  THE DRIVER LOST CONTROL OF THE 
TRUCK AND OVERTURNED IN THE ROADSIDE DITCH. OIL 
WAS RELEASED IN THE RIGHTING OF THE TRUCK. THE 
MAINE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
WAS AT THE (HAZMAT) SITE AND DIRECTED RECOVERY OF 
THE TRUCK AND CLEANUP. Yes 800 LGA 
http://www.wabi.tv/news/18462/850-gallons-of-heating-oil-spills-after-tanker-rolls-over 
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http://www.kjonline.com/news/clean-up-continues-on-nelson-road-spill_2011-03-07.html 
PHMSA ID: I-2011040233 
Tank Shell Bent 
A FOLDED PIECE ON FRONT COMPARTMENT TO LEAK AT 
A VERY SLOW RATE UNTIL THE VAC TRUCK COULD EMPTY 
IT. ESTIMATED AT 250 GALLONS. SPILL WAS ONTO DIRT IN 
LOWER AREA WITH NO ACCESS TO WATER OR DRAINS. 
MICRO BLAZE AND FOAM CONTAINED FUMES.  
 
http://www.kltv.com/Global/story.asp?S=14207610 
http://kygl.com/tanker-truck-accident-forces-school-closing/ 
http://www.ktre.com/story/14208340/gasoline-tanker-crash-closes-parts-of-highway-59-in-
texarkana?redirected=true 
PHMSA ID: I-2011050378 
VESSEL REMAINED INTACT. MINOR RELEASE DURING 
PRODUCT TRANSFER AND VEHICLE RECOVERY-30 GALS & -
10 
Yes 30 LGA 
 
http://articles.courant.com/2011-03-08/news/hc-tanker-crash-0309-20110308_1_leaks-
fuel-tanker-crash-tanker-truck 
http://www.myrecordjournal.com/talkaboutit/article_794a4aa8-4a04-11e0-be62-
001cc4c03286.html#.TukND7KismT 
http://www.wtnh.com/dpp/news/new_haven_cty/tanker-rollover-on-i-91-in-north-haven 
http://www.wtnh.com/dpp/news/new_haven_cty/tanker-rollover-on-i-91-in-north-haven 
http://www.myrecordjournal.com/talkaboutit/article_794a4aa8-4a04-11e0-be62-
001cc4c03286.html?mode=image&photo=0#.TukM7bKismQ 
http://www.wtnh.com/dpp/news/new_haven_cty/tanker-rollover-on-i-91-in-north-haven 
PHMSA ID: I-2011040341 
VEHICLE (A TRUCK MOUNTED CARGO TANK AND A 4 
AXLE CARGO TANK TRAILER) ROLLED.  
TRUCK MOUNTED CARGO TANK CARRYING DIESEL FUEL 
WAS TORN FROM MOUNTINGS DURING ROLLOVER  TANK 
LANDED UPSIDE DOWN APPROXIMATELY 15 YARDS FROM 
TRUCK CHASSIS AND CAB WHICH ALSO LANDED UPSIDE 
DOWN. THE TRUCK TANK RETAINED ALL PRODUCT.  
COMPLETE PRODUCT RECOVERY WAS NOT POSSIBLE BY 
ON SITE PERSONNEL RESULTING IN A 141 GALLON SPILL 
IN THE CRASH AREA.  
Yes 141 LGA 
THE TRAILER LANDED ON IT'S LEFT SIDE ON TOP OF THE 
CHASSIS DRIVE WHEELS WHICH PIERCED ON THE SIDE OF 
THE CARGO TANK CAUSING PRODUCT LEAKAGE.  
Yes 4031 LGA 
 
http://www.ktvb.com/news/local/Semi-rollover-has-I-84-closed-in-Elmore-County-
118139624.html 
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http://www.ktvb.com/news/local/Semi-rollover-has-I-84-closed-in-Elmore-County-
118139624.html?gallery=y&c=y&img=1#gallery-image 
PHMSA ID: I-2011030516 
WHEN HE LEFT THE ROAD HE MADE CONTACT WITH THE TAIL 
END OF AN UNOCCUPIED 4X4 PICK UP AND A HIGH PACKED 
SNOW BANK.  ONCE STOPPED 6 TO 10 CARS HIT OUR TRAILER  NO 
PRODUCT RELEASE. 
No 0 
http://www.kcra.com/r/27242922/detail.html 
PHMSA ID: I-2011060214 
TRUCK LEFT ROADWAY AND ROLLED OVER ON ITS SIDE. 
THERE WAS A SMALL CRACK IN THE TRAILER BUT NO 
PRODUCT WAS LEAKING. TRAILER CRACK WAS ON THE 
BULKHEAD SEAM AND WAS ON TOP OF THE TRAILER  LESS 
THAN 10 GALLONS WAS RELEASED 
Yes 10 LGA 
http://www.mtdemocrat.com/news/overturned-rig-carrying-5000-gallons-of-fuel-closes-
pleasant-valley-road/ 
http://www.mtdemocrat.com/news/overturned-rig-carrying-5000-gallons-of-fuel-closes-
pleasant-valley-road/ 
PHMSA ID: I-2011040497 
Loading 
or 
Unloadin
g Lines 
Torn Off 
or 
Damaged 
THE ACCIDENT DAMAGED THE 
LOADING LINES AND 
APPROXIMATELY 15 GALLONS OF 
GASOLINE WAS RELEASED. THE 
MEMPHIS FIRE DEPARTMENT 
HANDLED THE REMEDIATION. NO 
FURTHER ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
IS ANTICIPATED. Yes 15 
LG
A 
 
 No photos, see PHMSA incident report. 
PHMSA ID: I-2011050419 
Punctured 400 LGA 
 
http://thebatavian.com/howard-owens/tractor-trailer-and-multiple-car-accident-route-33-
and-bergen-road/25093 
http://thebatavian.com/howard-owens/fuel-truck-route-33-bergen-rolls-over-car-trapping-
woman-inside/25100 
http://thedailynewsonline.com/news/article_893cbb84-560d-11e0-9da7-
001cc4c03286.html?mode=story 
http://thebatavian.com/howard-owens/fuel-truck-route-33-bergen-rolls-over-car-trapping-
woman-inside/25100 
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http://thedailynewsonline.com/news/article_893cbb84-560d-11e0-9da7-
001cc4c03286.html?mode=story 
PHMSA ID: E-2011040367 
E-2011040367 Basic Material Structural 
The vehicle on the 
passenger side of the car 
and the unit rolled over 
and into a ditch on the 
side of the road.   
As a result of the accident  
and rollover the unit 
caught on fire.   
Yes 6500 LGA 
 
http://www.koco.com/news/27319620/detail.html 
http://www.koco.com/news/27319620/detail.html 
PHMSA Incident ID: I-2011040498 
Tank Shell Torn Off or Damaged 
UNIT ROLLED OVER AND 
WAS CONSUMED BY FIRE.  
MOST OF THE GAS ON THE 
TRAILER WAS CONSUMED 
BY THE FIRE. A SMALL 
AMOUNT WAS ABLE TO BE 
RELEASED AND WAS 
IMMEDIATELY CLEANED 
UP BY SWS 
ENVIRONMENTAL.  
Yes 7780 LGA 
http://www.wfaa.com/news/Deadly-wrong-way-tanker-truck-accident-118768599.html 
PHMSA Incident ID: I-2011040443 
Tank Head; Weld or Seam Ripped or Torn;  
THE TRUCK 
ENTERED A TURN 
AND ROLLED OVER 
CAUSING DAMAGE 
TO REAR PART OF 
TANK. A SEAM 
SEPARATED AND 
THE THE HEAD 
SUSTAINED A TEAR 
IN THE METAL 
CAUSING A 
RELEASE OF 
PROPANE.  
No 9500 LGA 
http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Tanker-fire-out-but-risk-remains-
1312267.php#ixzz1ge10qUp0 
http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Tanker-fire-out-but-risk-remains-1312267.php 
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PHMSA Incident ID: I-2011050420 
CASEY'S VEHICLE WAS TRAVELING EASTBOUND ON NE 
HWY 2 AND WAS MAKING A RIGHT HAND TURN ONTO NE 
HWY 67 WHEN OUR VEHICLE WAS STRUCK FROM BEHIND 
BY ANOTHER TRUCK. 
Yes 1731 LGA 
http://www.drunkdrivingfacts.net/car-accident-articles/dunbar-nebraska-fatal-semi-crash-
on-state-highway-67 
http://www.wowt.com/news/headlines/118945869.html 
http://www.ncnewspress.com/photos/x905911109/Photo-gallery-Fire-erupts-after-truck-
and-tanker-collision?foto=8  
PHMSA Incident ID: E-2011050047 
Piping or Fittings Torn Off or Damaged 
the trailer uncouple from the 
tractor.  The nose of the trailer 
hit the ground and sheared off 
the landing gear  front 
compartment pipe to discharge 
valve  and crunched the pump 
and piping thats used for above 
ground tanks pump off.  The 
trailer skidded for 100 yards on 
the concrete which ignited the 
gasoline that was in the front 
compartment pipe.   
No 3 LGA 
 
http://development.postbulletin.com/blogs/breaking_news/2011/04/07/interstate-694-
reopened-after-tanker-catches-fire/ 
http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2011/04/07/crash-closes-part-of-i-694-in-new-brighton/ 
PHMSA ID: I-2011070685 
Tank Shell Burst or Ruptured 
Apparently there was a rupture in the 
LRCG tank which was carrying 
approximately 8 500 gallons of 
gasoline and the tank ignited. The 
LRCG tractor  LRCG tank  the 
majority of its contents of gasoline and 
the tandem car carrier trailer were 
totally destroyed by the fire during the 
ensuing blaze.  
No 8500 LGA 
 
http://www2.wsav.com/news/2011/apr/07/15/fuel-truck-catches-fire-i-95-ar-1684215/ 
http://www.wtoc.com/Global/story.asp?S=14400509 
http://m.savannahnow.com/jamie-parker/2011-04-07/fiery-wreck-explosion-i-95-bryan-
county-kills-one 
http://www.wtoc.com/Global/story.asp?S=14400509 
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PHMSA ID: I-2011050227 
Loading or Unloading Lines 
RUPTURED VALVE. 400 GALLONS 
SPILLED INTO STORE PARKING 
LOT. FUEL WAS CONTAINED IN 
PARKING LOT WITH SAND BAGS & 
A SMALL DITCH. 
Yes 400 LGA 
 
http://www.bayoubuzz.com/louisiana-news/223972-suv-hits-tanker-resulting-in-leak-
evacuation 
PHMSA ID: E-2011050005 
Manway or Dome Cover Bent 
1. Around 6:30 PM tanker trailer was 
traveling South on 440 in the middle 
lane.  2. A car tried to exit from the 
far left lane  the third lane  for route 
9.  3. The car trying to exit struck the 
front of the truck  causing it to lose 
control and rollover. 
Yes 3000 LGA 
 
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/04/tanker_accident_shuts_440_for.html 
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/04/10/n-j-roadway-reopens-after-tanker-crashes-spills-
fuel/ 
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/04/10/n-j-roadway-reopens-after-tanker-crashes-spills-fuel/ 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BL_P9imIass 
PHMSA ID: E-2011050188 
Driver was is in a highway accident in which he rearended a truck. The 
driver's truck caught on fire and burned the whole truck. In result from 
the truck burning  a hole was  made in front of the trailer which released 
material. the hole in the trailer was 2'x3' on the top of the trailer. 500 gal. 
of material was released into retention pond. 18 000 gal. of contaminated 
water was pumped from the retention pond. 
Yes 500 LGA 
 
http://www.centredaily.com/2011/04/16/2652125/ethanol-tanker-crash-kills-
1.html#ixzz1gjyEezQv 
http://www.wjactv.com/news/news/1-dead-after-fiery-semitruck-crash/nDbYZ/ 
http://www.centredaily.com/2011/04/16/2652125/ethanol-tanker-crash-kills-1.html 
 
http://www.fox8tv.com/News/NewsDetails.asp?NewsID=5678  
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Incident ID: E-2011050220 
Tank 
Shell; 
Tank 
Shell 
Cracke
d; 
Crushe
d 
While on the Off Ramp making a sharp Left-Hand 
Turn  the Rig left the road on the right side crossing 
the right side shoulder  crashing through the guardrail  
down the grassy slope into a small gulley and rolled 
over.  The tanker shell was cracked appox. five(5) feet 
oppening the front two(2) compartments  and was the 
source of the released fuel.  The rear three(3) 
compartments had a hole drilled for pumping out 
product.  All Compartments had product pumped out 
into a rescue trailer; totaling 5 550 USG.  Recovered 
spilled fuel was 130 USG from a drip pan and vaccum 
pump by outside clean-up contractor. 
Ye
s 
45
2 
L
G
A 
 
http://bangordailynews.com/2011/04/15/news/bangor/fuel-truck-accident-snarls-traffic-
on-i-395-in-bangor/ 
http://bangordailynews.com/2011/04/15/news/bangor/fuel-truck-accident-snarls-traffic-
on-i-395-in-bangor/ 
http://bangordailynews.com/2011/04/15/news/bangor/fuel-truck-accident-snarls-traffic-
on-i-395-in-bangor/  
PHMSA ID: I-2011060462 
Manway or 
Dome 
Cover 
Leaked 
the truck had left the road way and came to rest on 
its top in the median. The trailer came to rest on 
the passenger side. The trailer was leaking out of 
the 1st compartment around the dome lid.  
Also the compartment #1 dome lid was secured 
until the trailer could be off loaded.  
Ye
s 
219
0 
L
G
A 
http://www.4029tv.com/r/27569673/detail.html 
http://www.4029tv.com/image/27569685/detail.html  
http://www.4029tv.com/slideshow/news/27569691/detail.html 
http://www.4029tv.com/slideshow/news/27569691/detail.html 
PHMSA ID I-2011060271 
Piping 
or 
Fittings 
Torn 
Off or 
Damage
d 
WAS STRUCK HARD FROM BEHIND. THIS 
VIOLENT REAR-END COLLISION 
RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE TO 
OUR TRAILER (CONSIDERED A TOTAL 
LOSS BY ZURICH  NA INSURANCE 
COMPANY).  DAMAGE TO THE CARGO 
TANK TRAILER WAS ALSO CAUSED BY THE 
FORCE OF THE COLLSION FROM BEHIND.  
THE FORCE OF THE COLLISION RIPPED 
THE DELIVERY PIPING FROM THE 
BOTTOM OF THE CARGO TANK. THIS LEFT 
Ye
s 
0.12
5 
L
G
A 
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A HOLE ABOUT 4  ACROSS AT THE 
BOTTOM OF THE CARGO TANK.  
 
SOME VAPOR FROM THE RESIDUAL ACID 
CAME OUT OF THE HOLE BEFORE IT WAS 
TEMPORARILY PATCHED BY THE 
EMERGENCY RESPONDERS (ADJACENT TO 
HARRISON COUNTY WHERE THE 
COLLISION OCCURRED)  TOLD ME THAT 
ANY ACID THAT MIGHT DRIPPED FROM 
THE HOLE WAS  VERY MINIMAL.   
http://www.hsconnect.com/?page=photos.largeImage&showlayout=0&loc=news&photoS
yndDir=&photo=559180_1.jpg&cutline=ACCIDENT%20CLOSES%20ROUTE%2022%2
0%E2%80%94%20Emergency%20squads%20were%20at%20the%20scene%20of%20an%2
0multi-
vehicle%20accident%20near%20Cadiz%20that%20closed%20down%20U.S.%20Route%20
22%20Thursday%20and%20resulted%20in%20three%20people%20being%20transported%
20to%20hospitals.%20%20-%20Robert%20DeFrank%3Cbr%20%2F%3E 
http://www.hsconnect.com/page/content.detail/id/559180/Multi-vehicle-crash-closes--U-
S--Route-22-in-Harrison.html?nav=5010 
PHMSA ID E-2011060384 
Tank Shell Gouged or Cut 
Vehicle #1 Catapulted across the median 
and crashed into the left side of our 
trailer ending at the traier tandems. The 
force of impact broke the trailer tandums 
and subframe from the rear of the tank.  
A crack about 2 feet long 1/2 inch wide 
appeared and Diesel fuel leaked out onto 
the shoulder of the roadway.  
Yes 2145 LGA 
 
http://www.kpho.com/story/14896487/sr-347-reopened-after-fuel-leak-forces-closure-5-
21-2011?clienttype=printable 
http://www.myfoxphoenix.com/dpp/traffic/truck-leaks-fuel-after-3-vehicle-crash-on-
sr347-05212011 
 
http://www.myfoxphoenix.com/dpp/traffic/truck-leaks-fuel-after-3-vehicle-crash-on-
sr347-05212011  
http://www.abc15.com/dpp/news/region_central_southern_az/maricopa/dps%3A-fuel-
leaks-from-truck-after-crash-in-maricopa 
http://www.myfoxphoenix.com/dpp/traffic/truck-leaks-fuel-after-3-vehicle-crash-on-
sr347-05212011 
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PHMSA ID E-2011070071 
Bolts or Nuts Leaked 
vehicle side swiped our trailer  hitting the 
right side. Damaging the ladder and struck 
the internal valve.  The Internal valve 
flange leaked a drop of product once a 
minute. There the flange bolts were 
tighten and the leak stopped.  
Yes 0.046875 LGA 
 
http://www.kfdm.com/articles/chemical-42972-city-rose.html 
PHMSA ID I-2011060086 
Manway 
or Dome 
Cover 
Leake
d 
The chassis started to jackknife and the unit rolled over.  
Material began to leak from the dome cover.  The leak 
was stopped when Emergency Responders tightened 
the dog ears.  Unit was uprighted and placed on a flat 
bed. 
Ye
s 
6
0 
L
G
A 
 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/05/23/I-270-remains-closed.html, 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/05/23/I-270-remains-closed.html  
PHMSA ID I-2011060459 
Loading 
or 
Unloadin
g Lines 
Torn Off 
or 
Damaged 
and struck the loading/unloading lines on the 
trailer. Approximately 264 gallons of gasoline was 
released. Patriot Environmental responded to the 
scene and handled the clean-up. No further 
environmental impact is anticipated. I have attached 
a copy of the CHP accident report. 
Ye
s 
26
4 
L
G
A 
http://abclocal.go.com/kabc/story?section=resources/traffic&id=8153570,  
http://abclocal.go.com/kabc/story?section=resources/traffic&id=8153570 
PHMSA ID I-2011080233 
Cover Leaked 
INITIALLY  THE UNIT WAS UPRIGHT  BUT 
BECAUSE OF THE SOFT GROUND IT SUNK IN 
AND THE WEIGHT OF THE 
TRACTOR/TRAILER AND THE LOAD OF FUEL 
ROLLED THE UNIT OVER.                                                                    
THE DEP  LOCAL FIRE DEPT AND MARITIME 
ENERGY'S SPILL RESPONSE ASSIST TEAM 
WERE CALLED TO THE SCENE.  A MINIMAL 
AMOUNT OF FUEL OIL WAS SPILLED.                                                                                                     
THE CLEANUP OF SPILL WAS DIRECTED BY 
THE FIRE DEP AND DEP WITH THE USE OF 
ABSORBENT PADS.  THE OFF-LOADING OF 
UNIT WAS DIRECTED BY THE DEP WITH THE 
USE OF ADDITIONAL TRACTOR/TRAILER ON 
THE SCENE AND OFF-LOADING EQUIPMENT. 
Yes 50 LGA 
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http://bangordailynews.com/2011/05/28/news/fuel-truck-driver-commended-for-bravery-
after-near-collision-on-route-1/  
http://bangordailynews.com/2011/05/27/news/oil-tanker-rolls-over-on-route-1-in-
warren/  
http://bangordailynews.com/2011/05/28/news/fuel-truck-driver-commended-for-bravery-
after-near-collision-on-route-1/  
PHMSA ID E-2011060427 
Basic Material Leaked 
the truck to rollover  and  damaged the 
compartments of the trailer.   
Approximately 5 000 gallons of gasoline were 
released to the loose bedrock area atop the 
ledge where the incident occurred.   
Yes 5000 LGA 
 
http://www.fiddleheadfocus.com/story/gas-tanker-truck-overturns-driver-injured,  
http://www.fiddleheadfocus.com/story/gas-tanker-truck-overturns-driver-injured 
http://www.fiddleheadfocus.com/story/gas-tanker-truck-overturns-driver-injured 
http://www.fiddleheadfocus.com/story/gas-tanker-truck-overturns-driver-injured 
http://www.fiddleheadfocus.com/story/gas-tanker-truck-overturns-driver-injured 
PHMSA ID: I-2011070473 
Tank Shell Gouged or Cut 
failed to continue on the road and went 
through the curve taking out a 
powerline pole andthen went into a 
heavily wooded area where he struck a 
large tree and several others. It has 
been speculated that during this time 
that the fuel tank was ruptured and 
caught fire and possibly the 
trailertanker itself. environment. 
Remediation efforts were coordinated 
with the NYDepartment of 
Conservation representative Tom Hall. 
The National Response Center was also 
notified  (NRC#979616) 
Yes 736.25 LGA 
 
http://www.wivb.com/dpp/news/orleans/Driver-dies-after-tanker-explodes,  
http://thedailynewsonline.com/news/article_317ef278-9707-11e0-b9bb-001cc4c03286.html  
http://www.13wham.com/Photo.aspx?content_id=25b4ebdf-a92d-4849-bc8e-
d2cee18c8551&i=2 
http://www.13wham.com/Photo.aspx?content_id=25b4ebdf-a92d-4849-bc8e-
d2cee18c8551&i=1 
http://www.13wham.com/Photo.aspx?content_id=25b4ebdf-a92d-4849-bc8e-
d2cee18c8551 
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http://rochesterhomepage.net/fulltext/?nxd_id=256487,  
PHMSA ID I-2011080235 
Cover Leaked 
IMPACTED THE CENTER MEDIAN BEFORE 
ROLLING OVER. APPROXIMATELY 15 
GALOONS OF GASOLINE WAS ABLE TO LEAK 
OUT OF THE DOME LIDS ON THE TRAILER 
BEFORE IT COULD BE UP RIGHTED.  
Yes 15 LGA 
 
http://www.azfamily.com/traffic/Tanker-wreck-fuel-spill-closes-I-17-at-Dunlap-
124849949.html 
http://www.azfamily.com/traffic/Tanker-wreck-fuel-spill-closes-I-17-at-Dunlap-
124849949.html 
http://www.azfamily.com/traffic/Tanker-wreck-fuel-spill-closes-I-17-at-Dunlap-
124849949.html 
http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/07/01/20110701phoenix-tanker-crash-
interstate-17.html,  
http://www.azfamily.com/news/local/Tanker-wreck-fuel-spill-closes-I-17-at-Dunlap-
124849949.html?gallery=y&img=0&c=y 
http://www.azfamily.com/news/local/Tanker-wreck-fuel-spill-closes-I-17-at-Dunlap-
124849949.html?gallery=y&img=0&c=y#/news/local/Tanker-wreck-fuel-spill-closes-I-17-
at-Dunlap-124849949.html?gallery=y&img=7&c=y  
http://www.azfamily.com/news/local/Tanker-wreck-fuel-spill-closes-I-17-at-Dunlap-
124849949.html?gallery=y&img=0&c=y#/news/local/Tanker-wreck-fuel-spill-closes-I-17-
at-Dunlap-124849949.html?gallery=y&img=8&c=y  
PHMSA ID I-2011080276 
Tank 
Shell; 
Inner 
Packagin
g 
Punctured; 
Leaked 
the tanker started over as it was traveling around 
a curve in the road.  The tanker rolled two and 
one half times resting on the driver side of the 
truck/tanker. The tanker was punctured in two 
places and was spilling gasoline out of the 
bottom puncture and no product was coming 
out of the puncture on the passenger side as it 
was lying with that side up.  Product was also 
leaking out of the void holes between 
compartments 3 and 4.   
Ye
s 
170
2 
L
G
A 
http://www.maysville-online.com/news/local/article_8bc6f38c-acda-11e0-a341-
001cc4c002e0.html  
http://www.kentuckystatepolice.org/cve/regions/press/2011/cve5_pr07_13_11.htm 
http://www.kentuckystatepolice.org/cve/regions/press/2011/cve5_pr07_13_11.htm 
http://www.maysville-online.com/news/local/article_e2716b7c-acb7-11e0-9573-
001cc4c002e0.html 
http://www.maysville-online.com/news/local/article_8bc6f38c-acda-11e0-a341-
001cc4c002e0.html  
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http://www.maysville-online.com/news/local/article_8bc6f38c-acda-11e0-a341-
001cc4c002e0.html  
http://www.maysville-online.com/news/local/article_8bc6f38c-acda-11e0-a341-
001cc4c002e0.html 
http://www.maysville-online.com/news/local/article_8bc6f38c-acda-11e0-a341-
001cc4c002e0.html 
http://www.maysville-online.com/news/local/article_8bc6f38c-acda-11e0-a341-
001cc4c002e0.html 
http://www.maysville-online.com/news/local/article_8bc6f38c-acda-11e0-a341-
001cc4c002e0.html 
PHMSA ID I-2011090537  
Tank Shell Punctured 
NO POLICE REPORT HAS BEEN ISSUED 
AS OF YET.  TRAVELING NORTH ON RT 
1 SAUGUS. DRIVER APPEARED TO 
SWERVE TO THE LEFT TO AVOID 
SOMETHING THEN TURNED RIGHT. 
TRUCK ROLLED OVER  HIT THE 
GUARD RAIL AND THEN IGNITED. 
Yes 500 LGA 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2018162/Gas-tanker-driver-killed-fireball-flipped-
truck-explodes-sets-houses-ablaze.html 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2018162/Gas-tanker-driver-killed-fireball-flipped-
truck-explodes-sets-houses-ablaze.html  
http://www.personalinjurylawyerbostonma.com/2011/07/massachusetts-tanker-causes-
major-accident-explosion.shtml,  
http://news.bostonherald.com/news/regional/view.bg?&articleid=1353785&format=&pag
e=1&listingType=Loc#articleFull  
http://www.bostoncaraccidentlawyerblog.com/2011/07/blaze_in_saugus_caused_by_cras_
1.html 
PHMSA ID I-2011100330  
    
DRIVER JUST STARTED HIS SHIFT. HE LOADED AT 
THE VANCOUVER FACILITY AND WAS GOING TO 
TOPPENISH. AT MP-34-I-84E WHEN HE BLACKED 
OUT. THIS CAUSED THE ACCIDENT. HE WAS TAKEN 
TO PROVIDENCE MEDICAL HOSPITAL - NO INJURY. 
Yes 700 LGA 
http://www.oregon.gov/OSP/NEWSRL/news/07_25_2011_i84_mp34_tanker_crash.shtm
l 
http://www.flashalertnewswire.net/images/news/2011-
07/1002/46345/072411.i84mp34.4.JPG 
http://www.flashalertnewswire.net/images/news/2011-
07/1002/46345/072411.i84mp34.6.JPG 
http://www.flashalertnewswire.net/images/news/2011-
07/1002/46345/072411.i84mp34.7.JPG 
http://www.columbian.com/photos/2011/jul/24/26497/  
 354 
 
http://www.columbian.com/news/2011/jul/24/truck-crash-closes-eastbound-i-84-
multnomah-falls/ , 
http://www.kptv.com/story/15138389/tanker-truck-crash-shuts-down-i-84  
http://www.kptv.com/story/15138389/tanker-truck-crash-shuts-down-i-84  
http://www.kptv.com/story/15138389/tanker-truck-crash-shuts-down-i-84  
www.kptv.com/story/15138389/tanker-truck-crash-shuts-down-i-84  
http://www.theoutlookonline.com/news/story.php?story_id=131163681549944500  
PHMSA ID E-2011080542 
Bod
y 
Torn 
Off or 
Damage
d 
entering a left hand curve and was traveling too fast to 
negotiate the curve and rolled the tractor trailer to the 
right side of roadway   
Trailer skidded striking a concrete barrier causing the 
body of the tanker to be ripped open spilling approx 
2465 gallons onto the right side of the roadway ditch.  
Ye
s 
246
5 
L
G
A 
 
http://www.summitdaily.com/article/20110828/NEWS/110829801,  
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_18773662, 
http://www.9news.com/news/article/215891/339/Tanker-rolls-over-spills-diesel-fuel-into-
Clear-Creek- 
http://www.9news.com/news/article/215891/339/Tanker-rolls-over-spills-diesel-fuel-into-
Clear-Creek- 
http://www.9news.com/news/article/215891/339/Tanker-rolls-over-spills-diesel-fuel-into-
Clear-Creek- 
PHMSA ID I-2011100460 
; ;  ; ;  
DRIVER PULLED TO RIGHT TO AVOID ACCIDENT 
AND GOT HUNG UP ON GUARDRAIL RESULTING IN 
ROLLOVER AND SPILL.  
Yes 5393 LGA 
 
http://www.wtnh.com/dpp/news/litchfield_cty/tanker-crash-closes-route-8-thomaston, 
http://www.countytimes.com/articles/2011/09/14/news/doc4e70f0e95a276072935673.txt
?viewmode=fullstory  
PHMSA ID I-2011090520 
Manway 
or Dome 
Cover; 
Tank 
Shell 
Rippe
d or 
Torn; 
Rippe
d or 
Torn 
TRUCK WENT OVER ON DRIVER SIDE.  THE 
TANK WAS RIPPED OFF OF THE FRAME 
AND THE DOME LIDS WERE ALL BROKE 
AND AN APPROX 8 INCH HOLE WAS 
RIPPED IN THE TANK  
Ye
s 
2700 
LG
A 
 
 355 
 
http://www.durangoherald.com/article/20110918/NEWS01/709189917/Cleanup-
continues-after-crash-on-US-550,  
http://durangoherald.com/article/20110917/NEWS01/709169900/0/Sports03/Driver-
killed-in-US-Highway-550-fuel-spill  
PHMSA ID I-2011100271 
Manway or Dome Cover Leaked 
ACCIDENT WHERE #2 
BROADSIDED #1 & CAUSED 
THE TRUCK & TRAILER TO 
FLIP - CAUSING A SPILL. 
Yes 225 LGA 
 
http://www.heartlandconnection.com/news/story.aspx?id=664508#.Tw3-64FZldg,  
http://www.kirksvilledailyexpress.com/features/x1804873571/Tanker-wrecks-on-Highway-
6-in-Adair-County?photo=0 
PHMSA  ID I-2011110195 
Tank Shell Ripped or Torn 
THE VEHICLE ROLLING OVER 1 
COMPLETE TIME AND LEAVING 
THE ROADWAY. THE VEHICLE 
ROLLED OVER THE GUARDRAIL 
AND DOWN A STEEP 
EMBANKMENT OVER VERY 
ROCKY TERRAIN. THE ROCKS 
PUNCTURED AND TORE A HOLE 
IN THE SHELL OF THE CARGO 
TANK  
Yes 2940 LGA 
 
http://www.nbc11news.com/home/headlines/BREAKING_NEWS__Semi_Truck_Rolls_
near_Gateway_132476873.html 
http://www.nbc11news.com/home/headlines/BREAKING_NEWS__Semi_Truck_Rolls_
near_Gateway_132476873.html 
http://denver.cbslocal.com/2011/10/26/driver-ticketed-after-tanker-crash-near-gateway/ 
http://www.krextv.com/news/around-the-region/Semi-Rollover-Accident-Near-Gateway-
132486023.html?m=y&smobile=y 
http://www.krextv.com/news/around-the-region/Semi-Rollover-Accident-Near-Gateway-
132486023.html?m=y&smobile=y 
http://www.krextv.com/news/around-the-region/Semi-Rollover-Accident-Near-Gateway-
132486023.html?m=y&smobile=y 
http://www.krextv.com/news/around-the-region/Semi-Rollover-Accident-Near-Gateway-
132486023.html?m=y&smobile=y 
http://www.krextv.com/news/around-the-region/Semi-Rollover-Accident-Near-Gateway-
132486023.html?m=y&smobile=y 
 
